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By global standards, the U.S. Supreme Court is unusual in a number of  
respects, but one of its most distinctive characteristics is its reluctance to engage in 
comparative constitutional analysis. Much has been said on the normative question 
of whether and in what ways the Court ought to make use of foreign constitutional 
jurisprudence. Rarely, however, do scholars broach the underlying empirical 
question of why some courts make greater use of foreign law than others. 
To identify the causes of comparativism, a behind-the-scenes investigation was 
conducted of four leading courts in East Asia: the Japanese Supreme Court, the 
Korean Constitutional Court, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, and the Hong 
Kong Court of Final Appeal. The results of this investigation highlight the crucial 
role of institutional and resource constraints in shaping judicial behavior but also 
pose an unexpected challenge to traditional conceptions of the role and function of 
constitutional courts.  
Evidence from interviews conducted with numerous justices, clerks, and senior 
administrators suggests that a combination of mutually reinforcing factors creates 
the conditions necessary for comparativism to thrive. The first factor is institutional 
capacity. A court that lacks institutional mechanisms for learning about foreign 
law, such as the recruitment of law clerks with foreign legal expertise or the use of 
researchers who specialize in foreign law, is unlikely to make more than sporadic 
use of foreign law. The second factor is legal education. Even the most elaborate of 
institutional mechanisms for facilitating comparativism is unlikely to be effective 
unless it is backed by a system of legal education that produces an adequate supply 
of lawyers with both an aptitude and appetite for comparativism.  
Investigation of the reasons for which courts engage in comparativism also  
reveals a hidden underlying phenomenon of judicial diplomacy. Unlike other 
judicial practices such as textualism or originalism, comparativism is not merely a 
means by which judges perform legal and adjudicative functions; it can also be a 
form of diplomatic activity. When constitutional courts demonstrate mastery of 
foreign law or host foreign judges, their goals may not consist exclusively, or even 
primarily, of writing stronger opinions or winning over domestic audiences. They 
may also be competing with one another for international influence or pursuing 
foreign policy objectives, such as promotion of the rule of law and judicial independ-
ence in other countries. The concept of judicial diplomacy helps to explain why 
constitutional courts engage in a number of practices that are only tenuously related 
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to the act of adjudication. Although the U.S. Supreme Court rarely practices 
constitutional comparativism, it is an active practitioner of judicial diplomacy in 
other forms.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICAN  
AND GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
By global standards, American constitutionalism is unusual—or, as some 
prefer to say, exceptional1—in many respects. Much of what makes it so 
atypical can be traced directly to the U.S. Constitution itself. The Constitu-
tion is very old. It is also very rarely amended. The average constitution has 
a 38% chance of being revised in any given year and is replaced every 
nineteen years.2 The U.S. Constitution, by contrast, is the oldest surviving 
constitution in the world.3 It has lasted twelve times longer than the average 
constitution, and it has not been amended in over twenty years.4  
 
1 See Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme 
Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1405-11 (2006) (discussing various 
features of American constitutional law that “explicitly reflect the extent to which America is an 
exceptional nation, different from any other,” and describing the Constitution itself as “the focal 
point of American exceptionalism,” “our holiest of holies,” and “our ark of the covenant”); David 
S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
762, 854 (2012) (discussing the view that the U.S. Constitution “lies at the very heart of an 
‘American creed of exceptionalism,’ which combines a belief that the United States occupies a 
unique position in the world with a commitment to the qualities that set the United States apart 
from other countries”). 
2 See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 101, 129 (2009) (calculating a mean “predicted amendment rate” of 
0.38 per year and a median lifespan of nineteen years for the world’s constitutions). 
3 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 852-53. 
4 The most recent amendment, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, was adopted in 1992 and 
stands as an object lesson in the difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution: over two hundred 
years elapsed between its proposal and its ratification. See David S. Law & David McGowan, 
There Is Nothing Pragmatic About Originalism, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 86, 93 & n.34 
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Whether one considers these characteristics of longevity and stability 
praiseworthy—and some do not5—they have as a purely empirical matter 
rendered the Constitution increasingly out of sync with the global mainstream. 
Since World War II, constitutional drafting around the world has become 
characterized by the widespread adoption of a core set of generic constitu-
tional rights that extend beyond the negative civil and political liberties 
found in the Bill of Rights.6 The U.S. Constitution, a relic of the late 
eighteenth century, has not partaken of these trends. Instead, it omits a 
significant number of provisions that have become highly popular, while 
including others that have become highly atypical.7 
 
(2007) (using the history of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to illustrate the difficulty of 
adopting even the most popular of constitutional amendments). 
5 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 9 (2006) 
(arguing that the U.S. Constitution has become “significantly dysfunctional” to the point of 
warranting a constitutional convention); LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION: 23 
PROPOSALS TO REVITALIZE OUR CONSTITUTION AND MAKE AMERICA A FAIRER COUNTRY 4-5 
(2007) (bemoaning the “political ossification” and “grotesque” inequities that have resulted from 
failure to engage in more than “insufficient tinkering” with the Constitution over the last two 
centuries); Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (dubbing the 
U.S. Bill of Rights “a late eighteenth-century constitution surrounded by twenty-first-century 
ones, a grandfather clock in a shop window full of digital timepieces”), in AMERICAN EXCEP-
TIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 11 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
6 See, e.g., Philip Alston, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights (enumerating a 
“core set of civil and political rights which is reflected almost without fail” in new national constitu-
tions and international human rights instruments alike), in PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (Philip Alston ed., 1999); David 
S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
1163, 1200-01 (2011) (identifying the twenty-five most “generic” rights-related constitutional 
provisions in the world, and documenting their rise in popularity from 1946 through 2006); 
Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on 
Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 501 (2000) (observing that most post-war 
constitutions combine distinctive elements with a “common core of human rights provisions that 
are strikingly similar”). 
7 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 804-06 (identifying the most “generic” rights-related 
provisions found in constitutions, and documenting the extent to which the U.S. Constitution 
both omits highly popular provisions and includes highly unpopular provisions); see also, e.g., 
Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 395, 399 (2008) (noting that the sheer age and “correspondingly 
anachronistic concerns” of the Constitution, and “its comparatively few enumerated rights,” 
“especially of a substantive rather than a procedural nature,” all stand in “marked contrast to [the] 
paradigmatic post-1945, rights-protecting constitutions” prevalent elsewhere in the world); 
Ignatieff, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that the U.S. Constitution is atypical in its omission of 
socioeconomic and welfare rights, its phrasing of rights in negative terms, and its inclusion of 
rights that “do not feature in other democratic systems,” such as the right to bear arms); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees? (deeming the 
U.S. Constitution “distinctive” in its omission of social and economic rights), in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 90, 92. 
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Other odd features of American constitutionalism are attributable not to 
the Constitution, but rather to the Supreme Court. Interpretive and 
argumentative approaches popular in the United States barely register in 
other countries, and vice versa. For example, originalism has become a 
fixture of judicial, academic, and even popular debate in the United States8 
but, as a former Canadian Supreme Court justice has observed, it is “simply 
not the focus, or even a topic, of debate elsewhere.”9  
As distinctive as the presence of originalism, however, is the absence of 
comparativism.10 It is difficult to identify a national high court that pays less 
attention to foreign constitutional jurisprudence than the U.S. Supreme 
Court.11 Indeed, the Court’s reluctance to engage foreign courts in a “global 
 
8 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2009) (describing 
“the elevated space originalism occupies within American legal and political culture”). 
9 Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of 
the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 33 (1998) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s “international 
impact” has diminished due in part to its preoccupation with originalism); see also, e.g., Greene, supra 
note 8, at 3-6 (discussing the “global rejection of American-style originalism”); Ozan O. Varol, The 
Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1239, 1242, 1262-77 
(2011) (noting the “prevailing view” that “originalism is primarily an American obsession,” and 
discussing at length the rare counterexample of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s use of originalist 
reasoning to defend a strict separation of church and state). Although it is an overstatement to say 
that originalism is not discussed anywhere else in the world, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s assessment is 
not terribly far off the mark. Singapore, Malaysia, and to some extent Australia are rare examples of 
countries other than the United States where originalist arguments are frequently encountered. See 
PO JEN YAP, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE IN COMMON LAW ASIA (forthcoming 2015) (manu-
script at 262-66) (on file with author) (discussing the espousal of “hard originalism” in Singapore); 
Yvonne Tew, Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 780, 783-84 (2014) 
(listing Malaysia, Turkey, Singapore, Australia, and the United States as countries where some form 
of originalist methodology has taken hold). 
10 See, e.g., Ignatieff, supra note 5, at 1, 8-10, 14 (identifying “legal isolationism,” or the unwill-
ingness of American judges to consider “foreign human rights precedents,” as a form of “American 
exceptionalism” in the area of human rights, and observing that “[i]n the messianic American 
moral project, America teaches the meaning of liberty to the world; it does not learn from 
others”); Frank I. Michelman, Integrity-Anxiety? (“[E]xceptional reluctance by the American 
judiciary to pay heed to foreign constitutional law may seem . . . both the toughest to explain and 
the most embarrassing of all the types of U.S. exceptionalism in the field of human rights . . . .”), 
in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 241, 244. 
11 See, e.g., MICHAL BOBEK, COMPARATIVE REASONING IN EUROPEAN SUPREME 
COURTS passim (2013) (canvassing the ways in which high courts throughout Europe make use of 
foreign law); RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARA-
TIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW passim (2014) (discussing the frequency with which the Canadian 
Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court, among others, cite foreign law); BASIL 
MARKESINIS & JÖRG FEDTKE, JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEW SOURCE 
OF INSPIRATION? 61-108 (2006) (surveying judicial use of foreign law in Italy, France, England, 
Germany, Canada, and South Africa); THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITU-
TIONAL JUDGES passim (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013) (surveying the use 
of foreign precedent by constitutional courts in sixteen countries, including the United States); 
Ursula Bentele, Mining for Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa’s Experience with Comparative 
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judicial dialogue”12 on matters of common concern has itself become an 
object of criticism from both foreign jurists13 and members of the Court 
 
Constitutional Law, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 227, 244 (2009) (reporting that over half of the 
South African Constitutional Court’s decisions over the preceding fourteen years cited foreign law, 
and that “the justices have the benefit of up to five clerks selected from applicants around the 
world”); Brun-Otto Bryde, The Constitutional Judge and the International Constitutionalist Dialogue 
(noting on the basis of personal experience as a member of the German Constitutional Court that 
foreign decisions are consulted “extensively,” and that it is standard for the preparatory materials 
relied upon by the Court to incorporate any relevant comparative literature that is available in 
German), in JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEW SOURCE OF INSPIRATION?, 
supra, at 295, 297-98; Martin Gelter & Mathias M. Siems, Language, Legal Origins, and Culture 
Before the Courts: Cross-Citations Between Supreme Courts in Europe, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 215, 
268 (2013) (concluding on the basis of statistical analysis of private law and criminal law decisions 
by ten European high courts that citation of foreign law “is not an isolated phenomenon in Europe 
but happens on a regular basis”); Johanna Kalb, The Judicial Role in New Democracies: A Strategic 
Account of Comparative Citation, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 423, 424 & n.5, 425 (2013) (citing Uganda, 
India, South Africa, Japan, Namibia, France, Taiwan, and Hungary as examples of countries where 
courts frequently consider foreign and international law in the course of their deliberations); 
David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523, 
558-61 (2011) (documenting the Taiwanese Constitutional Court’s extensive behind-the-scenes 
usage of foreign law); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 131, 135 (2006) (observing that “[c]onsultation of foreign law seems to be the rule, not the 
exception” when national courts engage in constitutional interpretation); Cheryl Saunders, Judicial 
Engagement with Comparative Law (“The practice of referring to foreign constitutional experience 
is growing, in terms not only of the number of jurisdictions that engage in it but also of the range 
of comparators on which courts draw.”), in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 571, 574, 586 
(Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011); Li-ann Thio, Beyond the “Four Walls” in an Age of 
Transnational Judicial Conversations: Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudication in 
Malaysia and Singapore, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 428, 431-32, 497-518 (2006) (noting a “steady 
traffic of foreign cases in both Malaysian and Singaporean courts”); Transcript of Interview of U.S. 
Supreme Court Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, April 10, 2009, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 820 (2009) 
[hereinafter Justice Ginsburg Interview] (expressing hope that the Court’s reluctance to “take account 
of international law and . . . refer to decisions of other tribunals” is a “passing phase,” and that the 
more accepting attitudes of the early nineteenth century toward judicial usage of foreign law will 
return); cf. Brian Flanagan & Sinéad Ahern, Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law: A Survey 
of Common Law Supreme Court Judges, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 12-14 (2011) (noting a “paucity of 
judges who are on record as sceptics about the use of foreign law,” and reporting that, out of forty-
three supreme court judges surveyed from common law jurisdictions, twenty-three responded that 
they “regularly” referred to foreign law in rights-related cases, while none claimed to avoid foreign 
law altogether). 
12 E.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (2004) (positing a 
“growing dialogue” among judges “around the world on the issues that arise before them”); Law & 
Chang, supra note 11, at 527, 535-68 (critiquing on both conceptual and empirical grounds the use 
of the “dialogue” metaphor to describe the judicial practice of citing foreign law). 
13 See L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 9, at 38-39 (observing that the Supreme Court’s failure to 
engage with relevant jurisprudence from other courts decreases the relevance and appeal of its own 
decisions to other courts); Michelman, supra note 10, at 241 (observing that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has “earn[ed] itself a mildly pariah status” by standing “noticeably aloof” from the practice among 
judiciaries in democratic countries of “treating each other’s judgments as required reading”). 
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itself.14 Although references to foreign law in a succession of high-profile 
constitutional decisions toward the tail end of the Rehnquist Court attracted 
tremendous attention,15 the actual number of constitutional cases in which 
the Court cites foreign law remains very low in absolute terms and may 
even be declining. From 1986 through 2010, less than 0.3% of opinions in 
constitutional cases—majority, concurring, and dissenting alike—cited 
foreign case law.16 Moreover, all of the citations that did occur date back to 
 
14 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]Kind”: The Value 
of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 575, 584 (2005) 
(arguing that it is no more problematic for judges to consider foreign law than to consult treatises 
or legal scholarship, and listing various questions on which “comparative law inquiry could prove 
enlightening or valuable”); Justice Ginsburg Interview, supra note 11, at 820; Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 45 FED. LAW. 20, 
20-21 (1998) (“[O]ther common law courts which have struggled with the same basic constitutional 
questions . . . have something to teach us . . . . Our flexibility, our ability to borrow ideas from 
other legal systems, is what will enable us to remain progressive, with systems that are able to cope 
with a rapidly shrinking world.”); William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts - Comparative Remarks 
(“[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United 
States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own 
deliberative process. The United States courts, and legal scholarship in our own country generally, 
have been somewhat laggard in relying on comparative law and decisions of other countries.”), in 
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN–AMERICAN 
SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993); Jeffrey Toobin, Swing 
Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW 
YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, 50 (“If we are asking the rest of the world to adopt our idea of 
freedom, it does seem to me that there may be some mutuality there, that other nations and other 
peoples can define and interpret freedom in a way that's at least instructive to us . . . . Liberty isn’t 
for export only.” (quoting Justice Kennedy)); Stephen Breyer & Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justices, 
Supreme Court of the United States, A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign Law for 
American Constitutional Adjudication, Discussion at the American University Washington 
College of Law ( Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/ 
2005/050113.cfm (disclosing Justice Breyer’s view that it is “important” for the Justices to show 
other courts that “we read their opinions”); Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States, The Supreme Court and the New International Law, Address to the 97th Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http:// 
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_04-04-03 (“Ultimately, I believe the 
‘comparativist’ view that several of us have enunciated will carry the day—simply because of the 
enormous value in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar experience of others.”).  
15 See David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 653-57 (2005) (noting 
the controversy over judicial citation of foreign law in constitutional cases decided mostly in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, such as Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003); and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)); see also, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi 
& Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of 
Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 755 (2005) (arguing 
that the importance of the constitutional cases in which the Supreme Court cites foreign law has 
risen over time). 
16 See Angioletta Sperti, United States of America: First Cautious Attempts of Judicial Use of Foreign 
Precedents in the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTI-
TUTIONAL JUDGES, supra note 11, at 393, 405. That figure includes citations to specific foreign 
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the Rehnquist Court; none occurred during the first six years of the Roberts 
Court.17 Nor is there reason to suspect that the U.S. Supreme Court 
routinely consults foreign law in the course of its deliberations without 
revealing that it has done so.18 
 Vast quantities of ink have been spilled over the normative question of 
whether, and in what ways, courts ought to engage with foreign law.19 
 
decisions in concurring opinions but excludes references to international law and non-country-
specific references to foreign practices, such as the “law of nations.” Id. at 395-98; see also Sarah K. 
Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 419-20 (2003) 
(finding “a remarkably low number” of U.S. Supreme Court cases over the preceding decade “in 
which there is even a passing reference to foreign law or legal practice”); David Zaring, The Use of 
Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 297, 299, 
314 (2006) (noting that, in absolute terms, “the Supreme Court uses less foreign law now than it 
has at any other time in its history,” and that “the federal courts as a whole” are not “citing foreign 
tribunals any more frequently now than they were 60 years ago—once the increase in the total 
number of opinions is accounted for”). 
17 See Sperti, supra note 16, at 405; see also Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1119, 1121 (1996) (“[I]n a very few instances in the less-distant past, the United States Supreme 
Court has looked to international ‘human rights’ norms in determining whether certain forms of 
punishment violated our Eighth Amendment . . . . But this approach, however, even within its 
limited scope of application, was short-lived and has now been retired.”). 
18 Although many courts make a habit of researching and considering foreign law without 
divulging in their opinions that they do so, see infra Part I, those courts tend for a variety of 
reasons to be civil law courts. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing citation 
conventions among civil law courts). By contrast, the opinions rendered by common law courts 
tend to be relatively transparent about the sources taken into consideration. See, e.g., Michel 
Bastarache, How Internationalization of the Law Has Materialized in Canada, 59 U. NEW BRUNS-
WICK L.J. 190, 200 (2009) (reporting that “attribution is systematic and considered mandatory” 
whenever the Canadian Supreme Court draws upon foreign jurisprudence); Law & Chang, supra 
note 11, at 533 & nn.33-35 (discussing, and rejecting, the possibility that the Canadian Supreme 
Court “looks habitually to the South African Constitutional Court for guidance and inspiration” 
but simply fails to acknowledge when it has done so); infra text accompanying notes 244-50 
(discussing the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal’s strong norm of fully disclosing all foreign 
authorities considered). But see Roger Alford, Outsourcing Research About Outsourced Authority, 
OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 22, 2006, 10:43 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2006/11/22/outsourcing-research-
about-outsourced-authority, archived at http://perma.cc/VT2L-5WJG (noting the number of 
research requests received by the Library of Congress from “judicial agencies” pertaining to 
foreign election law and constitutional court decisions, and concluding that “even in cases . . . that 
did not cite foreign authority[,] it appears the Court considered foreign experiences in rendering 
its decision, and relied on the Library of Congress to provide that information”). 
19 See, e.g., VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 
17-102 (2010) (advocating a judicial posture of “engagement,” as opposed to “resistance” or 
“convergence,” toward foreign law); MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 11, at 109-65 (proposing 
various criteria for judicial use of foreign law); SLAUGHTER, supra note 12, at 65-103 (arguing that 
participation in a global “community of courts” and “common judicial enterprise” enables judges to 
“learn from one another’s experience and reasoning” and thus improve the quality of their 
decisionmaking); JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”: 
FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS 3 (2012) (arguing that “sometimes it is appropriate for 
our courts to make use of foreign legal materials”); Roger P. Alford, Four Mistakes in the Debate on 
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Rarely, however, have scholars writing in this vein broached the empirical 
question of why some courts make greater use of foreign law than others.20 
The question is not as easily answered as it might appear. Two of the 
explanations that come most readily to mind—namely, isolationism on the 
part of judges, and political controversy over the use of foreign law—prove 
inadequate, especially when courts outside the United States are considered.  
1. The judicial isolationism hypothesis. — It is tempting to think that judicial 
reluctance to use foreign law might simply reflect isolationism or parochialism 
on the part of judges, but there are several problems with this explanation. 
First, it is somewhat circular. To say that some judges refuse to engage with 
foreign law because they are isolationist is akin to saying that some people 
tend to vote Republican because they are Republicans. Labeling behavior is 
not the same as explaining behavior. Even if there are judges who can be 
described in some sense as isolationist, that merely begs the question of why 
they hold such views while others do not.  
Second, the extent to which judges engage with the rest of the world 
does not appear to play a crucial role in determining whether they will 
practice comparativism. Foreign interaction is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for comparativism to occur. On the one hand, comparativism can 
be a routine occurrence even if foreign interaction is restricted, as shown by 
the example of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court.21 On the other hand, 
 
“Outsourcing Authority,” 69 ALB. L. REV. 653, 658-61 (2006) (listing various “heavy-weights” on 
both “the left and right” who have offered arguments for and against judicial citation of foreign 
law, and observing that the debate has “spilled over into contemporary political parlors”); Michael 
Kirby, Transnational Judicial Dialogue, Internationalisation of Law and Australian Judges, 9 MELB. J. INT’L 
L. 171, 184 (2008) (arguing that “[i]nternational engagement” can help judges to “enhance their service 
to their own courts, enlarge their thinking and improve the efficiency of their judicial service”); Law, 
supra note 15, at 653-59 (providing an overview of the heated normative debate over the propriety of the 
Supreme Court’s use of comparative analysis in constitutional cases); Law & Versteeg, supra note 6, at 
1166 (noting the “extensive, if not tiresome, normative debate” over judicial citation of foreign and 
international law, and citing numerous examples); L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 9, at 40 (exhorting the 
U.S. Supreme Court to join in the “global dialogue on human rights and other common legal 
questions” by considering the decisions of courts elsewhere); see also Antonin Scalia, Outsourcing 
American Law: Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation 5 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 152, 
2009), available at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20090820-Chapter2.pdf (lamenting 
that the citation of foreign law in constitutional cases appears to be the “wave of the future”). 
20 See HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 40 (observing that, “despite the tremendous scholarly interest 
in the international migration of constitutional ideas, the actual empirical evidence on the nature and 
scope of reference to foreign law . . . remains thin”); Ryan C. Black & Lee Epstein, (Re-)Setting the 
Scholarly Agenda on Transjudicial Communication, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 791, 792 (2007) (urging 
“empirically minded” scholars to remedy the lack of “rigorous theoretical and empirical research 
devoted to understanding the exchange of law among nations”). 
21 See infra Sections IV.B & IV.E ( juxtaposing the Taiwanese Constitutional Court’s habitual 
usage of foreign law with its heavily restricted opportunities for engagement with foreign courts). 
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frequent interaction with foreign courts and foreign judges does not guarantee 
a thriving practice of comparativism. For evidence of this fact, we need look 
no further than the U.S. Supreme Court, which is well connected to foreign 
courts but nevertheless shuns comparativism. Across the ideological spectrum, 
the Justices are in high demand internationally as both guests and hosts, and 
they do not turn their backs on the rest of the world. Indeed, the Court hosts 
overseas visitors so often that it has developed the equivalent of a diplomatic 
office for dealing with them.22  
Nor is it only the advocates of comparativism who enjoy foreign contact.23 
Even Justices known for their opposition to comparative constitutional 
analysis24 frequently visit foreign courts and participate in international 
conferences.25 As unlikely as it might be for Justice Scalia to cite Taiwanese 
 
22 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 12, at 98-99 (describing “the formation of an actual ‘foreign 
policy’ arm of the U.S. federal judiciary” in the form of the Committee on International Judicial 
Relations); International Judicial Relations, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/ijr/home.nsf/ 
page/intl_activities (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9N7V-8U3F (describing 
the Federal Judicial Center’s international activities and its Office of International Judicial Relations). 
23 See sources cited supra note 14 (quoting Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and O’Connor, and the 
late Chief Justice Rehnquist). In the specific context of treaty interpretation, even Justice Scalia 
has advocated a comparativist approach. See Alford, supra note 19, at 657 & n.23 (citing Olympic 
Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660-61 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
24 See Law, supra note 15, at 655-56 (quoting various opinions by Justices Scalia and Thomas 
critical of foreign law usage); Tim Wu, Foreign Exchange: Should the Supreme Court Care What Other 
Countries Think?, SLATE (Apr. 9, 2004, 5:03 PM), http://slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2004/04/foreign_exchange.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FAD8-XSYR (likening 
the exchanges within the Court over the use of foreign legal materials to “a Punch and Judy show,” 
in which “[j]ust about every time the court cites foreign materials, Scalia and/or Clarence Thomas 
dissent”). But cf. MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 11, at 60-61 (quoting Justice Scalia’s 
discussion of Australian, Canadian, and English election law in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 381-82 (1995), and querying “how . . . a judge who denounces so strongly 
references to foreign law when opposing moves to decriminalise sodomy or restrict the application 
of the death penalty [can] nonetheless invoke foreign examples himself ”); Ryan C. Black et al., 
Upending Global Debate: An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Transnational Law to 
Interpret Domestic Doctrine, 103 GEO. L.J. 1, 32 tbl.4 (2014) (finding empirically that, through 2008, 
Justice Scalia referred to foreign countries and foreign tribunals more often than Justice Breyer); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Brave New Judicial World (noting Justice Scalia’s insistence that American 
judges “look to the national decisions of other treaty parties” when interpreting international 
treaties, and citing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004), as an 
example), in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 277, 283.  
25 See Scalia, supra note 17, at 1122 (“I welcome international conferences . . . in which the 
judges of various countries may exchange useful insights and information . . . .”); Jada F. Smith, 
Royalties and Teaching Help Fill Bank Accounts of Justices, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2014, at 
A16 (noting that, while Justice Breyer “traveled to the most foreign countries,” Justice Scalia “took 
more trips than any of his colleagues in 2013, filing for reimbursement on 28 excursions, including 
one to Peru, one to Germany and two trips to Italy”); Bill Mears, Justices’ Finances Show Overseas 
Travel, Book Royalties, Gifts, CNN.COM (June 20, 2012, 5:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/ 
20/us/scotus-justices-finances, archived at http://perma.cc/LQ7A-SGPT (describing all of the 
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constitutional precedent, for example, he is one of the few jurists from 
anywhere in the world to have visited the Taiwanese Constitutional Court in 
person.26 Indeed, the globetrotting Justice Scalia—who once taught compara-
tive law27—is second only to Justice Breyer in the extent of his foreign 
travel.28 In short, whatever reasons certain members of the Court may have 
for denouncing the use of foreign law in constitutional cases,29 those reasons 
do not stem from a lack of foreign contact or rank xenophobia.  
2. The political controversy hypothesis. — Alternatively, it might be argued 
that the degree of judicial comparativism depends on the degree of political 
controversy surrounding it. Perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis comes from the United States, where judicial aversion to foreign 
law coincides with unusually intense opposition to comparativism.30 Justices 
who dare to cite foreign law have faced calls for impeachment and even 
death threats,31 while nominees to the Court now take care to disavow the 
use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation.32 Meanwhile, a nationwide 
 
justices as “busy travelers,” revealing that Justice Scalia is “neck-and-neck” with Justice Breyer in 
the extent of his overseas travel, and noting Justice Thomas’s participation together with Justice 
Kagan at an international legal conference in Argentina). 
26 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 555. 
27 See Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 3 (1986) (statement of Sen. John 
Warner) (summarizing then-Judge Scalia’s teaching experience at the University of Virginia). 
28 See Smith, supra note 25; Mears, supra note 25 (describing Justice Scalia as “neck-and-neck” 
with Justice Breyer in the extent of his overseas travel, as revealed by their financial disclosure forms). 
29 See Law, supra note 15, at 655-56 (quoting various criticisms leveled by Justice Scalia 
against other members of the Court for citing foreign law). 
30 Compare, e.g., KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103-11 (2004) (describing how 
“judicial flirtation with treaties and international human rights agreements” in the years immedi-
ately following World War II “occasioned a swift and serious political response,” including calls for 
a constitutional amendment to limit the Treaty Power), MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 11, at 
55 (describing the tone of the American debate over judicial comparativism as “surprisingly 
strident”), and Alford, supra note 19, at 664 (noting a “groundswell of opposition” in the United 
States to constitutional comparativism “from various corners and for a variety of reasons”), with, 
e.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 30, 141 (noting that the practice of citing foreign law “has never 
been seriously contested” in Canada). 
31 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 581-82 (noting various congressional bills and resolu-
tions against the use of foreign law by the federal courts, and quoting the death threat made 
against Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg for their support of comparativism); Law, supra note 15, at 
657 n.17 (citing examples of negative political and popular reaction to citation of foreign law by 
members of the Court). 
32 See, e.g., Alford, supra note 19, at 680 (“[A] judge's willingness to rely on comparative 
experiences in constitutional interpretation quickly has become an important test for many 
senators in judging a judicial nominee's qualifications.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle and the Challenge of Resisting—or Engaging—Transnational Constitutional Law, 
66 ALA. L. REV. 105, 110 n.24 (2014) (citing the confirmation hearings of Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan); David M. Herszenhorn, Court Nominee Criticized As 
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campaign to enact laws limiting or prohibiting judicial usage of foreign law 
continues to gain traction. As of this writing, legislatures in thirty-four 
states33 as well as Congress34 have considered taking measures against 
judicial comparativism; in eleven states, some type of action has passed the 
legislature.35 Not surprisingly, experimental evidence suggests that citation 
 
Relying on Foreign Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at A13 (reporting on congressional criticism of 
public remarks by then-Judge Sotomayor that were supportive of comparativism). 
33 Support for the campaign appears to draw upon a combination of opposition to judicial usage 
of foreign law in general and animus directed at Islamic law in particular. See FAIZA PATEL ET AL., 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FOREIGN LAW BANS: LEGAL UNCER-
TAINTIES AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 1-13 (2013), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/ForeignLawBans.pdf; Kimberly Railey, More States Move to Ban Foreign Law, 
USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 2013, at 4A. The thirty-four states where laws against judicial use of foreign 
law have been introduced or enacted as of this writing are Alabama, where voters have passed a 
constitutional amendment placed on the ballot by the legislature, S.B. 4, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Ala. 2013); Alaska, H.B. 88, 27th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2011) (lapsed due to committee inaction); 
Arizona, where legislation was enacted in 2011, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-3103 (2011); Arkansas, H.B. 
1348, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (lapsed due to committee inaction); Florida, FLA. 
STAT. § 61.0401 (2014); Georgia, S. Res. 808, 152d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014) 
(committee proceedings pending); Idaho, which passed a nonbinding resolution, H. Con. Res. 44, 
60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010); Indiana, S.B. 460, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 
2013); Iowa, H.F. 76, 85th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2013); Kansas, where legislation was 
enacted in 2012, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2012); Kentucky, H.B. 43, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess (Ky. 
2014); Louisiana, where legislation was enacted in 2010, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010); 
Maine, H.P. 811, 125th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011); Michigan, H.B. 4769, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 2011); Minnesota, where the bill in question was withdrawn by its author, S.F. 2281, 87th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2012); Mississippi, H.B. 44, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014); Missouri, 
where a bill passed by the legislature was vetoed by the governor, S.B. 267, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013); H.B. 757, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess (Mo. 2013); Nebraska, Leg. B. 
647, 102d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011); New Hampshire, H.B. 1422, 2011 Gen. Court, 162d Sess. 
(N.H. 2011); New Jersey, where the bill in question was withdrawn, Assemb. B. 3496, 214th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010); New Mexico, S.J. Res. 14, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2012) (lapsed due 
to committee inaction); North Carolina, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 416; Oklahoma, which enacted a 
ban in 2013, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 20 (2013); Pennsylvania, H.B. 2029, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Pa. 2011); South Carolina, S. 60, 120th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2013); S. 81, 120th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2013); South Dakota, which passed a law in 2012, S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2012); Tennessee, which passed legislation in 2010, TENN. CODE. 
ANN. § 20-15-102 (2010); Texas, H.B. 288, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2012); S. 1639, 83d Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Tex. 2013); Utah, H.B. 296, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010); Vermont, S. 265, 2014 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2014); Virginia, H.B. 1322, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013); Washington, 
which enacted a law in 2013, WASH. REV. CODE § 2.28.165(4)-(6) (2013); West Virginia, H.R. 
2216, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014); and Wyoming, H.J. Res. 0005, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Wyo. 2013); H.J. Res. 0004, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2013). 
34 See Law, supra note 15, at 656 n.16 (citing various bills and resolutions introduced in Congress).  
35 The states in question are Alabama (where legislative action has placed a constitutional 
amendment on the ballot), Arizona, Florida, Idaho (where the legislature passed a nonbinding 
resolution), Missouri (where the law was vetoed by the governor), Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee. See supra note 33 (citing the relevant bills and resolutions).  
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of foreign law may undermine rather than bolster public acceptance of 
Supreme Court opinions.36 
It is not difficult to imagine that such pressure might have an effect on 
the Justices. Time and time again, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its 
sensitivity both to public opinion37 and to the elected branches.38 In reality, 
however, the Justices do not behave as if they are simply slaves to public 
opinion, as evidenced by the fact that a number of them have made a point 
of publicly advocating comparativism.39 If their goal is truly to avoid 
controversy or criticism, the last thing they should do is take a public stand 
in favor of something very controversial. Yet this is precisely what some of 
them do, and the political controversy hypothesis cannot easily account for 
their behavior.  
The behavior of courts in other countries is even harder for the political 
controversy hypothesis to explain. In East Asia, popular and political 
attitudes toward comparativism do not vary much from country to country, 
yet there are significant variations in the level of foreign law usage. Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong share similarly welcoming attitudes toward 
foreign law, yet the Japanese Supreme Court makes much less use of 
foreign law than the Korean or Taiwanese Constitutional Court or the 
 
36 See Brett Curry & Banks Miller, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places? Foreign Law and 
Support for the U.S. Supreme Court, 36 POL. & POL’Y 1094, 1107-08 (2008) (reporting the results of 
an experiment conducted upon undergraduate students in which citation of foreign law in 
fabricated Supreme Court decisions decreased support for the Court among subjects with low 
levels of political knowledge). 
37 The Supreme Court’s responsiveness to public opinion has been repeatedly documented 
by political scientists, see, e.g., KERSCH, supra note 30, at 110 (noting that “virulent political 
reaction” and “critical commentary” against judicial use of treaties to advance human rights led 
courts to abandon “bold reasoning” that deemed treaties such as the U.N. Charter to be self-
executing); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (finding that “the policy views dominant on the Court 
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of 
the United States”); Terri Peretti, An Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous 
Branch (surveying the literature, and noting findings to the effect that the Court may follow 
public opinion more closely than Congress), in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: 
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 123, 130-33 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2005), and 
more recently by legal scholars as well, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: 
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE 
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION passim (2009). 
38 See ANNA HARVEY, A MERE MACHINE: THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY passim (2013) (showing empirically the extent to which the Court 
defers to congressional preferences, particularly those of the House of Representatives). 
39 See supra note 14 (quoting Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and O’Connor and the late Chief 
Justice Rehnquist). 
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Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal.40 Because the level of comparativism 
varies even when the degree of controversy surrounding it does not, the 
degree of controversy obviously cannot explain the variation in the level of 
comparativism. 
This is not to suggest that political controversy has no effect on the 
practice of judicial comparativism. But it is never the only factor at play, 
and in many countries, it is not even an important factor. The role of 
institutional factors, by contrast, is widely overlooked and underestimated. 
Legal scholars and political scientists alike tend to depict judicial behavior 
as a function of the legal views and policy preferences that judges hold, 
subject to constraints imposed by the political environment.41 Yet the 
structure and practices of institutions such as courts and law schools also 
have profound effects on the preferences and capabilities of judges and 
lawyers.42 Judicial and popular attitudes may help to explain whether judges 
want to engage in comparativism, but they cannot explain how those 
attitudes arose in the first place. Nor do those attitudes determine whether 
judges are even capable of practicing comparativism. For answers to such 
questions, we must also consider the implications of the institutional 
environment for judicial behavior. 
 
40 See infra Sections II.B, III.B, IV.B, V.B (discussing attitudes toward comparativism and 
levels of comparativism in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong).  
41 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, at xii (2d ed. 2013) (“To generalize grossly, 
law professors have tended to view the Justices as driven by felt obligations of fidelity to distinc-
tively legal ideals, while political scientists have regarded them as ideologically motivated actors 
with political agendas.”); id. at xvii (acknowledging “the now familiar insight that loosely ‘political’ 
values and concerns influence Supreme Court decision making”); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 
48-114 (2002) (contrasting the “legal model” of Supreme Court decisionmaking, which holds that 
judicial decisions are “substantially influenced” by a combination of case-specific facts and 
governing law, with the “attitudinal model,” which holds that “the Supreme Court decides disputes 
in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices,” and the 
“rational choice model,” which holds that the justices pursue a broad range of goals in strategic 
ways); Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 
25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 629 (2000) (noting that emphasis on the “sharp dichotomy” between 
legal and political explanations for judicial behavior has been “most pronounced when scholars of the 
Court are engaged in competition over models of judicial behavior”). 
42 See, e.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors 
in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 789 (1984) (contrasting mainstream political science, 
which treats preferences as exogenous, with “new institutionalism,” which argues that preferences 
develop “through a combination of education, indoctrination, and experience” and emphasizes the 
role of institutions in inculcating preferences); Whittington, supra note 41, at 615 (“Individuals 
cannot be conceptualized as autonomous, free choosers who just happen to find themselves in a 
particular institutional context. Institutions do not merely impose constraints on choices; they 
constitute preferences.”). 
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This Article argues that a combination of symbiotic institutional factors 
must exist in order for judicial comparativism to thrive. The first factor is 
institutional capacity: a court that lacks the institutional capacity to learn 
about foreign law is, in a literal sense, incapable of engaging in compara-
tivism in more than ad hoc fashion. Institutional capacity may not be a 
sufficient condition for comparativism to occur, but it is a necessary condi-
tion. The second factor, without which the first cannot exist, is a system of 
legal education that values and inculcates the practice of comparativism. 
High levels of judicial engagement with foreign law are dependent upon the 
availability of institutional mechanisms for learning about foreign law, such 
as the availability of clerks or researchers with foreign legal expertise. Such 
mechanisms are unlikely to be effective, in turn, unless they are backed by a 
system of legal education that produces an adequate supply of lawyers with 
both the ability and the desire to engage in comparativism.  
The effects of institutional variation can be observed only by studying 
institutions that actually vary from one another. In other words, the study 
of judicial comparativism requires a comparative approach. The heart of this 
Article, therefore, is an in-depth look at the operation of the most promi-
nent constitutional courts in East Asia, an increasingly important region of 
the world that nevertheless receives relatively little scholarly attention.43 
 
43 See, e.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 4, 17, 163, 211-13 (noting the “near-exclusive focus” of 
the field of comparative constitutional law on “a small number of overanalyzed, ‘usual suspect’ 
constitutional settings or court rulings” drawn from “a dozen liberal democracies,” and the 
resultant fact that the “constitutional experiences of entire regions,” including much of Asia, 
“remain largely uncharted terrain, understudied and generally overlooked”); MARK TUSHNET, 
ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (2014) (suggesting 
that “South and East Asia are relatively neglected areas of study” “[p]artly because of language 
issues”); Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: 
Constitutional Design in Divided Societies (observing that “[f]or nearly two decades,” the comparative 
constitutional law literature has been “oriented around a standard and relatively limited set of 
cases: South Africa, Israel, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the United 
States, and to a lesser extent, India”), in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: 
INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION? 3, 8 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008); Rosalind Dixon & Tom 
Ginsburg, Introduction to RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1, 13 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (“It is probably the case that 90% of compara-
tive work in the English language covers the same ten countries, for which materials are easily 
accessible in English.”); The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A 
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 519, 
530 (2005) [hereinafter Scalia–Breyer Conversation] (“We have referred to opinions of India's 
Supreme Court. But I confess that fewer opinions from other Asian nations come to our 
attention.” (quoting Justice Breyer)); see also, e.g., Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland, Preface to 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, at v-vi (Andrew Harding & Peter 
Leyland eds., 2009) (introducing a collection consisting of eight chapters on European courts, 
three on African courts (including one on South Africa), two on Asian courts, and one survey 
chapter on Latin American courts, and acknowledging explicitly that the selection of courts was 
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The specific courts in question are the Japanese Supreme Court (JSC), the 
Korean Constitutional Court (KCC), the Taiwanese Constitutional Court 
(TCC), and the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (HKCFA). Although 
Asian courts do not have a reputation for engaging in comparativism,44 the 
reality is that all four of these courts make substantially greater use of 
foreign law than the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Investigation of these courts sheds light on not only the institutional 
mechanisms, but also the hidden motivations behind judicial comparativism. 
Interviews with numerous judges and other officials disclose that courts 
practice comparativism not only to enrich or justify their decisions, but also 
to pursue what might best be described as judicial diplomacy.45 Courts engage 
in a variety of activities, ranging from translation of their own opinions and 
citation of foreign law to engagement with international organizations, that 
are not aimed simply at crafting stronger opinions or winning over domestic 
audiences. These activities also constitute strategies for competing or cooper-
ating with other courts in pursuit of political, economic, and diplomatic 
 
constrained by “the availability of scholars with the appropriate interest and expertise”); JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND 
THE WORLD (Peter H. Russell & David M. O’Brien eds., 2001) (containing six chapters on 
European jurisdictions, five chapters on former British territories, and only two chapters on other 
jurisdictions—namely, one on Japan and one on Central America); MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, 
supra note 11, at 62-108 (analyzing the use of comparative law in Italy, France, England, Germany, 
Canada, and South Africa).  
44 See Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Internationalization of Constitutional Law (reporting 
that there is “little judicial dialogue” in Asia, and that Asian courts tend either to refrain from 
engaging in “explicit comparative analysis” or to focus on a narrow set of “common law jurisdictions,” 
depending upon whether they hail from a civil law or common law tradition), in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1165, 1173, 1176 (Michel Rosenfeld & 
András Sajó eds., 2012); Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 27, 33 (2010) (noting the grudging approach of Japanese courts to the domestic 
application of international law, and describing the resistance offered in the name of “Asian values” 
to the “liberal universalism” of rights discourse). 
45 See Alford, supra note 19, at 669-70 (observing that, for the first time ever, “we have Supreme 
Court Justices who are . . . actively embracing global constitutionalism in an effort to perform 
functions akin to foreign diplomats,” and citing Justices Breyer and Kennedy as examples); Ken I. 
Kersch, The Supreme Court and International Relations Theory, 69 ALB. L. REV. 771, 774-75, 787 (2006) 
(observing that “the justices may frequently understand themselves as diplomats, representing 
American values and explaining American practices to what is often an ignorant, misinformed, or 
hostile world,” and that the tendency of legal scholars to treat the “‘globalist’ turn” in deciding 
domestic constitutional cases “as an issue of interpretive theory” has obscured the extent to which the 
Justices have employed “a whole range of ‘diplomatic’ justifications” for their behavior); Law & 
Chang, supra note 11, at 570 (likening the TCC’s extensive use of foreign jurisprudence to “a form of 
judicial diplomacy” that can counteract Taiwan’s severe diplomatic isolation by “generat[ing] badly 
needed support and acceptance among the international community”); Law & Versteeg, supra note 6, 
at 1181 (arguing that the adoption of constitutional ideas from other countries can be an attractive 
strategy for “marginal states” to “court[] foreign approval and enhance[] their legitimacy”). 
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objectives. Comparativism is part of a repertoire of judicial strategies for 
achieving goals of an international character. 
Part I explains the methodology behind this Article and the measurement 
challenges that it is designed to address. On the one hand, a full account of 
how and why courts engage in comparativism cannot be gathered simply by 
reading judicial decisions. Quantitative data collection that relies on the 
coding of judicial opinions is particularly inadequate because many courts do 
not disclose in their opinions the extent of their foreign legal research. On the 
other hand, a qualitative case study approach runs into the problem that it 
can be difficult to generalize from a small number of cases. This Article 
responds to these challenges by combining extensive interview-based 
research with a case selection strategy designed to isolate the effect of 
particular variables. 
Parts II, III, IV, and V offer detailed accounts of the comparativist prac-
tices and foreign dealings of the JSC, KCC, TCC, and HKCFA respectively. 
Each case study highlights a number of variables that cannot be captured by 
reading the court’s decisions, such as the gap between foreign law usage and 
foreign law citation and the institutional mechanisms for conducting foreign 
legal research. The relevant institutional characteristics of the four courts, as 
well as the U.S. Supreme Court, are summarized in Table 1. Across the 
board, each court’s institutional capacity for comparativism is highly 
correlated with the degree to which it actually uses foreign law. The KCC, 
TCC, and HKCFA are better equipped to perform foreign legal research 
than the JSC, which in turn enjoys decisive advantages over the U.S. 
Supreme Court. It is no coincidence that the JSC’s level of foreign law 
usage falls between that of the KCC, TCC, and HKCFA, at the high end of 
the spectrum, and the U.S. Supreme Court, at the low end. 
Part VI canvasses a variety of legal and political explanations for  
comparativism, such as a shortage of domestic jurisprudence or a court’s 
need for credibility in the eyes of domestic audiences. Although there is 
truth to many of these explanations, they do not tell the whole story. 
Drawing upon the wealth of information provided by the case studies, Part 
VII highlights the fact that courts sometimes engage in comparativism for 
reasons that have less to do with adjudication than diplomacy. Among East 
Asian courts, comparativism serves goals that range from cultivating interna-
tional influence and prestige, to promoting the rule of law in other countries, 
to reassuring foreign investors, to fulfilling treaty-based sovereignty  
arrangements. Comparativism is not always, however, the preferred judicial 
strategy for advancing such goals. Although the U.S. Supreme Court rarely 
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practices constitutional comparativism, it is an active practitioner of judicial 
diplomacy in other forms.  
Part VIII makes the basic but widely overlooked point that compara-
tivism is shaped as much by the ability of judges to use foreign law as by 
their desire to do so. Courts and judges operate within institutional and 
resource constraints that define the outer limits of their capabilities. These 
constraints include the range of institutional mechanisms within a court for 
learning about foreign law, and the extent to which legal education generates 
an adequate supply of lawyers and judges with both the ability and the desire 
to consult foreign law.  
The Conclusion reflects on both the inevitability of judicial diplomacy 
and the obstacles that courts face in their pursuit of international influence 
and prestige. Notwithstanding the globalization of constitutional law, it 
remains difficult for constitutional courts to be fully global in either influ-
ence or intellectual reach. Instead, courts belong to jurisprudential networks 
or legal families, and they tend to exhibit little interest in, or influence over, 
courts that fall outside their own groups.  
I. THE CHALLENGES OF MEASURING COMPARATIVISM: 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
Comparativism can be defined and measured in more ways than one. In 
order to understand what we are attempting to explain and how it can be 
measured, we must draw two distinctions. The first is the distinction 
between foreign law and international law. Although scholars sometimes 
lump foreign law together with international law under the umbrella 
category of “transnational law,”46 foreign law usage and international law 
usage do not occur for exactly the same reasons. In particular, judicial usage 
of international law often enjoys a stronger legal basis than judicial usage of 
foreign law.47 Therefore, the two phenomena cannot be treated as fungible 
 
46 E.g., Black et al., supra note 24, passim (exploring the conditions under which the Justices 
cite “transnational law,” without distinguishing between foreign law and international law). 
47 The most obvious difference is that countries often consider themselves bound by interna-
tional law, whereas they are by definition not bound by foreign law. See HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 
75 (noting that, “[u]nlike the legally binding and warranted application of other bodies of law,” the 
practice of referring to “foreign law” is “purely voluntary”); JACKSON, supra note 19, at 169 
(noting that “much international law is binding, or potentially binding, on all nations” whereas 
“comparative foreign law is not”); David S. Law, Constitutional Convergence and Comparative 
Competency: A Reply to Professors Jackson and Krotoszynski, 66 ALA. L. REV. 145, 146-47 (2014) 
(noting that it is normatively plausible for courts to pursue convergence with international law, but 
not convergence with foreign law). It is also the case that constitutions often contain provisions 
expressly authorizing or even obligating courts to take heed of international law. See Tom 
Ginsburg et al., Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate 
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for purposes of explanation. This Article concerns itself with judicial usage 
of foreign law as opposed to international law.  
The second crucial distinction is between judicial citation of foreign law 
and judicial usage of foreign law. Citation of foreign law is a narrow phenom-
enon that can be measured simply by reading judicial opinions. Usage of 
foreign law is a broader phenomenon that can be much harder to observe. 
Perhaps because citation is so easily observed and quantified, it is tempting 
to conflate citation and usage, or to treat citation as a convenient proxy for 
usage.48 However, the two are not the same, and neither is a satisfactory 
proxy for the other, for several reasons.  
First, courts frequently fail to cite their sources. Numerous courts make 
a habit of researching and weighing foreign law yet rarely, if ever, divulge 
their research by citing it explicitly in their published opinions.49 The 
copious citation practices followed by courts in common law jurisdictions 
such as Canada, South Africa, and the United States may reliably indicate 
 
International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 207-10 (listing the number and percentage of 
constitutions written after 1945 that explicitly reference or incorporate treaties or customary 
international law). By contrast, constitutions are much less likely to explicitly endorse judicial 
usage of foreign law. Apart from the constitutions of South Africa or Zimbabwe, it is unclear 
whether any national constitutions do so, and even the South African constitution gives foreign 
law less favorable treatment than international law. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 39 
(“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court . . . (b) must consider international law; and (c) 
may consider foreign law.”); ZIM. CONST., 2013, § 46 (“When interpreting this Chapter, a 
court . . . may consider relevant foreign law . . . .”). 
48 See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 24 (referring interchangeably to the “using” and “citing” of 
transnational law). 
49 See, e.g., BOBEK, supra note 11, at 97, 174 (noting that judges in France and Slovakia frequently 
consider foreign law but consider it improper to cite foreign law in their decisions); MARKESINIS & 
FEDTKE, supra note 11, at 62-65 (discussing France and Italy, and noting that, although French judicial 
opinions as a rule do not cite foreign law, the avocats généreaux who advise the Cour de cassation “are 
nowadays expected to consult foreign law when preparing their recommendations”); LÁSZLÓ SÓLYOM 
& GEORG BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 4-5 (2000) (revealing that the Hungarian Constitutional Court is 
influenced by the jurisprudence of several countries, especially Germany, but explicitly cites only the 
European Court of Human Rights); Gelter & Siems, supra note 11, at 234, 240 (noting that variations 
in “citation style” may explain why the supreme courts of France, Italy, and Spain cite foreign decisions 
less frequently than other supreme courts in Europe, and that study of citations alone “cannot capture 
when judges do not disclose the origin of their inspiration coming from foreign cases or contacts with 
their peers abroad,” or when courts issue documents other than decisions that reflect their knowledge of 
foreign law); Gábor Halmai, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation (dividing “constitu-
tional jurisdictions” into three categories: those which do not use foreign law,” such as the U.S. 
Supreme Court; “those which do use foreign law but do not do so explicitly,” such as Hungary; and 
“those which do so explicitly,” such as South Africa), in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARA-
TIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 1328, 1329; Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 557 
(discussing the Taiwanese Constitutional Court’s decision not to cite foreign law). 
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the use of foreign law,50 but such practices are far from universal.51 The 
opinion-writing conventions of civil law courts, for example, may disfavor 
the explicit citation of any case law, much less foreign case law.52 As a 
 
50 See, e.g., Bastarache, supra note 18, at 200 (reporting that “attribution is systematic and 
considered mandatory” whenever the Canadian Supreme Court draws upon foreign jurispru-
dence); Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 523, 533 & nn.33-35 (discussing, and rejecting, the 
possibility that the Canadian Supreme Court “looks habitually to the South African Constitutional 
Court for guidance and inspiration” but simply fails to acknowledge when it has done so); infra 
text accompanying notes 244-50 (noting that the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal makes a point 
of disclosing any foreign authorities on which it has relied). 
51 See, e.g., BOBEK, supra note 11, at 84 (describing the style of English judicial decisions as 
“open and discursive” and “not hiding anything,” “[i]n contrast to the judicial reasoning styles in a 
number of Continental jurisdictions”); MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBER-
ATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 3-5 
(2004) (summarizing the manner in which common law observers tend to contrast the opinion-
writing practices of common law and civil law courts); MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 11, at 
62-66 (citing Italy and France as examples of countries where courts give considerable attention to, 
but do not cite, foreign law); Bryde, supra note 11, at 297 (noting that “the German Constitutional 
Court has developed a style of reasoning where it basically cites only its own precedents”); 
Saunders, supra note 11, at 580 (observing that “features of the process of adjudica-
tion . . . associated with common law and civil law legal systems” may help to “explain differences 
in the extent of explicit reference to foreign constitutional experience in judicial reasoning”). 
52 Citation practices vary within the civil law world, but French and German constitutional 
adjudication share in common their tendency to cite only a narrow range of domestic legal sources. 
The French judicial style is famously restrictive and frowns upon citation of anything but codified 
domestic law. See JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES WITHIN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 73-74 
(2006) (describing the “style” of French judgments as “simply giv[ing] a result, which follows from 
the rule,” “but not . . . provid[ing] the reasons,” in a manner “more like the minutes of a committee 
meeting, which do not attempt to summarise the debates that went on before the decision was 
reached”); BOBEK, supra note 11, at 97-99 (dubbing the French judicial style “the example[] of a 
legal tradition which hides more than it explicitly tells,” and noting that legislation is “essentially 
the only visible authority to which a French judicial decision is allowed to refer”); LASSER, supra 
note 51, at 31-35 (observing that the manner in which French Cour de cassation decisions are written 
“effectively denies access to anything but the numerical citation and the syllogistic application of 
the codified law”); id. at 329-30 (discussing how French legal theory denies judicial decisions the 
status of “law”). To some degree, Dutch and Italian judicial opinions share similar characteristics. 
See Gelter & Siems, supra note 11, at 253 (noting that “some courts may not be able to cite foreign 
law (or even anything else beside the applicable codes and statutes) openly, either due to a legal 
prohibition or to a social constraint,” and that “[t]his seems to be the case particularly in France 
and Italy”); Elaine Mak, Why Do Dutch and UK Judges Cite Foreign Law?, 70 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 420, 
430-31 (2011) (observing that the Dutch Supreme Court was historically influenced by the French 
Cour de cassation and tends to render short opinions that do not cite foreign law, even if foreign 
materials were considered). 
By contrast, the German legal tradition—to which the Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese legal 
systems all trace their roots—is “relatively open” to consideration of a wide range of sources. 
BOBEK, supra note 11, at 120. According to a member of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court 
(the Bundesverfassungsgericht), “[t]here are no fundamental objections against referring to 
international and foreign sources in German courts in general or the Constitutional Court in 
particular,” and the Constitutional Court consults the work of other courts “extensively.” Bryde, 
supra note 11, at 296-97. Notwithstanding its willingness to consider foreign law in its deliberations, 
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result, judicial citation of foreign law may be poorly correlated with judicial 
usage of foreign law.53  
Second, courts can and do use foreign law in ways that have little, if any, 
influence on the opinions they issue. Most scholarship on judicial usage of 
foreign law focuses on the kind of usage that manifests itself explicitly or 
implicitly in judicial decisions.54 There are other ways, however, in which 
courts make use of foreign law. For example, courts have been known to 
establish research institutes dedicated to comparative law, publish transla-
tions of judicial opinions, issue reports about foreign law, join international 
organizations, and host international conferences. All of these activities 
constitute judicial usage of foreign law in the sense that they involve 
deliberate exposure to, or dissemination of, foreign law. It is not always the 
case, however, that these activities occur primarily or exclusively for the 
purpose of enriching judicial deliberations or adorning judicial opinions 
with foreign citations. Creation of a research institute that specializes in 
foreign law might be intended, for instance, to enhance a court’s interna-
tional prestige and influence, or to facilitate legislative or constitutional 
reform activities by other government institutions, or to create a repository 
of knowledge for the benefit of the general public.55  
In short, it is difficult to measure judicial usage of foreign law using 
quantitative techniques because neither the frequency nor the range of 
usage can be reliably observed simply by reading judicial decisions. A 
qualitative case study approach that involves in-depth investigation of a 
 
however, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s style of reasoning generally excludes the citation of foreign 
law. See BOBEK, supra note 11, at 141 (counting only three comparative references among all of the 
court’s published decisions in 2008); Bryde, supra note 11, at 297 (observing that the court’s 
tendency to cite “only its own precedents” has resulted in “a huge gap between the sources of the 
decision cited and those actually influencing the judges”). 
53 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 527 (warning that “the frequency with which a court 
cites foreign law in its opinions is an extremely unreliable measure of the extent to which the court 
actually makes use of foreign law”). 
54 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 19, at 17-102 (calling upon judges to “engage” with foreign 
law by evaluating whether, and to what extent, foreign law holds valuable lessons for domestic 
jurisprudence). 
55 The research institute established by the KCC, for instance, publishes reports on foreign 
law but has no responsibility for performing foreign legal research in connection to pending cases; 
such research is handled by an entirely different set of foreign law specialists. Thus, whatever 
purpose the institute actually serves, the connection between the creation of the institute and the 
adjudication of actual cases is tangential at best. See infra subsection III.D.6 (discussing the KCC’s 
creation of a Constitutional Research Institute that performs comparative constitutional research 
unrelated to pending cases); see also, e.g., Gelter & Siems, supra note 11, at 240 (noting that the 
French Cour de cassation, which rarely cites foreign law explicitly in its own decisions, issues an 
annual report that “regularly considers developments in other jurisdictions”). 
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specific court is, in theory, well suited to overcoming this type of problem.56 
However, a case study approach suffers from potential drawbacks of its 
own. If the cases selected for study are too different in too many ways, it 
becomes impossible to attribute similarities or differences across cases to 
any specific variable.57 Ideally, one would compare cases that share many 
background characteristics in order to isolate the effect of a smaller number 
of variables. 
This Article addresses these challenges by employing what social scientists 
call a structured-focused comparison of most-similar and most-different cases, 
which seeks to combine the best of both worlds.58 On the one hand, a case 
study approach permits the kind of probing investigation that is necessary 
to unearth accurate information about usage, as opposed to citation, of 
foreign law. Extended discussion with court personnel who possess first-
hand knowledge is a particularly rich source of such information. On the 
other hand, the disadvantages of the case study approach can be mitigated 
through a combination of case selection and data collection strategies. 
Section I.A sets forth the logic behind the selection of most-similar and 
most-different cases, while Section I.B elaborates upon the structured-
focused approach to data collection. 
A. Case Selection: Most-Similar Versus Most-Different Cases 
The reliability of the case study approach is inherently improved by  
collecting data on multiple countries rather than a single country, but the 
selection of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in particular has the further 
methodological advantages associated with comparing “most similar cases.”59 
 
56 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 527 (urging “[s]cholars who wish to understand or 
measure a particular court’s usage of foreign law” to “supplement quantitative research methods, 
such as statistical analysis of citations to foreign law, with qualitative approaches that are capable 
of probing more deeply, such as interviews with court personnel”). 
57 See GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: 
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 104 (1994); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The 
Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2002); Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 135 (2005). 
58 See A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 18 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008) (explaining the methodological merits 
of “structured-focused comparison,” and offering a fruitful example of its application to the study 
of courts); ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 67-72 (2005) (explaining the origins and merits of 
“structured, focused comparison”). 
59 Hirschl, supra note 57, at 133-35 (observing that the selection of “most similar cases” is a 
“standard case selection principle[] in inference-oriented, controlled comparison in qualitative, 
‘small-N’ studies” that “control[s] for variables or potential explanations that are not central to the 
study” and thus helps isolate the effect of the key variables of interest). 
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Selection of cases that share much in common makes it possible to isolate 
the effect of the differences that remain. Not only are all three countries 
geographically adjacent, but they also belong to the same legal and geopolit-
ical groupings. All three are democracies with German-influenced civil law 
systems and similar ways of training and promoting judges. South Korea 
and Taiwan share the added similarities of being former Japanese colonies 
that received German law through a Japanese filter and subsequently 
experienced democratization and a renaissance of judicial review at roughly 
the same time in the late 1980s. Furthermore, all three countries are closely 
aligned with the United States in security and economic matters. Finally, 
none of the three countries possesses a constitutional provision that either 
endorses or limits judicial consideration of foreign or international law.60 
These similarities make it possible to rule out a number of explanations 
for variation among the three countries. A finding that one of the three 
courts makes greater use of foreign law than the others, for example, cannot 
be attributed to the existence of a career judiciary, the historical influence of 
German law, or close relations with the United States because those charac-
teristics are common to all three countries. Likewise, because none of the 
three countries possess constitutional provisions that address judicial usage 
of foreign law, there is no possibility that the presence or absence of such 
provisions accounts for differences among the three countries. 
The fourth case study, Hong Kong, is included for precisely the opposite 
reasons. An invaluable complement to the study of most similar cases is the 
study of most different cases.61 A combination of most similar and most 
different cases can rule out competing explanations in ways that an analysis of 
most similar cases alone cannot. Suppose, for example, that three highly 
similar courts both engage heavily in comparativism, but it is unclear which 
(if any) of their many shared characteristics explains their behavior. If a 
fourth court that shares only one of those characteristics behaves the same 
way, that characteristic becomes more plausible as an explanation.62 Alterna-
 
60 See supra note 47 (noting provisions in the constitutions of South Africa and Zimbabwe 
that explicitly authorize judicial usage of foreign law). As an empirical matter, it is far from clear 
whether the existence of such provisions actually affects the degree to which courts use foreign 
law. See Kalb, supra note 11, at 425 (observing that the degree of judicial “engagement with foreign 
and international law does not seem to vary measurably” as between countries that possess or lack 
constitutional provisions addressing the use of foreign law). 
61 See Hirschl, supra note 57, at 139-42 (explaining the logic of the “most different cases” 
approach). 
62 See id. at 139-41 (observing that analysis of “most different” cases can isolate and emphasize 
the explanatory power of the few “key independent variables” that the cases share in common). 
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tively, if a fourth court shares none of those characteristics in common yet 
still behaves the same way, then the explanation must be sought elsewhere.  
Within East Asia, Hong Kong fills the role of a most different case. As a 
wealthy, industrialized society, it shares enough in common with the other 
three jurisdictions that comparisons can plausibly be made. The inclusion of 
Hong Kong in the analysis also rounds out the list of jurisdictions with 
judicial review in East Asia and yields a relatively comprehensive picture of 
the region as a whole.63 In numerous respects, however, Hong Kong is 
unlike the other three cases. It belongs to different legal and geopolitical 
families: whereas Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all possess a German legal 
tradition and rely upon the United States for their security, Hong Kong has 
a strongly British legal tradition and forms part of China. Unlike the others, 
Hong Kong is not a sovereign state but instead a “Special Administrative 
Region” of China that enjoys heightened autonomy.64 One aspect of this 
autonomy is that Hong Kong’s courts are not answerable or inferior to any 
court in mainland China.65 Hong Kong is therefore unusual within East 
Asia, and indeed globally, in combining vigorous judicial review by inde-
pendent courts with a lack of democratic self-rule66 and oversight by an 
authoritarian central government.67 Finally, Hong Kong’s constitution 
 
63 The only East Asian country with judicial review that this Article does not cover is Mongolia. 
See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
ASIAN CASES 164-200 (2003) (describing the often vigorous practice of judicial review in Mongolia). 
64 See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA, art. 2 (H.K.) (authorizing the HKSAR to “exercise a high 
degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power”); Danny 
Gittings, Hong Kong’s Courts Are Learning to Live with China, 19 H.K. J., July 2010, at 1, 1, available 
at http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/193248/1/Content.pdf (describing the 1984 agreement, the 
Sino–British Joint Declaration, “under which Britain agreed to restore Hong Kong to China in 
1997, in return for generous promises about the high degree of autonomy Hong Kong would enjoy 
under a ‘one country, two systems’ formula”).  
65 See Gittings, supra note 64, at 1 (describing the HKCFA’s existence and power of final 
adjudication as “a key part of the deal struck between London and Beijing in 1984” that was 
subsequently enshrined in the Sino–British Joint Declaration). 
66 Only half of Hong Kong’s relatively weak legislature, the Legislative Council, is directly 
elected, while the head of the government, the Chief Executive, is selected by interest groups or 
“functional constituencies” that are largely sympathetic to China from a list of candidates 
approved by Beijing. See DANNY GITTINGS, INTRODUCTION TO THE HONG KONG BASIC 
LAW 107-13 (2013) (explaining why the “functional constituency” system for selecting Hong Kong’s 
Chief Executive confers outsized influence upon a “small circle” of roughly 200,000 voters and 
prevents pro-democracy candidates from winning); id. at 129-40 (describing how the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress blocked the introduction of universal suffrage for 
Legislative Council elections, and observing that the “functional constituency” system empowers 
“economically important but numerically small” groups). 
67 See STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG., DECISION OF THE STANDING 
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE 
SELECTION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
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contains several provisions that explicitly authorize or contemplate judicial 
usage of foreign and international law.68 
B. Data Collection: A Structured-Focused Approach 
This case selection strategy of combining most-similar and most-
different cases is paired with a “structured-focused” approach to data 
collection, meaning that the investigation of each case is structured around 
the same set of questions.69 For each of the four courts, the following 
questions are addressed sequentially: (1) the level of each court’s foreign law 
usage, (2) the level of each court’s foreign law expertise, (3) the jurisdictions 
most frequently considered by each court, (4) the mechanisms that each 
court possesses for learning about foreign law, and (5) the extent of each 
court’s interaction with foreign courts. The table at the end of this Article 
provides further structure and focus for the data by summarizing and 
contrasting the relevant institutional characteristics of the four East Asian 
courts plus the U.S. Supreme Court. Use of a structured-focused approach 
ensures that similar data is collected on each court and facilitates inferences 
about the effect of a consistent set of variables. This approach also yields 
benefits for the overall study of courts and comparativism: it promotes the 
development of a cumulative body of scholarship by furnishing a template 
for data collection on additional countries and courts.  
The data for the case studies were collected as follows. In Japan, interviews 
were conducted in 2008, 2009, and 2013 with a variety of judges, officials, and 
scholars, including eight sitting and retired members of the JSC itself; two 
judges assigned to the JSC as research judges or chōsakan, who perform the 
functions of law clerks; and judges sent abroad to study foreign law at 
government expense. Likewise, the original data in this article on the KCC 
derive from interviews conducted by the author in 2011, 2013, and 2014 with a 
combination of judges, officials, and scholars, including a retired member of 
 
REGION BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND ON THE METHOD FOR FORMING THE LEGISLA-
TIVE COUNCIL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION IN THE YEAR 
2016, at 3-4 (Aug. 31, 2014), available at http://www.2017.gov.hk/filemanager/template/en/doc/ 
20140831a.pdf (requiring the screening of candidates for Chief Executive of Hong Kong by a 
“nominating committee” dominated by interest groups sympathetic to Beijing on the grounds that 
“the Chief Executive has to be a person who loves the country [China] and loves Hong Kong”); 
Tony Cheung et al., Beijing Emphasises Its Total Control over HK, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), 
June 10, 2014, at A1 (describing the position formally taken by China’s State Council that Hong 
Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” is itself “subject to the central government’s authorisation,” and 
that it remains the central government’s prerogative to oversee Hong Kong’s government). 
68 See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text. 
69 A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 58, at 18; see also GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 
58, at 67-72. 
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the KCC; three senior officials responsible for relations with foreign courts 
and oversight of legal research; three Constitutional Research Officers (the 
Korean equivalent of law clerks); a researcher at the newly established 
Constitutional Research Institute, a subsidiary of the KCC; several judges 
sent abroad by the Korean judiciary to study foreign law; a prosecutor; and 
several scholars with prior judicial experience. The bulk of the fieldwork in 
Taiwan consisted of confidential, face-to-face interviews conducted in 2011 
and 2014 with thirteen current and former justices of the TCC and ten 
current and former law clerks.70 In Hong Kong, interviews were conducted 
in 2014 with three members of the HKCFA, two law clerks at the HKCFA, 
two former lower-court judges, and a variety of local scholars and attorneys. 
II. THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT 
A. Level of Foreign Law Citation 
The JSC rarely cites foreign law in its decisions. A recent empirical 
analysis suggests that actual citations to foreign precedent appear in roughly 
5% of the JSC’s constitutional decisions.71 The rarity of explicit citations to 
foreign precedent reflects in part the fact that, compared to a common law 
court such as the U.S. Supreme Court, the JSC writes relatively concise, 
lightly footnoted opinions in a style more characteristic of many civil law 
courts.72 
B. Level of Foreign Law Usage 
Like the KCC and TCC, the JSC is significantly more likely to perform 
foreign law research than to cite foreign law in its opinions. Unlike the 
KCC or TCC, however, the JSC has neither routinized nor institutionalized 
the practice of researching foreign law. The overall attitude at the JSC 
 
70 The interviews in Taiwan were conducted by the author, on some occasions in conjunction 
with Professor Wen-Chen Chang and once with the participation of Professor Carol Lin, in a 
combination of Mandarin and English tailored to the interviewees. Professor Chang was a law 
clerk to former Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng of the TCC but is not included in the count of 
interviewees. 
71 See Akiko Ejima, A Gap Between the Apparent and Hidden Attitudes of the Supreme Court of 
Japan Towards Foreign Precedents (identifying 11 cases in which foreign law was cited, out of a total 
of 234 constitutional cases decided from 1990 through mid-2008), in THE USE OF FOREIGN 
PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES, supra note 11, at 273, 277, 283. 
72 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (contrasting the opinion-writing and citation 
practices of civil law and common law courts). 
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toward such research is perhaps best described as one of indifference, rather 
than either enthusiasm or hostility.  
On the one hand, consideration of foreign law is distinctly uncontroversial. 
None of the justices I interviewed could think of any case in which a judge 
or justice had resisted or criticized the consideration of foreign approaches 
to a particular legal question. This lack of resistance to comparative legal 
analysis was attributed to the fact that Japanese law is itself of largely 
foreign origins. Those foreign origins are primarily German, but American 
influence is also obvious in the area of constitutional law.73 In the words of 
one justice, there is “nothing to prevent” the JSC from engaging more 
heavily in comparative analysis.74  
On the other hand, neither the justices nor the clerks perform foreign 
legal research as a matter of course. Several justices echoed the sentiment 
that foreign legal research is “neither encouraged nor discouraged” but is 
instead conducted when “necessary for the case,”75 and in most cases, it is 
“not so necessary.”76 By their own account, Japanese judges are, for the most 
part, “not so interested” in foreign law. The fact that lawyers tend not to 
employ foreign law in their briefs and arguments to the JSC also contrib-
utes to the JSC’s “limited motivation” to learn about foreign law.77 One 
justice characterized the JSC’s use of foreign law as “far behind compared to 
global standards.”78  
When foreign legal research does occur, it may occur either upon the 
initiative of a law clerk79 or at the request of a particular justice. Whether 
foreign law research is considered “necessary” varies with both the area of 
law and the specific topic under consideration. My sources estimated that 
foreign legal research is conducted in less than 10% of cases; according to 
one justice, the total is perhaps “less than 1%” of all cases heard, amounting 
 
73 See David S. Law, The Myth of the Imposed Constitution (discussing American involvement in 
the drafting of Japan’s post-war constitution and the consequent characterization of the Japanese 
constitution as “imposed”), in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 
239, 242-44 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013). 
74 Interview with Justice F, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan ( July 17, 2013). 
75 Interview with Justice H, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan ( July 17, 2013). 
76 Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan ( July 17, 2013). 
77 Interview with Justice F, supra note 74. 
78 Id. 
79 See David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 1545, 1579 (2009) (describing how successful career judges are recruited by the judicial 
bureaucracy to serve as law clerks, or chōsakan, on the JSC for several years). 
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to “a few occasions per year.”80 However, these estimates reflect usage of 
foreign law across the JSC’s entire docket.81 Unlike either the TCC or 
KCC, the JSC is a court of general jurisdiction, and only a small fraction of 
its docket consists of constitutional cases.82 Several justices agreed that the 
JSC is more likely to consider foreign law in constitutional cases than in 
other areas of law,83 but as one justice observed, the court is typically 
confronted with a “lack of important constitutional litigation,” which may 
help to explain its overall lack of foreign law usage.84 
Not only the composition, but also the sheer size of the JSC’s docket 
may have consequences for its usage of foreign law. As Japan’s highest court 
of general jurisdiction, the JSC faces a massive docket of over 12,000 cases 
annually,85 most of which it lacks discretion to reject.86 Even though Japan 
has only one-third the population of the United States, the JSC’s docket is 
even greater than that of the U.S. Supreme Court87 (which, unlike the JSC, 
 
80 Interview with Justice H, supra note 75. 
81 For most purposes, the JSC divides its docket into civil, criminal, and administrative cases 
and does not track constitutional cases as a distinct category. See infra note 85 (citing official court 
statistics that employ these three categories). 
82 Professor Ejima’s analysis of the 15,885 JSC decisions rendered from 1990 through mid-
2008 and included in the TKC database found only 234 cases (or 1.5% of the total) that contained 
any mention of the Japanese Constitution. See Ejima, supra note 71, at 275, 277. One judge who 
worked at the JSC as a chōsakan for nearly five years indicated that he encountered fewer than 
twenty-five cases in total that involved a constitutional question. 
83 See Interview with Justice H, supra note 75; Interview with Justice F, supra note 74. Other 
areas of more frequent foreign law usage reportedly include intellectual property cases and, 
increasingly, corporate law cases. See id. 
84 Interview with Justice F, supra note 74. 
85 In 2012, the most recent year for which the JSC has released statistics as of this writing, 
the JSC received 12,311 new cases (8169 civil and administrative cases and 4142 criminal cases) and 
decided 12,594 existing cases (8336 civil and administrative cases and 4258 criminal cases). See 
SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES: NEWLY FILED, 
RESOLVED, AND PENDING, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/sihotokei/nenpo/pdf/ 
B24DMIN1-1.pdf (reporting the numbers of civil and administrative cases filed and decided in 
2012); SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, CRIMINAL AND OTHER CASES: NEWLY FILED, 
RESOLVED, AND PENDING, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/sihotokei/nenpo/pdf/ 
B24DKEI01.pdf (reporting the numbers of criminal cases filed and decided in 2012). 
86 See HIROSHI ITOH, THE SUPREME COURT AND BENIGN ELITE DEMOCRACY IN 
JAPAN 47 (2010) (noting that 1996 revisions of the Japanese civil code that were intended to 
increase the JSC’s discretion over its civil docket have failed to significantly alleviate the JSC’s 
workload); John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public 
Trust (noting that, “[u]nlike the United States Supreme Court and most state supreme courts in 
the United States,” the JSC “does not exercise any significant discretion over its docket”), in LAW 
IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99, 105 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007); Law, supra note 79, at 1577-78 
(detailing the JSC’s “overwhelming” docket, which rivals that of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
absolute size but consists largely of cases that the JSC cannot decline to hear). 
87 See The Justices’ Caseload, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3WFE-2CDW. 
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can and does dismiss the vast majority of its cases at will) and far greater 
than that of either the KCC or the TCC (which receive roughly 150088 and 
50089 petitions per year, respectively). All other things being equal, the 
more cases that a court must hear, the less time that it can spend per case, 
and the less likely that it can afford to perform foreign legal research. 
Nevertheless, docket pressure alone cannot explain the JSC’s modest use of 
foreign law. Both the Israeli Supreme Court and the Indian Supreme 
Court, for example, face daunting caseloads,90 yet both are known for 
engaging in comparative analysis.91 
Consideration of foreign law becomes more likely if another court is 
known for its extensive jurisprudence on a topic with which the JSC itself 
has relatively little experience. The leading example is electoral malappor-
tionment. In 1976, the JSC declared unconstitutional an electoral appor-
tionment scheme for the legislative lower house that weighted rural voters 
five times as heavily as urban voters.92 To date, the 1976 malapportionment 
 
88 In 2013, the KCC received 1480 new cases and disposed of 1585 existing cases. See Case 
Statistics of the Constitutional Court of Korea, CONST. CT. KOREA, http://english.ccourt.go.kr/ 
cckhome/eng/decisions/caseLoadStatic/caseLoadStatic.do (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/UH4T-SJTK (reporting the cumulative number of cases filed and decided 
through the present); see also CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, TWENTY YEARS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA 121 (reporting an annual average of 1214 filings from 
September 1988 through August 2007). A backlog of cases means that it is possible for the KCC to 
decide more cases in a given year than it receives. 
89 Justices of the Constitutional Court: Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, DEP’T STAT. 
JUD. YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/report/eg-1.htm (last visited Feb. 28. 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/J594-SBQ4. 
90 See Suzie Navot, Israel: Creating a Constitution—The Use of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme 
Court (1994–2010) (noting that the Israeli Supreme Court “is the first, last, and only” court in 
Israel with jurisdiction over most disputes concerning “government institutions and state organs” 
or “between citizens and the State”), in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITU-
TIONAL JUDGES, supra note 11, at 129, 136; Nick Robinson, A Quantitative Analysis of the Indian 
Supreme Court’s Workload, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 570, 578-79 (2013) (reporting that the 
Indian Supreme Court currently receives roughly 70,000 filings per year). 
91 See Navot, supra note 90, at 135 (noting that over 20% of the Israeli Supreme Court’s cita-
tions over the period from 1948 to 1994 were to foreign law); id. at 141-42 (reporting that over the 
period from 1994 to 2010, roughly one in three of the Israeli Supreme Court’s constitutional 
decisions cited foreign law); Adam M. Smith, Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in 
Domestic Jurisprudence: The Indian Case, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218, 239-40 (2006) (finding that 
the Indian Supreme Court referred to foreign law in roughly one-quarter of its decisions between 
1950 and 2005); Alexander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second 
Germanization of American Equal Protection Review, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284, 284 n.1 (1998) 
(characterizing the Israeli Supreme Court as “the most important comparative constitutional law 
institute of the world,” and giving credit to the court’s “practice of employing clerks from all over 
the world, who do the research work on their country of origin”). 
92 See Law, supra note 79, at 1547-48 (discussing Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Control 
Commission, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 1976, 30 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 223 ( Japan)).  
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decision is one of only nine cases in which the JSC has ever held a law 
unconstitutional, and it remains the most momentous decision rendered by 
the court since its establishment in 1947.93 At the time of the decision, the 
JSC knew that the U.S. Supreme Court had already compiled a significant 
body of jurisprudence on the issue of electoral malapportionment, but the 
manner in which the JSC became aware of the relevant American case law 
stands as a lesson in the importance of in-house foreign legal expertise. In 
1976, the chief chōsakan at the JSC, Jiro Nakamura, was a common law expert 
and was familiar in particular with the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 
decisions in Baker v. Carr94 and Reynolds v. Sims.95 Nakamura was reportedly 
responsible for introducing both cases to the members of the JSC.96  
C. Jurisdictions Considered 
To the extent that the JSC considers foreign case law, it is most likely to 
evaluate the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, the German  
Bundesverfassungsgericht, and in recent years the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR).97 Interest in German jurisprudence is a natural conse-
quence of the extent to which Japanese law is modeled on German law, 
while the extensive role played by the American occupation in the drafting 
of Japan’s post-war constitution makes American constitutional jurispru-
dence of particular interest in Japan. Notably absent from the list are two 
courts from the English-speaking world, the Canadian Supreme Court and 
South African Constitutional Court, both of which enjoy a reputation in the 
English-language comparative constitutional literature for exporting their 
constitutional jurisprudence.98 
 
93 See id. (counting eight cases as of 2009 in which the JSC had struck down a law as uncon-
stitutional). In late 2013, the JSC held a law unconstitutional for only the ninth time since its 
establishment in 1947. See Tomohiro Osaki & Reiji Yoshida, Top Court Shoots Down Unequal 
Inheritance Rights, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/09/04/national/ 
top-court-shoots-down-unequal-inheritance-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/KK7Q-DKB5 
(describing the JSC’s decision to overrule several earlier decisions and hold unconstitutional a 
provision of the Civil Code that limits illegitimate children to one-half the inheritance of 
legitimate children). Prior to the 2013 case, the last time the JSC struck down a law was in 2008, in 
a case that also involved explicit formal discrimination against illegitimate children. That case 
involved eligibility for citizenship as opposed to inheritance. See Law, supra note 79, at 1547. 
94 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
95 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
96 See Interview with Justice F, supra note 74. 
97 See, e.g., id.; Interview with Justice H, supra note 75. 
98 See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 12, at 74 (singling out the South African Constitutional 
Court and the “Canadian Constitutional Court” [sic] as “disproportionately influential” and 
“highly influential, apparently more so than the U.S. Supreme Court and other older and more 
established constitutional courts”); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of 
 
  
958 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 927 
 
Although the justices themselves are generally not avid consumers of 
legal scholarship, one justice explicitly credited the expansion of compara-
tive constitutional scholarship in Japan for increasing both the degree to 
which the JSC performs foreign legal research and the range of jurisdictions 
that the JSC considers.99 Scholarly translation and analysis of foreign law is 
facilitating the citation of foreign law by lawyers, which in turn makes it 
more likely that the chōsakan and the justices will consider it “necessary” to 
conduct their own research into foreign law. 
D. Level of Foreign Law Expertise 
The Japanese judiciary has a longstanding practice of sending promising 
recruits abroad to study foreign law. Even so, however, the justices and 
clerks of the JSC tend on average to possess less foreign legal expertise than 
their Korean, Taiwanese, or Hong Kong counterparts, as summarized below 
in Table 1.  
The beginnings of this practice were modest. In the early 1960s, Japan 
sent one judge per year to the United States to earn an LL.M. with the 
support of the Fulbright Foundation, and Germany was subsequently added 
as a destination with a combination of private and public funding.100 The 
scope of the study-abroad program has grown substantially over time. In 
any given year, the judiciary will recruit roughly 100 to 120 judges from its 
in-house training institute.101 From this number, approximately thirty will 
be selected by the judicial bureaucracy early in their careers to study 
 
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 558 
n.316 (2005) (identifying the Canadian Supreme Court as “one of the most influential domestic 
courts worldwide on human rights issues”); Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is Now 
Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A1 (noting that many legal scholars have 
“singled out” the Canadian Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court as “increas-
ingly influential”). 
99 See Interview with Justice F, supra note 74; cf. Giorgio Fabio Colombo, Japan as a Victim of 
Comparative Law, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 731, 747 (2014) (observing that “almost every 
Japanese law professor reads (and very often speaks fluently) at least one, but often more than one 
foreign language among German, English and French, and has a deep knowledge of a foreign 
jurisdiction,” and arguing that “Japanese legal scholars are probably the best comparative lawyers 
in the world”). 
100 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 76; Interview with Justice F, supra note 74. 
101 The Shiho Kensyujo, or Legal Training and Research Institute (LTRI), is a mandatory 
training program operated by the judiciary at government expense for those who pass the Japanese 
bar examination. Judges and prosecutors are recruited directly from the LTRI. See Law, supra note 
79, at 1552. 
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abroad.102 At least half of that group goes to the United States, while the 
remainder is typically distributed among the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Germany, France, and perhaps also Australia.  
At present, the majority of Japanese judges who study abroad do so as 
visiting scholars or court observers rather than degree candidates.103 Of the 
roughly twenty judges studying abroad in the United States in the 2013–2014 
academic year, three-quarters took up residence at law schools as visiting 
scholars, while the remainder were assigned to courts in various cities as 
observers.104 The General Secretariat, the administrative arm of the JSC, 
maintains a list of approximately fifteen American law schools that have 
regularly accepted Japanese judges as visiting scholars and are approved 
destinations.105 Although being sent abroad to study is no longer as excep-
tional as it once was, it is still considered a sign of professional promise and 
distinction. 
The practice of sending judges abroad has borne at least some fruit in 
the area of constitutional law. Several prominent judges who studied 
abroad, such as Jiro Nakamura, Yasuo Tokikuni, and Kojo Toshimaro, 
became known for importing ideas from American constitutional litigation 
to Japan, as in the case of the 1976 electoral malapportionment decision.106 
There have also been instances in which the JSC’s law clerks—who are 
themselves elite career judges assigned to the JSC on a temporary basis107—
have exposed the justices to foreign ideas and ways of thinking.108  
Nevertheless, the overall impact of the study-abroad program on the 
judiciary and the JSC in particular appears to be limited. The General 
Secretariat’s objectives in sending judges abroad are to “widen their views” 
and expose them to foreign legal systems that have influenced Japanese 
 
102 Judges are selected for study abroad by the Jimusōkyoku or General Secretariat of the 
Supreme Court, the powerful administrative arm of the judiciary that also selects judges to serve 
as chōsakan on the JSC and to work at the General Secretariat itself. See id. at 1556-58. 
103 See Interview with Judge 7, Japanese District Court Judge, in Location Concealed (Sept. 
10, 2013) (estimating that roughly twenty of the hundred or so members of his judicial cohort 
studied in the United States as visiting scholars, while only five or six did so as LL.M. candidates). 
104 See id. 
105 See id. In years past, the few judges who went abroad typically did so as LL.M. candidates. 
See Interview with Justice A, supra note 76. Today, a relatively small number who undergo a more 
rigorous selection process that includes a competitive examination still have the opportunity to earn 
an LL.M. at government expense. See Interview with Judge 7, supra note 103.  
106 See supra text accompanying notes 92-96. 
107 See Law, supra note 79, at 1556-57, 1579. 
108 See id. at 1583 n.241 (recounting the story of one justice’s exposure to the constitutional 
theory of John Hart Ely courtesy of a law clerk).  
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law.109 Several justices opined that, in reality, most judges have little 
opportunity to retain their foreign language skills after returning to Japan 
and become largely indistinguishable from those who were never sent 
abroad. In addition, relatively few of the justices themselves are likely to be 
alumni of the judiciary’s study-abroad program. The fifteen seats on the 
court are allocated among different segments of the legal profession on the 
basis of an informal quota system, and under current practice, six of the 
fifteen justices are selected from the ranks of the career judiciary.110 It is 
thus unlikely that more than one or two of those justices at any given time 
will have personally taken advantage of the study-abroad program.  
The remaining nine justices may be exposed to foreign law in other 
ways. Typically, four of the nine are former attorneys from private practice, 
two are former prosecutors, two are former government bureaucrats, and 
one is a former law professor.111 The frequent practice of selecting a former 
diplomat to occupy one of the two seats allocated to the bureaucracy has 
both the goal and the effect of equipping the court with native expertise in 
international law.112 It is also not unusual for one of the former attorneys on 
the court to have practiced international business law. The academic on the 
court is especially likely to have extensive exposure to foreign law. Law 
professors in Japan are much more likely to engage in comparative legal 
scholarship and to possess foreign legal training than their American 
counterparts,113 and a number of the professors to have served on the JSC 
have been renowned for their expertise in foreign law. Regardless of how 
they acquire foreign legal expertise, however, the justices who already 
possess such expertise are also the ones who are most likely to “go to the 
library themselves” to research foreign law.114  
The chōsakan, elite career judges who are selected by the General Secre-
tariat to assist the JSC for several years as law clerks,115 are neither required 
nor expected to possess foreign legal training or foreign language skills. 
 
109 Interview with Justice D, Current or Former Member of the Supreme Court of Japan, in 
Tokyo, Japan ( July 19, 2013). 
110 See Law, supra note 79, at 1551, 1564-74 (elaborating at length upon the manner in which 
seats on the JSC are filled in practice). 
111 See id. at 1568-69. 
112 See id. at 1571. 
113 See Colombo, supra note 99, at 747 (“[A]lmost every Japanese law professor reads (and 
very often speaks fluently) at least one, but often more than one foreign language … and has a 
deep knowledge of a foreign jurisdiction among the most ‘prestigious’: France, Germany, England 
or the US.”); infra Table 1 (contrasting the foreign educational credentials of constitutional law 
professors at elite Japanese and American law schools). 
114 Interview with Justice F, supra note 74. 
115 See Law, supra note 79, at 1557. 
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However, the fact that a particular judge has studied abroad is considered 
an “advantage” for purposes of chōsakan recruitment.116 In addition, the 
General Secretariat reportedly attempts to ensure that the JSC has at least 
one German-trained and one French-trained chōsakan (out of a total of 
thirty-seven) to address any needs for German or French legal research that 
may arise. In recent years, roughly half of the chōsakan at any given time are 
likely to have studied law overseas, a fact that reflects both the growing scope 
of the judiciary’s study-abroad program and the recruitment advantage 
enjoyed by alumni of the program. Most of the former chōsakan interviewed 
by the author reported that they had at some point performed foreign legal 
research, either upon their own initiative or at the request of a justice.  
E. Level of Interaction with Foreign Courts 
The JSC’s level of interaction with foreign courts falls between the  
extremes of the TCC, which is frequently thwarted by Taiwan’s lack of 
diplomatic recognition,117 and the KCC and HKCFA, both of which possess 
strong institutional ties to courts elsewhere.118 Members of the JSC have 
regular opportunities to make official visits to foreign courts and jurisdic-
tions. Each year, five of the fifteen justices are eligible to take a one-week 
overseas trip at the court’s expense. Their destinations have run the gamut 
from the usual suspects (such the U.S. Supreme Court and the ECtHR) to 
courts that are somewhat off the beaten path, such as the Supreme Court of 
the Vatican City State, the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and the Constitu-
tional Court of Slovenia. 
The extent to which individual justices actually travel overseas varies 
widely. In this respect, the JSC is probably no different from any other 
court.119 Over the course of roughly a decade on the JSC, one exceptionally 
well-traveled justice met judges from twenty-eight countries and visited 
every continent except South America, but this individual had served as a 
diplomat prior to joining the court and was by all accounts highly atypical. 
 
116 Interview with Justice F, supra note 74. 
117 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 540-43, 548-57 (describing Taiwan’s diplomatic isola-
tion and various consequences for the judiciary of this isolation); infra Section IV.E. 
118 See infra Sections III.E, V.E. 
119 The same could be said, for example, of European courts. See BOBEK, supra note 11, at 50 
(observing of Continental courts that “it tends to be always the same few members of the court 
who participate in the various international meetings”). Particular justices may have unique 
responsibilities that demand greater travel, such as the KCC member who represents South Korea 
before the Venice Commission, or the TCC member who played a leadership role in the Interna-
tional Association of Women Judges.  
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A more typical member of the JSC might journey abroad every other year. 
Several justices cited the pressures of the JSC’s enormous docket as a factor 
preventing more frequent travel.120  
Like many other courts, the JSC regularly welcomes judicial visitors from 
other countries, although its efforts at affirmative outreach pale in comparison 
to those of the KCC. The JSC does host a prominent legal figure from abroad 
on an annual basis. Past guests have included the chief justices of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court, the French Cour de cassation, the German  
Supreme Court, the ECtHR, and the U.S. Supreme Court. The guest is 
typically selected on the basis of group discussion among the fifteen justices. 
III. THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
A. Level of Foreign Law Citation 
It is relatively rare for the KCC to actually cite foreign law in its opin-
ions. Sources inside the KCC estimated that foreign law, in the form of 
judicial precedent or otherwise, is explicitly cited in no more than 5 to 10% 
of decisions.121  
B. Level of Foreign Law Usage 
Although the KCC is reluctant to cite foreign law, it has embraced the 
use of foreign law. The degree to which the KCC has routinized and 
institutionalized foreign legal research is breathtaking. Its mechanisms for 
researching and analyzing foreign law range from specialized researchers 
hired specifically for their foreign legal credentials, to the establishment of a 
freestanding research institute that publishes comparative constitutional 
scholarship and monitors the work of constitutional courts around the world.  
Sources inside the KCC gave estimates of how frequently foreign legal 
research is conducted that ranged from 60% of cases to “always.”122 The 
decision to research foreign law in a given case is usually made by the 
Constitutional Research Officer (CRO) responsible for preparing the bench 
memorandum. As discussed below, CROs are roughly equivalent to law 
clerks but are significantly more experienced and much more likely to 
 
120 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the size of the JSC’s docket). 
121 See, e.g., Interview with Official A, Current or Former Constitutional Research Officer of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, in Location Concealed (Feb. 25, 2011); Interview with 
Official B, Current or Former Constitutional Research Officer of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Korea, in Seoul, Korea ( July 6, 2011). 
122 Interview with Judge 1, Korean District Court Judge, in Location Concealed (Date Con-
cealed) (quoting a judge employed at the KCC). 
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possess foreign legal training than their American counterparts. On rare 
occasions—perhaps 5 to 10% of the time—foreign legal research will be 
performed at the specific request of a justice.123  
C. Jurisdictions Considered 
The jurisdictions most often considered by the KCC are Germany, the 
United States, and Japan, in roughly that order. Interest in the case law of 
the ECtHR is growing, and research on French law is also conducted from 
time to time. The KCC’s attention to German and Japanese law is partly a 
legacy of the imposition of Japanese law during the colonial period. Because 
Japanese law at the time was inspired by German law, Korean law borrows 
heavily but indirectly from German law as well. Research on German law is 
conducted at least half of the time.124  
American law receives attention in approximately 20% of cases and is 
especially likely to be considered in freedom of expression and habeas 
corpus cases. The lack of social and economic rights in the U.S. Constitu-
tion was identified by several sources as a factor that limits the relevance of 
American jurisprudence to the KCC. However, the use of American law is 
on the rise. Korean emphasis on the acquisition of English-language skills 
and interest in professional opportunities for American-trained lawyers 
have helped to tip the balance of foreign legal training away from German 
law toward American law. It is widely felt among younger Koreans, includ-
ing law students, that English opens a wider range of professional opportu-
nities than other languages such as German.  
Japanese law is considered in a small, and declining, proportion of cases, 
in the neighborhood of 15%. Cases involving older statutes that date back to 
Japan’s occupation of Korea continue to call for Japanese legal research. 
However, Japan was described as offering “little constitutional jurispru-
dence” and “little to learn” because the JSC is “too conservative” and “never 
strikes anything down.”125 Through the mid-1980s, the training curriculum 
for Korean judges included a Japanese language requirement. It is perhaps 
both a cause and a symptom of declining judicial interest in Japanese law 
that the requirement was abandoned in the late 1980s.  
Like the JSC and TCC, the KCC appears to pay relatively little attention 
to courts from common law jurisdictions other than the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
123 See Interview with Official A, supra note 121. 
124 See id.; E-Mail from Unnamed Official, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to 
author (Aug. 30, 2013, 03:37 EST) (on file with author). 
125 Interview with Official A, supra note 121. 
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Neither the Canadian Supreme Court nor the South African Constitutional 
Court was identified as a major influence or regular point of comparison. A 
recently retired justice opined that the KCC is “expanding its repertoire, 
slowly” and cited as evidence the deliberate recruitment of researchers to 
specialize in the European Court of Human Rights.126 However, when asked 
about the actual impact of the ECtHR, a veteran court official indicated that 
its jurisprudence is considered “from time to time,” but “not that often.”127 
The holdings in the KCC’s library offer a rough but quantifiable proxy 
for the court’s interest in specific jurisdictions and in foreign law more 
generally. Of the roughly 125,000 volumes held by the library, 55% are of 
foreign origin.128 The library’s constitutional law collection is skewed even 
more heavily in a comparative direction. German volumes make up 28% of 
the collection, while Korean volumes make up only 25.5%.129 English-
speaking jurisdictions (including the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the rest of the Commonwealth) together contribute 18.6% of the total, 
while Japan by itself accounts for 16%. Leading the remainder are France 
with 5% and Austria with 1.3%. 
D. Level of Foreign Law Expertise 
The KCC’s means of learning about foreign legal systems are remarkably 
varied and extensive. Its repositories of foreign legal expertise include: (1) the 
justices who have studied overseas; (2) the permanent law clerks who possess 
foreign legal expertise; (3) the law clerks hired as specialists in foreign law; 
(4) the law professors who work for the court on a part-time basis; (5) experts 
hired by the parties; and (6) the newly established Constitutional Research 
Institute. Each will be discussed in turn.  
1. The Justices Themselves 
With respect to the proportion of its membership that has studied law 
abroad, the KCC falls between the JSC and the TCC. Four of the nine 
 
126 Interview with Justice A, Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Korea, in Seoul, Korea (Sept. 6, 2011). 
127 Telephone Interview with Unnamed Official, Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Korea (Aug. 22, 2013). 
128 The figures reported here were provided to the author by the KCC library’s circulation 
desk in the form of a spreadsheet dated October 30, 2014. As of that date, the KCC’s library 
contained a total of 125,941 titles, of which 56,830 (or 45.12%) were classified as domestic in origin. 
129 Per the statistics cited above in note 128, the library holds 19,890 volumes on constitu-
tional law, 14,813 of which are of foreign origin. In the area of constitutional law, German volumes 
outnumber Korean volumes by a margin of 5647 to 5077. 
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justices have studied law overseas: three hold LL.M. degrees from the 
United States (two from the University of Michigan, one from Southern 
Methodist University), and one studied criminal law at the Max Planck 
Institute in Germany.130 The members of the KCC have all traditionally 
been recruited from the career judiciary or the prosecutor’s office; no law 
professor has ever been appointed to the KCC.  
The level of foreign training possessed by the justices is likely to grow 
over time as a result of the Korean judiciary’s expanding study-abroad 
program.131 At present, the Korean judiciary provides funding for roughly 
sixty judges to study overseas for one year at government expense.132 Judges 
who apply successfully for this program are awarded full tuition and a 
stipend that is slightly lower than their usual judicial salary.133 Another 
forty or so judges are given a lower level of financial support to study 
abroad for a shorter period of six months as visiting scholars.134 Judges are 
ordinarily eligible to apply for the study-abroad program from their seventh 
through tenth years of service. Given that there are roughly two hundred 
judges in any given cohort, the overall proportion of Korean judges who 
study abroad at some point approaches, if not exceeds, one-half.135  
Moreover, the Korean Supreme Court has recently announced a dramatic 
expansion of the program: all judges appointed after 2003 have now been 
promised the opportunity to study abroad, albeit as visiting scholars rather 
than degree candidates.136 
The official application for overseas study lists as possible destinations 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Swit-
zerland, Japan, China, Spain, Russia, Australia, and Italy, but the list is not 
exclusive, and other countries may be requested “with enough evidence of 
necessity.” Judges express their preferences for particular institutions from a 
list approved by the Korean Supreme Court, which allocates applicants 
among the various institutions. The judges themselves are then responsible 
 
130 See E-mail from Unnamed Official, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to 
author (Sept. 5, 2013, 20:57 EST) (on file with author); E-mail from Unnamed Official, Constitu-
tional Court of the Republic of Korea, to author (Sept. 5, 2013, 19:39 EST) (on file with author). 
131 The Korean Ministry of Justice operates a comparable program for prosecutors. 
132 See Interview with Judge 1, supra note 122. 
133 See id.; REPUBLIC OF KOREA JUDICIARY, OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., PERSONNEL 
ADMIN. AGENCY, 2013 NYEONDO HAEUEYEONSU ANNAE [2013 STUDY ABROAD GUIDE] 6-
7 (on file with author). 
134 See Interview with Judge 1, supra note 122. 
135 There are roughly 200 judges in any given cohort, which means that approximately 800 
judges are within the four-year eligibility window at any given time. Meanwhile, over the course of 
any given four-year period, roughly 400 judges will be selected for some form of overseas study. 
136 See Interview with Judge 1, supra note 122. 
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for gaining admission to the institutions to which they are assigned. As a 
practical matter, a major obstacle to a successful application is demonstration 
of the requisite language skills: some judges attend cram school on weekends 
in order to muster the necessary TOEFL score. 
Notwithstanding the historical importance of German and Japanese law, 
roughly two-thirds of Korean judges opt for English-speaking jurisdictions, 
with a particular bias in favor of the United States. For the 2013–2014 
academic year, out of a total of sixty-five judges receiving full funding for 
their overseas studies, forty-three selected English-speaking countries, of 
whom the overwhelming majority (thirty-five) chose the United States 
(thirteen as LL.M. students and twenty-two more as visiting scholars).137 
The United Kingdom has three, Canada and Australia each have two, and 
one opted for the Netherlands (which the Korean judiciary classifies as an 
English-speaking jurisdiction for purposes of study abroad).138 By contrast, 
eight judges went to German-speaking countries (six to Germany itself, one 
to Austria, and one to Switzerland).139 Only two chose Japan, which is now 
tied with China and is less popular than either France (five judges) or Spain 
(three judges).140  
Both the judicial preference for English-speaking countries, and the level 
of familiarity in Korea with American law more generally, are likely to grow 
in the future. A number of Korean judges attributed the preference for 
English-speaking countries to the heavy premium that Korean society 
places on the acquisition of English-language skills. Judges view time spent 
in the United States as an opportunity for their children to be exposed to 
the American educational system and to learn English. Law students in 
particular value English for the access that it gives them to the American 
legal market as well as elite Korean law firms, which have recruited large 
numbers of foreign-qualified lawyers.141 These trends are both reflected and 
reinforced by government regulation of Korean legal education. The law 
school accreditation committee established by the Korean ministry of 
education has adopted guidelines that call upon Korean law schools to offer 
 
137 See E-mail from Unnamed Official, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to 
author (Oct. 1, 2013, 19:28 EST) (on file with author).  
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See Anthony Lin, Made In USA, ASIAN LAW., July 2013, at 16, 16-17 (citing statistics on 
the prevalence of foreign-qualified attorneys at top Korean law firms, and noting that the “vast 
majority of foreign lawyers at Korean firms are Korean Americans or Korean nationals who 
studied law in the United States”). 
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at least eight courses in foreign languages.142 Although some law schools 
offer courses in Japanese and Chinese, the majority of the foreign-language 
offerings are in English.143 
2. Constitutional Research Officers (CROs) 
Compared to their counterparts elsewhere in East Asia or in the United 
States, the justices of the KCC enjoy access to higher levels of research 
assistance and foreign legal expertise. The KCC has at its disposal four 
types of support personnel who possess varying levels of foreign legal 
training and perform a combination of distinct and overlapping tasks: 
Constitutional Research Officers (CROs), Constitutional Researchers 
(CRs), Academic Advisers, and researchers at the KCC’s Constitutional 
Research Institute.  
Of these four types, the CROs are most analogous to law clerks of the 
American variety but are more numerous and more experienced. Most 
CROs are permanent employees who have passed the infamously demand-
ing Korean bar examination144 and are comparable in rank and pay to career 
judges. They are hired not by individual justices, but by the President of 
the KCC upon a collective vote of the justices.145 Relatively demanding 
eligibility requirements are imposed by statute: a CRO must be a judge, 
prosecutor, or attorney; a legal academic of assistant professor rank or 
higher at an accredited university; a “Grade 4 or higher” public employee 
with five or more years of experience in “law-related positions in state 
agencies”; or a holder of a doctorate in law with five or more years of “law-
related” experience in a state agency, university, or other research institute 
specified by KCC regulation.146 Those who pass the selection process serve 
for renewable ten-year terms. A relatively inexperienced CRO may possess 
two to four years of experience; some possess over a decade of experience 
and have served longer than the justices themselves.  
 
142 See E-mail from Yukyong Choe, Research Fellow, Judicial Policy Research Institute,  
Supreme Court of Korea, to author (Sept. 9, 2013 10:00:27 CST) (on file with author) (citing 
Ministry of Education, Science & Technology Directive 3.1.2.5).  
143 See id. 
144 Historically, the bar pass rate in Korea has rarely exceeded 5%. See Kyong-Whan Ahn, 
Law Reform in Korea and the Agenda of “Graduate Law School,” 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 223, 227 (2007). 
Both the bar examination system and the bar pass rate are currently in flux due to profound 
reforms of Korean legal education, including the introduction of American-style graduate law 
schools that award J.D. degrees in lieu of undergraduate law programs. See Thomas Chih-hsiung 
Chen, Legal Education Reform in Taiwan: Are Japan and Korea the Models?, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 32, 
34 (2012) (discussing legal education reforms in Korea). 
145 See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, supra note 88, at 115-16. 
146 Id. (referencing the Constitutional Court Act as amended as of 1991). 
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The KCC also has at its disposal a number of temporary CROs. The 
Korean Supreme Court has a longstanding practice of dispatching judges to 
assist the KCC. Likewise, the Ministry of Justice regularly loans prosecu-
tors to the KCC to serve as CROs. As of this writing, the KCC has over 
seventy CROs in total, including fifty-six regular CROs (five of whom are 
currently seconded to the Constitutional Research Institute), fourteen 
judges on loan from the Korean Supreme Court, four prosecutors on loan 
from the Ministry of Justice, and two temporary CROs on loan from 
miscellaneous government agencies (one from the Korean equivalent of the 
Internal Revenue Service and another from the Ministry of Government 
Legislation).  
Under reforms initiated by the KCC’s newly installed chief justice in 2013, 
a majority of the CROs are assigned to individual justices. Court administra-
tors assign to each justice the equivalent of three and a half CROs.147 
Typically, each justice is assigned two regular CROs plus a career judge on 
loan from the Korean Supreme Court. In addition, each justice shares a 
CRO from the prosecutor’s office with one other justice. With the excep-
tion of a handful who perform administrative or supervisory roles, the 
remaining CROs are divided by subject matter into three teams: liberty 
rights (meaning civil and political rights), economic and property rights, 
and social welfare rights (a category that includes pension and social 
security issues). The KCC’s Constitutional Researchers and Academic 
Advisers, who possess extensive foreign legal expertise,148 are also divided 
among the three subject-matter teams. The clerks assigned to individual 
justices handle routine cases, especially those that can be dismissed for 
jurisdictional or justiciability reasons. Difficult or controversial cases are 
referred to the subject-matter teams for group discussion.  
Over half of the regular CROs have studied law overseas, and all are 
guaranteed the opportunity to do so at government expense after three or 
four years of service.149 As of this writing, out of fifty-six regular CROs, 
twenty-five have studied in the United States as either LL.M. candidates or 
visiting scholars, while six have studied in Europe (specifically, Germany, 
France, and Spain). This geographical breakdown reflects a significant shift 
 
147 The justices do not have the ability to select their own CROs from the overall pool. Other-
wise, explained one administrator, “there would be a big mess, even war” among the justices over the 
most capable CROs. E-mail from Unnamed Official, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, 
to author (Aug. 29, 2013, 22:24 EST). 
148 See infra subsections III.D.3, III.D.4 (discussing the foreign training of the KCC’s Consti-
tutional Researchers and Academic Advisers). 
149 See Interview with Official B, supra note 121 (indicating that “literally everyone” who 
works as a CRO will eventually have studied law overseas). 
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in emphasis away from Germany toward the United States. A veteran 
administrator at the KCC reminisced that most of the initial cohort of 
CROs circa 1988 had studied law in Germany before joining the KCC and 
came of age at a time when German was widely taught in Korean high 
schools. By contrast, more recent CROs who arrive at the KCC with the 
intention of studying in Germany sometimes switch to the United States. 
The longer history of judicial review in the United States was cited as one 
factor. Other reasons for the shift toward the United States resemble those 
given by judges participating in the Korean Supreme Court’s study-abroad 
program, including the opportunity for children to learn English.  
Foreign legal study is not limited to enrollment at academic institutions. 
The KCC also stations CROs directly with foreign courts. Since 2011, the 
KCC has arranged for CROs to spend six months at the U.S. Supreme Court 
performing research on specific topics. To be selected for this program, a 
CRO must have previously studied in the United States as either a visiting 
scholar or LL.M. candidate. Likewise, the KCC has dispatched CROs to the 
German Constitutional Court to perform analogous research. Prior work 
experience can also be a source of foreign legal expertise, as in the case of one 
CRO who clerked at the South African Constitutional Court before joining 
the KCC. 
Nor does the study of foreign law cease once CROs have returned 
home. In recent years, the CROs have organized study groups that translate 
prominent works of foreign legal scholarship into Korean. The resulting 
translations are distributed internally within the KCC.150 Other study 
groups have focused on German and Spanish constitutional law. The KCC 
also regularly hosts international conferences that present additional 
opportunities for learning about foreign law. Both speakers at the court’s 
first international symposium in 2012 hailed from Germany, while the 
December 2013 international symposium on the topic of welfare policy and 
constitutional adjudication featured prominent scholars from Germany, 
France, and the United States.  
3. Constitutional Researchers (CRs) 
As if the foreign legal expertise of the CROs were not enough, the KCC 
further bolsters its foreign legal research capabilities through the use of both 
 
150 In 2006, for example, the U.S. constitutional law study group collectively translated the 
second edition of Professor Chemerinsky’s constitutional law treatise, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2d ed. 2002), and in 2009, it selected 
Professor Farber’s treatise on the First Amendment, DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 2002). 
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Constitutional Researchers (CRs) and Academic Advisers. The defining 
characteristic of CRs, as opposed to CROs, is that CRs are required to hold 
advanced degrees in foreign law and are hired specifically for their expertise 
in foreign law. Also unlike CROs, CRs are not permanent employees but 
instead work for the court under one-year contracts that are renewable up to 
a maximum of five years. As of this writing, a total of five CRs are divided 
among the three subject-matter teams.  
CRs are asked to perform foreign legal research in one of two ways. 
First, the head of a team may ask a CR to write a memorandum on how a 
pending case would be decided in a foreign jurisdiction. Second, CRs 
routinely field requests from CROs for focused research on foreign law in 
connection with specific cases. However, there is nothing to prevent 
experienced or knowledgeable CROs from choosing to handle foreign legal 
research themselves rather than delegate it to a CR. 
The educational backgrounds of the CRs reflect the emphasis attached 
to certain countries. As of this writing, one holds a doctorate in German 
law, another holds a doctorate in Japanese law, and three were trained in the 
United States (two J.D. holders and one S.J.D. holder). The two CRs 
assigned to the civil and political rights team are both U.S.-trained. The 
social rights team has one U.S.-trained CR and one German-trained CR, 
while the Japanese-trained CR is attached to the economic and property 
rights team. Because expertise on particular countries is unevenly allocated 
across teams, CRs routinely receive requests for help from other teams. 
CRs are also expected to provide coverage of additional countries according 
to their language skills. For example, U.S.-trained CRs have been asked to 
research British law, while the German-trained CR may be tasked with 
Austrian legal research. 
Expertise on specific countries tends to be in greater demand for certain 
topics than for others. For example, civil and political rights cases were 
described by a CR as requiring more foreign legal research, “especially into 
U.S. law.” By contrast, U.S. law is viewed as less relevant to social welfare 
rights cases “because we know the U.S. Constitution doesn’t have social 
rights provisions.”151  
4. Academic Advisers 
The KCC also hires three professors in the fields of constitutional and 
administrative law as “Academic Advisers” on a contractual basis. One 
Academic Adviser is currently attached to each of the three subject-matter 
 
151 Telephone Interview with Unnamed Official, supra note 127. 
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teams. Academic Advisers have part-time contracts and spend two days per 
week at the KCC participating in team discussion of pending cases and 
consulting with the justices and head CRO.  
The standards of Korean legal academia ensure as a practical matter that 
the professors who are recruited by the KCC possess extensive comparative 
legal expertise. Constitutional law professors who lack foreign law degrees 
are a rare breed in Korea. Historically, it was difficult to find employment 
as a constitutional law professor in Korea without German legal training or 
language skills. Among younger generations of scholars, however, training 
in common law jurisdictions in lieu of Germany has become increasingly 
common, if not typical. 
5. Experts Hired by the Parties 
The KCC holds oral argument in only a small handful of highly important 
or controversial cases, on the order of one or two cases monthly.152 In these 
rare cases, both sides to the dispute tend to retain foreign law experts alongside 
regular counsel.153 These experts—many of whom are former CROs in private 
practice or legal academia—submit written opinions then present their 
opinions at oral argument.154 
From time to time, court-appointed attorneys may also perform foreign 
law research, but the amount is likely to be limited. By statute, all litigants 
before the KCC must be represented by counsel,155 and the KCC has the 
power to appoint state-funded attorneys not only for indigent parties, but also 
whenever it would be in the public interest to do so.156 Roughly sixty attorneys 
per year are appointed from a list of eligible attorneys that includes former 
members of the KCC and former CROs as well as numerous individuals 
nominated by the Korean Bar Association.157 Although these attorneys 
sometimes research foreign law, most are not foreign law experts,158 and the 
extremely modest compensation that they receive—a flat rate of roughly $700 
 
152 See E-mail from Unnamed Official, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to 
author (Mar. 15, 2014, 08:00:09 EST) (on file with author). 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, supra note 88, at 122 (citing the Constitutional 
Court Act). 
156 See id. at 123. 
157 See E-mail from Unnamed Official, supra note 152. In 2012, the KCC appointed a total of 
sixty-two lawyers. See id. 
158 See E-mail from Unnamed Official, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, to 
author (Mar. 11, 2014, 03:32 CST) (on file with author). 
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per case—further limits the amount of foreign legal research that they can be 
expected to conduct.159 
6. The Constitutional Research Institute 
In 2011, the Korean legislature authorized the creation of a Constitutional 
Research Institute (the Hunbeob Jaepan Yongu Won, or CRI) under the 
auspices of the KCC. The CRI is billed on its website as “a hub for research 
and education on constitution[s] and constitutional adjudication.”160 The 
KCC announcement of the CRI’s creation hails South Korea for being “the 
first among some 80 countries having specialized and independent constitu-
tional adjudication bodies to have created a research institution under the 
authority of a constitutional court.”161 The CRI was established during the 
tenure of former KCC Chief Justice Kang-Kook Lee, who desired that the 
KCC become the standard-bearer for constitutional adjudication in Asia and 
fashion a viable jurisprudential alternative to the traditionally dominant 
European and American models.162 The CRI would further these goals, it 
was argued, by equipping the KCC with the capacity to analyze, critique, 
and improve upon foreign approaches. 
Led by the former dean of a prominent Korean law school, the CRI is 
housed in a separate building from the KCC and boasts a staff of approxi-
mately twenty-five researchers. Most of the CRI’s researchers are contract 
employees limited to a maximum term of five years, and CROs on loan 
from the KCC serve in supervisory roles. The researchers are divided into 
four teams: Comparative Constitutional Law, Legal Systems (or Legal 
Institutions), Basic Rights, and Instruction (or Education). With the 
exception of the Education Team—which is also the smallest of the four 
 
159 See E-mail from Unnamed Official, supra note 152. 
160 Greetings, CONST. CT. KOREA: CONST. RES. INST., http://ri.ccourt.go.kr/eng (follow 
“About CRI” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PU5N-K4YD. 
161 Constitutional Research Institute Opens on Jan. 10, CONST. CT. KOREA, ( Jan. 10, 2011, 
13:16:22), www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome/news_view.jsp?seq=106, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/8E3M-W2AF. A senior KCC official acknowledged that the Peruvian Constitutional 
Court also possesses its own dedicated research institute, the Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 
albeit one that is much smaller in scale. The Argentinian Supreme Court also possesses a research 
institute. See Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, Argentina (describing the creation of a Foreign Research 
and Reference Institute within the Argentinian Supreme Court Library), in THE IMPACT OF 
FOREIGN LAW ON DOMESTIC JUDGMENTS 4, 7 (The Law Library of Congress, Mar. 2010), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/domestic-judgment/impact-of-foreign-law.pdf. 
162 See Telephone Interview with Unnamed Official, supra note 127. The KCC has openly pro-
claimed its goal of promoting throughout the world a “Korean system of constitutional justice” that 
“differs from the German or U.S. models.” The 3rd Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional 
Justice Ends in Success, CONST. CT. KOREA (Oct. 2, 2014), http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/eng/ 
introduction/news/newsDetail.do?bbsSeq=18, archived at http://perma.cc/864R-ZEVB. 
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teams—the work of the CRI has thus far emphasized the study of foreign 
constitutional law in one form or another.163 Its publications include annual 
reports on worldwide trends in constitutional adjudication and bimonthly  
e-mail newsletters that have touched on a wide range of countries from 
Algeria and Belgium to Peru and Serbia.164  
On occasion, the CRI does address explicitly domestic issues. For  
example, the Legal Systems team’s responsibilities include the study of 
constitutional issues surrounding Korean reunification. Even this issue, 
however, has called for foreign legal research (on the topic of German 
reunification), and the majority of the research papers generated by the 
Legal Systems team have focused on various aspects of constitutional justice 
in other countries, such as the operation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
amicus curiae system and France’s transition from abstract to concrete 
judicial review in 2008. 
CRI researchers are akin to the KCC’s in-house CRs in several respects: 
they possess advanced degrees in foreign law, and their primary responsibility 
is foreign legal research. Three-quarters hold doctorates, while the remainder 
hold a J.D. or LL.M. from the United States. However, the two types of 
researchers perform complementary functions. Those at the KCC perform 
comparative research dictated by the adjudication-related demands of 
specific cases, whereas those at the CRI propose and pursue in-depth 
comparative research projects, free from the urgency of having to resolve 
pending cases. In other words, although researchers at both the KCC and 
CRI perform foreign legal research, those at the CRI do so proactively as 
opposed to reactively.  
To expand its geographic coverage, the CRI also hires Korean-speaking 
“foreign correspondents” who reside in other countries and either possess 
legal training or work in the legal profession. Foreign correspondents are 
responsible for keeping the CRI apprised on a regular basis of constitutional 
adjudication in their respective countries. A recent vacancy announcement 
for positions in “Spanish-speaking countries,” for example, provides that 
correspondents will be required to submit bimonthly reports, for which they 
will be paid approximately $180 each.165 
 
163 The remit of the Education Team is to educate prospective attorneys, government em-
ployees, and the general public on issues of constitutionalism and the rule of law. 
164 Telephone Interview with Unnamed Official, supra note 127.  
165 A copy of the vacancy announcement is on file with the author. 
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E. Level of Interaction with Foreign Courts 
In stark contrast to the TCC, the KCC’s level of engagement with  
foreign courts can only be described as extremely high. Its international 
outreach efforts are made possible by a combination of ambitious goals, 
considerable resources, and unhindered access to foreign audiences. The 
KCC boasts publicly of “transferring its experience and knowledge to a 
number of other countries, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, 
Thailand, and Turkey.”166 The court’s heavy commitment to foreign 
interaction is reflected by the existence of a full-time International Affairs 
Division with responsibility for organizing international conferences, 
receiving foreign delegations, and supporting overseas visits by members of 
the court.167  
The KCC has capitalized upon its involvement in international organi-
zations to boost its influence and status in a number of ways. In 2006, South 
Korea became the first and only Asian member of the Venice Commission, 
the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters and the 
practical equivalent of an intergovernmental think tank for promoting 
constitutionalism and the rule of law.168 A visit to Europe by the president 
of the KCC coincided with a desire on the part of the Commission to 
expand its membership and influence to Asia, and South Korea was soon 
thereafter invited to join the organization. Within the KCC, the invitation 
was widely construed as “evidence of global recognition” and acceptance of 
the KCC as the “epitome of Korean liberal democracy and rule of law.”169 
Thus far, South Korea’s representatives on the Commission have been 
drawn from the KCC,170 and the KCC’s own account of its first twenty 
 
166 The 3rd Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice Ends in Success, supra note 162. 
167 See Interview with Unnamed Official, Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea, in 
Seoul, Korea (Dec. 19, 2014) (indicating that staffing levels at the International Affairs Division 
doubled to roughly twenty people to cope with preparations for the World Conference of 
Constitutional Justice hosted by the KCC); Organization, CONST. CT. KOREA, 
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/eng/introduction/organization/organization.do (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5VL2-BYQD (disclosing the existence of the “Interna-
tional Affairs Division” within the KCC’s “Planning and Coordination Office”). 
168 The Venice Commission is known formally as the European Commission for Democracy 
Through Law and was founded following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but its ambitions and 
operations now extend well beyond legal reform in the former Soviet bloc countries. See Paolo G. 
Carozza, “My Friend Is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1067 (2003) (summarizing the history and goals of the Venice Commission). 
169 See Telephone Interview with Unnamed Official, supra note 127. 
170 As of this writing, the South Korean delegate to the Venice Commission is Justice Il-Won 
Kang of the KCC. See Members of the Venice Commission, COUNCIL EUR.: VENICE COMMISSION, 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/members/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/839W-6ZWD. 
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years brags of its responsibility as the “constitutional court of a country 
with a flourishing constitutional system” for “assisting newly democratizing 
countries” via the Venice Commission.171  
The KCC is not content merely to participate in international judicial 
organizations, but instead aggressively pursues leadership opportunities. 
With the encouragement and financial support of the Venice Commission, 
the KCC established in 2010 the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts 
(AACC),172 a regional organization that mirrors the Commission’s objec-
tives173 and counts as its charter members the constitutional courts of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uzbekistan, 
in addition to the KCC itself. The KCC has made no secret of either its 
role in the AACC or its desire to enhance Korean influence and status 
through such initiatives. The AACC’s website praises the KCC’s “leading 
role” in launching the organization and characterizes the AACC’s first 
meeting as “a good opportunity for Korea to enhance its international status 
as chair country that led the AACC’s creation and also to promote to the 
world about [sic] its economic development and judicial advancement.”174 
Korean leadership, if not domination, of the AACC is further evidenced by 
the absence of Japan, Taiwan, and China. Although overtures were made to 
both the JSC and TCC, the AACC is viewed by the TCC as a thoroughly 
Korean undertaking, while various members of the JSC professed ignorance 
of the AACC’s existence. More recently—and once again with the  
endorsement of the Venice Commission—the KCC has also proposed the 
creation of an Asian Court of Human Rights, which it would play a leading 
role in organizing.175 
 
171 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, supra note 88, at 143. 
172 See 7th Conference of Asian Constitutional Court Judges Dealing With “Election Laws,”  
KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG: RULE L. PROGRAMME ASIA, http://www.kas.de/rspa/en/ 
events/41710 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4B4H-64SF (noting the 
adoption of the Jakarta Declaration, which established the Association of Asian Constitutional 
Courts). 
173 For a formal statement of the AACC’s objectives, see Statute, ASS’N ASIAN CONST. 
CTS. & EQUIVALENT INSTITUTIONS, http://www.aaccei.org/ccourt?act=statute, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FVN7-Y7XD. 
174 See The Constitutional Court of Korea to Host the AACC’s Inaugural Congress, ASS’N ASIAN 
CONST. CTS. & EQUIVALENT INSTITUTIONS (May 16, 2012), http://www.aaccei.org/ccourt? 
act=noticeView&bbsId=3100&bbsSeqn=245, archived at http://perma.cc/CW8D-AVCF. 
175 See 3RD CONG. OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, 
SEOUL COMMUNIQUÉ (Sept. 30, 2014), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/wccj/seoul/ 
WCCJ_Seoul_Communique-E.pdf (describing “the initiative of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Korea to promote discussions on human rights co-operation, including the possibility 
of establishing an Asian human rights court”). 
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International conferences are another part of the KCC’s strategy for 
achieving prominence in the judicial world. Membership in the Venice 
Commission contributed to the selection of South Korea to host the third 
congress of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice (WCCJ) in 
September of 2014.176 The Commission acts as the secretariat for the WCCJ 
and reportedly favored an Asian venue after the first two meetings in Cape 
Town and Rio de Janeiro.177 After broaching the possibility with the KCC, 
it chose South Korea over Indonesia to host the event.178 The KCC seized 
upon this opportunity to promote itself and assert its leadership within the 
region. Its efforts to impress the foreign judges in attendance included a 
multimedia campaign featuring Olympic figure skater and beloved national 
icon Yuna Kim as the official Goodwill Ambassador of the Constitutional 
Court of Korea.179 It also capitalized upon the high-profile forum of the 
WCCJ to unveil its proposal for an Asian Court of Human Rights.180 As 
with the AACC, the congress was held without the participation of Japan, 
Taiwan, or China. 
IV. THE TAIWANESE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
A. Level of Foreign Law Citation 
The published opinions of the TCC give the superficial appearance of a 
court that makes relatively little use of foreign law. Actual citation of foreign 
law is rare, especially in majority opinions. Of the 644 constitutional deci-
sions rendered from January 1949 to June 2008, only four majority opinions 
(0.62%) cited foreign judicial precedent, and only eight (1.4%) cited a foreign 
constitution or statute.181 Concurring and dissenting opinions are more likely 
 
176 See Overview, 3RD CONGRESS WORLD CONF. ON CONST. JUST., http:// 
en.wccj2014.kr/eng/wccj3/overview.do (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
FHY5-U56C (describing the congress and its venue). 
177 E-mail from Unnamed Official, Constitutional Court of Korea, to author (Sept. 16, 2013, 
20:32 EST). 
178 See id. 
179 See Yuna Kim’s Promotional Video for 3rd Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional 
Justice (WCCJ), ALL THAT YUNA (Sept. 18, 2014), http://yunakimfan.com/2014/09/18/40786, 
archived at http://perma.cc/VE7Z-MNPT (featuring English and Korean promotional videos in 
which Yuna Kim introduces herself as “Goodwill Ambassador for the Constitutional Court of 
Korea” and hails the conference for “bring[ing] together the top leaders of constitutional justice 
such as presidents of constitutional courts and chief justices of supreme courts from almost 100 
countries around the world”). 
180 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
181 Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 557; see also Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Judges as 
Discursive Agent: The Use of Foreign Precedents by the Constitutional Court of Taiwan (analyzing the 
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than majority opinions to mention foreign law: out of 554 separate opinions 
authored over the same period, 74 (13.4%) cited foreign precedent, while 121 
(21.8%) cited foreign constitutions or statutes.182  
The lack of explicit citation of foreign law is attributable at least partly 
to the conventions of judicial opinion-writing in Taiwan. Traditionally, 
opinions for the court are concise and do not contain footnotes. As a result, 
any references to foreign law must take up limited space in the main text of 
the opinion, which renders them conspicuous and awkward. By contrast, 
separate opinions follow what one justice described as a “less rigid” form 
that allows for footnotes.183 Consequently, separate opinions cite foreign 
law more frequently than majority opinions, and 80% of those citations 
appear in footnotes.  
B. Level of Foreign Law Usage 
The TCC’s published opinions barely hint at the full extent to which the 
court investigates foreign law. For a majority of the justices, comparative 
constitutional analysis is a virtually automatic practice. Multiple justices 
indicated that they “consult foreign constitutional materials” in “almost 
every case” or “ninety-plus percent” of the time.184 The rare exceptions are 
cases in which foreign law is obviously unhelpful or irrelevant, such as a 
separation-of-powers dispute involving the Examination Yuan, one of the five 
branches of a convoluted governmental structure that is part of Sun-Yat Sen’s 
intellectual legacy and unique to the Republic of China’s Constitution.185 
 
TCC’s use of foreign precedent through 2010), in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES, supra note 11, at 373, 381-86. 
182 Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 557. 
183 Interview with Justice B, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 19, 2010). 
184 Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 12, 2010); Interview with Justice B, supra note 183; see 
also, e.g., Interview with Justice K, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan ( Jan. 3, 2011) (deeming it “really obvious that German-
trained justices will investigate German law maybe eighty to ninety percent of the time”); 
Interview with Clerk 2, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 17, 2010) (observing that foreign legal research occurs in “almost 
every case”). But see Interview with Justice I, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010) (indicating that the frequency of 
foreign legal research is “definitely not ninety-plus percent of the time”). 
185 See MINGUO XIANFA ZENGXIU TIAOWEN art. 6 (2000) (Taiwan) (setting forth the powers 
and composition of the Examination Yuan). Notwithstanding its defeat in mainland China at the 
hands of the Communists, the Republic of China continues to control Taiwan and a number of 
smaller neighboring islands. See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 540-43 (summarizing the history of 
the Republic of China, and describing the competing claims to sovereignty over Taiwan). 
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Even the justices who are relatively infrequent users of foreign law by 
the standards of the TCC still use it frequently in absolute terms. The most 
conservative estimate of foreign law usage was given by a law clerk who 
indicated that the justice for whom he works, a career judge, consults 
foreign law in one or two out of every six cases. It was widely (but not 
universally) agreed that justices appointed from the career judiciary tend to 
be more skeptical of the value and relevance of foreign law than those from 
academic backgrounds.186 The justices who were not themselves former 
academics tended to be more circumspect about the extent to which they 
consult foreign law, saying only that “it depends on the case,”187 or that they 
engage in comparative research “only if we think there is relevant foreign 
law to guide us.”188 
When hired, law clerks are often told that their “primary responsibility” 
will be comparative legal research.189 For the small minority of cases that 
are decided on the merits, comparative legal research is “the most basic 
thing” that the clerks do and is required “probably 100% of the time.”190 
Various clerks also reported that analysis of the TCC’s own precedent 
typically comprises only a “very small portion” of the reports that they 
prepare for the justices on each case; the “vast majority” of the typical 
report is foreign legal research.191 Indeed, foreign constitutional law is taken 
so seriously that the Taiwanese judiciary itself publishes and sells hard-
bound Chinese translations of case law from constitutional courts that are 
considered most influential in Taiwan—namely, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and, most recently, the ECtHR, but no 
longer the JSC.192  
 
186 Compare, e.g., Interview with Justice C, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010), Interview with Clerk 6, Law 
Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 25, 
2010), Interview with Clerk 8, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010), and Interview with Clerk 9, Law Clerk to a Justice of 
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010) (all indicating 
that career judges are less inclined to use foreign law), with Interview with Justice B, supra note 
183, and Interview with Clerk 3, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010) (arguing that career judges are no less inclined to use 
foreign law).  
187 Interview with Justice G, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010). 
188 Interview with Justice I, supra note 184. 
189 Interview with Clerk 1, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 17, 2010); Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184. 
190 Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 186. 
191 Interview with Clerk 1, supra note 189; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184. 
192 Sources inside the TCC attribute the Judicial Yuan’s recent discontinuation of the transla-
tion of JSC decisions to a “lack of resources,” Interview with Justice B, supra note 183, combined 
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All agreed that consulting foreign constitutional materials is simply not 
controversial, and that there is no meaningful correlation between a justice’s 
“politics” in a “liberal” versus “conservative” sense and his or her willingness 
to consider foreign law. As one clerk observed, “Conservatives use foreign law 
too. They all use it.”193 
C. Jurisdictions Considered 
The major objects of comparative study for the TCC are Germany, the 
United States, Austria, and Japan. However, interest in Japanese constitu-
tional law is in sharp and conspicuous decline, as evidenced by the Taiwanese 
judiciary’s decision to stop publishing translations of JSC decisions. Much as 
in Korea, officials attributed the turn away from Japanese jurisprudence to the 
JSC’s overwhelming conservatism in the area of constitutional law and 
consequent failure to produce noteworthy constitutional jurisprudence.194 By 
contrast, consideration of ECtHR and Korean jurisprudence remains rare 
but is on the rise. From time to time, the TCC’s clerks survey countries in 
the English-speaking world other than the United States. Historically, the 
TCC enjoyed a close relationship with the South African judiciary in 
particular: South Africa under apartheid was one of the few nations that 
extended diplomatic recognition to Taiwan and hosted Taiwanese judges on 
an official basis.195 Those ties, however, have lapsed, and neither the South 
African Constitutional Court nor any other common law court apart from 
 
with the fact that the influence of the JSC on Taiwanese constitutional law “is obviously declining, 
severely,” Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184. This decline was attributed, in turn, to a variety 
of mutually reinforcing factors. One is the growing willingness and greater ability on the part of 
the justices to “cut out the middleman” and look directly to U.S. and German law, from which 
Japanese constitutional jurisprudence borrows heavily. Interview with Justice B, supra note 183. 
Another is the fact that few of the current justices or clerks have Japanese legal training, which 
both reflects and accelerates the decline of Japanese influence. Third is a growing sense that the 
JSC is simply too conservative and too willing to uphold government action for its decisions to be 
of continuing interest or use to the TCC. On the increasingly rare occasions that a justice attempts 
to argue in favor of the (invariably conservative) Japanese approach, other justices are said to 
object that Japan is “not really an open, free country,” that there is consequently “no need to look 
at what they’re saying,” Interview with Clerk 5, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010), and that Taiwan ought to look to 
“more advanced or progressive countries.” Interview with Clerk 6, supra note 186; accord Interview 
with Clerk 8, supra note 186; Interview with Clerk 4, Law Clerk to a Justice of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 22, 2010). Yet another cause, related to the 
immediately preceding one, is that Japanese legal scholarship has become a substitute for Japanese 
case law because, compared to the case law, the scholarship is more “solid,” “fully developed,” and 
“critical” and thus of greater use to the TCC. Interview with Clerk 4, supra. 
193 Interview with Clerk 5, supra note 192. 
194 See supra note 192. 
195 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 548. 
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the U.S. Supreme Court was described by any of the justices or clerks 
interviewed as a regular source of inspiration. 
There is a strong relationship between the educational backgrounds of 
the justices and the sources of foreign law that they prefer to cite. Justices 
with German law degrees account for 87% of citations to German precedent 
and 60% of citations to German constitutional or statutory provisions.196 
Likewise, justices with some form of American legal training were responsible 
for 61.7% of citations to American precedent.197 Moreover, the period during 
which citations to the U.S. Supreme Court outnumbered citations to the 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht (1985 to 1994) coincided with the period 
during which justices educated in the United States outnumbered justices 
educated in Germany.198 These correlations are not difficult to explain: in 
Taiwan as elsewhere,199 judges are more likely to use what they know than 
what they do not know.  
D. Level of Foreign Law Expertise 
The TCC is highly knowledgeable about how courts elsewhere have 
approached similar issues. If the justices fail to cite or adopt another court’s 
approach to a particular question, they do so out of choice, not out of 
ignorance. “If it’s been covered elsewhere,” assured one clerk, “they have 
considered it. They might not follow [the foreign approach], but they’ll 
consider it.”200 One justice put it bluntly: “We are already fully knowledgeable 
about foreign law. The problem is translating this knowledge into our social 
and political context.”201 
For the most part, the justices and their clerks acquire their extensive 
knowledge of foreign law in traditional ways: they study it in school, they 
conduct research, and they talk to their colleagues. As of this writing, eleven 
of the fifteen justices hold either an LL.M. or Ph.D. in law from another 
country; three have studied law in more than one foreign country. Seven 
 
196 See id. at 558. 
197 See id. 
198 See Chang & Yeh, supra note 181, at 383, 384 tbl.1 (describing the educational background 
and foreign citation habits of the justices during the TCC’s fifth term). 
199 See, e.g., Gérard V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME. 
L. REV. 211, 213 (1994) (noting a “definite link” between the use of American precedent by 
Canadian Supreme Court justices and the training of those justices in the United States); 
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 9, at 20 (“Judges, lawyers, and academics who go abroad for parts of 
their education . . . naturally turn for inspiration and comparison to those jurisdictions whose 
ideas are [already] familiar to them.”). 
200 Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184. 
201 Interview with Justice F, Current or Former Justice, Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 27, 2010). 
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have studied in Germany, four in the United States, two in Japan, and one 
in mainland China. The fact that a majority of the justices are former law 
professors contributes to the high level of foreign legal training.202 In 
Taiwan—and indeed in most of East Asia, but not the United States—it is 
common for constitutional law professors to possess a law degree from 
overseas.203  
The TCC does not have nearly the same range of resources for conducting 
foreign legal research as the KCC, but Taiwan’s justices make the most of 
what they have. Each justice is allotted only one law clerk, and there are no 
shared clerks. The clerks do not serve fixed terms, but most serve for longer 
than just one year.204 Many clerks are either concurrently enrolled in domestic 
Ph.D. programs or preparing to apply for Ph.D. programs overseas. It is up 
to each justice how to select his or her clerk, but an LL.M. is a de facto 
hiring requirement, and many of the clerks receive part or all of their 
graduate-level legal training overseas. In addition, some justices prefer to 
hire clerks with strength in a particular language, typically either English or 
German, that will be helpful for research purposes.205 The clerks, in turn, 
rely heavily upon one another, thanks in part to the fact that they comple-
ment each other with different language skills and foreign legal expertise. 
Research on foreign law is now conducted “mostly” on the Internet and 
through online research services such as Westlaw and its German equiva-
lent, Beck Online.206  
 
202 By statute, law professors constitute one of the five categories of persons eligible for 
appointment to the TCC, and no single category is supposed to comprise more than one-third of 
the court’s members. See Ssu Fa Yuan Tsu Chih Fa [Organic Act of the Judicial Yuan], art. 4, para. 
1, 37 XIANXING FAGUI HUIBIAN 25399, 25400 (1957) (Taiwan). In practice, “flexible interpreta-
tion” of the categories, combined with the fact that many candidates fall under multiple categories, 
has meant that a majority of the justices are former academics. Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 545-46 
& 545 n.93. The TCC is not unusual among specialized constitutional courts in having designated 
seats for legal academics. See Saunders, supra note 11, at 578 (noting that the “mode of appoint-
ment” to specialized constitutional courts “often includes a proportion of scholars with an interest 
and some expertise in comparative law”). 
203 See infra Table 1 (summarizing the extent to which constitutional law professors at elite 
law schools in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States possess foreign 
legal training).  
204 For example, one justice had four different clerks over the course of seven years, which is 
a fairly typical level of turnover. 
205 Of the justices who make a point of hiring clerks with particular linguistic aptitudes, 
some seek out clerks who can compensate for their own weakness in a particular language, while 
others prefer clerks who share the same linguistic strengths as they do, in order to help them 
research the law of countries that they already tend to consult most frequently.  
206 The TCC has librarians who do not help with substantive foreign legal research but will 
acquire foreign law books upon request. See Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184. 
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The litigants themselves are of limited use in helping the justices to 
learn about relevant foreign law. Most petitioners are pro se,207 and the few 
lawyers who do appear tend to be inexperienced at making constitutional 
arguments of any kind, much less comparative ones.208 However, if the 
justices feel that they need more information on a particular topic, they may 
convene an unofficial information-gathering session (shuo ming hui) at which 
academics will discuss the topic and explain relevant foreign jurisprudence.209 
These sessions serve as a functional substitute for both oral argument 
(which occurs only in “extreme cases”)210 and amicus curiae briefing (which 
is not “against the rules” but “not the habit” either)211 but double as a 
mechanism for learning about foreign law. Perhaps twice a year, the TCC 
will also invite foreign scholars, most frequently from Germany, to conduct 
informational seminars with the justices.212  
E. Level of Interaction with Foreign Courts 
The TCC’s opportunities for engagement with foreign courts are severely 
constrained. In a globalized world, the TCC is a rarity: it has been cut off 
from regular interaction with other courts. The TCC has become a “natural 
experiment in judicial isolation”213 due to mainland China’s largely successful 
efforts to isolate Taiwan from the international community. 
 The dwindling handful of countries with which Taiwan still enjoys  
diplomatic relations214 are the few remaining places in the world where the 
 
207 See Interview with Justice B, supra note 183.  
208 See id. (characterizing the briefs filed by attorneys with the TCC as weak); Interview with 
Clerk 1, supra note 189 (describing the quality of briefs filed with the TCC as “poor” and reflective 
of a lack of experience with constitutional litigation, but noting that test cases are occasionally 
brought on a pro bono basis by Lee & Li, a large law firm with superior resources); Interview with 
Clerk 2, supra note 184 (concurring in Clerk 1’s assessment); Interview with Chien-Feng Wei, 
Attorney, in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 24, 2010) (estimating that no more than five or six attorneys in 
all of Taiwan regularly litigate constitutional cases, and indicating that he personally brings one or 
two cases before the TCC per year); Interview with Nigel Li, Partner, Lee & Li, in Taipei, Taiwan 
(Nov. 24, 2010) (concurring that very few attorneys in Taiwan regularly litigate constitutional 
cases, and indicating that he personally handles roughly ten to twelve cases per year that result in 
petitions to the TCC). 
209 See Interview with Justice B, supra note 183; see also Saunders, supra note 11, at 579 (noting 
the TCC’s practice of holding “expert meetings in which scholars give their views on aspects of 
comparative constitutional experience”).  
210 Interview with Justice B, supra note 183. 
211 Id. 
212 Interview with Admin. Official, Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, 
Taiwan (Nov. 25, 2010). 
213 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 527, 538. 
214 Taiwan has official diplomatic ties with only twenty-three countries. See id. at 540 n.66. 
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Justices of the Constitutional Court can expect a red-carpet welcome. South 
Africa under apartheid was one such country; visiting members of the TCC 
attended a party in their honor with members of the South African Consti-
tutional Court and were even treated to a tour of the country.215 Today, the 
members of the TCC can still look forward to a warm welcome if they visit 
Panama or Burkina Faso. But such hospitality is disappearing in tandem 
with Taiwan’s diplomatic relations.  
Membership in international organizations also poses challenges for the 
TCC and its justices. A case in point is the Korean-instigated formation of 
the AACC, discussed above in Section III.E. A member of the KCC invited 
the TCC to apply for membership, but after some internal discussion, the 
TCC decided not to apply, partly for fear of the potential “embarrassment” 
that might result if China were subsequently asked to participate.216 A 
number of justices expressed concern that if the TCC were to join first 
(under its proper name, the “Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
China”) and then China were to join subsequently, China might insist that 
the TCC be forced to participate under a different name or ejected from the 
organization entirely—a possibility that they wished to avoid.217  
Participation in international conferences can be equally problematic. 
The website for the second congress of the WCCJ held in 2011 in Rio de 
Janeiro, for example, boasted the sponsorship of the Venice Commission 
and the participation of no less than eighty-eight constitutional courts and 
ten regional court associations.218 Yet no one from the TCC was invited.219 
Nor were the Taiwanese welcome when their Korean neighbors hosted an 
 
215 See id. at 548; Interview with Justice E, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 3, 2010); Interview with Justice D, 
Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, 
Taiwan (Nov. 26, 2010). 
216 See Interview with Justice A, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 18, 2010); Interview with Justice I, supra note 184; 
Interview with Judicial Admin., in Taipei, Taiwan (Nov. 25, 2010). The justices were also aware 
that Japan had already decided not to join, although its reasons for declining were not known. 
217 To date, neither Taiwan nor China has joined the association.  
218 See 2ND CONGRESS OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, LIST 
OF PARTICIPANTS (2011), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Rio/WCCJ_List_of_ 
Participants.pdf (listing the representatives of the eighty-eight constitutional courts and ten regional 
court associations that participated in the January 2011 meeting hosted in Rio de Janeiro by the 
Federal Supreme Court of Brazil and sponsored by the Venice Commission). 
219 See E-mail from Justice A, Current or Former Justice of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of China, to author (Feb. 27, 2011, 09:31 PST) (on file with author); E-mail from Justice 
H, Current or Former Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, to author 
(Mar. 1, 2011, 04:16 PST) (on file with author). 
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even larger number of courts at the third congress in 2014.220 In some cases, 
Taiwanese judges have literally been turned away at the border, as occurred 
in 1983 when the International Association of Judges met in Egypt221 and 
again in 2004 at the biennial meeting of the International Association of 
Women Judges held in Uganda.222  
Efforts by members of the TCC to visit constitutional courts in other 
countries have also been frustrated by Chinese interference. The justices 
ordinarily receive a travel budget that enables them to visit foreign courts 
for research purposes; the choice of destination is left to them, and in a 
typical year, a group of three or four justices will make use of the summer 
recess to visit a constitutional court that they find of particular interest or 
relevance to their work.223 Some countries, such as Australia,224 Germany,225 
Hungary,226 and South Korea,227 were identified as relatively hospitable and 
trouble-free destinations, at least for a fortunate few justices. Other coun-
tries, however, have resorted to face-saving avoidance techniques. The 
justices may be told, for example, that a visit to France’s Conseil constitutionnel 
requires approval by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,228 or that the officials 
needed to authorize passage through France happen to be on vacation.229 
Similar episodes have occurred in Italy and Spain.230 
Nor are countries with close historical or political ties to Taiwan neces-
sarily more receptive to Taiwanese visitors. Notwithstanding Japan’s 
primary responsibility for shaping Taiwan’s current legal system over five 
decades of colonial rule, Japanese judges and officials were described as 
“generally unwilling to meet” with Taiwanese visitors and more concerned 
with the state of their relations with China than with their former colony.231 
The fact that some Taiwanese judges have studied in Japan and are personally 
 
220 See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text (noting both the magnitude of the event 
and the exclusion of the TCC). 
221 Interview with Justice E, supra note 215. 
222 According to a justice who attempted to attend the conference, the Taiwanese judges were 
denied entry visas by Uganda because China had offered to fund construction of a new building 
for the judiciary and had made clear its desire that the Taiwanese delegation be barred from 
attending. Interview with Justice I, supra note 184.  
223 Interview with Justice B, supra note 183; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184.  
224 Interview with Justice I, supra note 184; Interview with Judicial Admin., supra note 216. 
225 Interview with Justice C, supra note 186. 
226 Interview with Justice B, supra note 183. 
227 Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184 (describing an official reception held at the South 
Korean Constitutional Court for visitors from the TCC). 
228 See Interview with Judicial Admin., supra note 216. 
229 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 556; Interview with Justice C, supra note 186. 
230 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 556-57. 
231 See Interview with Judicial Admin., supra note 216. 
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acquainted with Japanese judges means that judge-to-judge contact remains 
possible, at least on an unofficial, individual basis.232 However, if official 
visitors from the TCC are received at the Japanese Supreme Court at all, it is 
generally by administrative officials or, at best, retired justices.233  
As difficult as it can be for Taiwan’s judges to attend international  
meetings or visit courts in other countries, playing the part of host can pose 
even greater challenges. Inviting distinguished judges from other countries to 
Taiwan is, in the words of one TCC justice, “very hard.”234 The President of 
the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, for example, indicated with regret that it 
would be “difficult” for political reasons to accept an invitation from the 
TCC,235 and a number of justices reported that their success in inviting 
German constitutional jurists had been limited to retirees.236 On this count, 
the members of the United States Supreme Court have proved braver: Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia have all visited the TCC.237 Even when 
dealing with the U.S. Supreme Court, however, Taiwan’s justices are wary of 
extending official invitations for fear that they are likely to be rebuffed.238 
The TCC’s ties to the outside world are bolstered to some extent by the 
fact that the former law professors on the court possess their own international 
network of academic connections, but the use of these contacts does not always 
bear fruit.239 The effectiveness of academic backchannels is limited, moreover, 
by Chinese efforts to thwart the participation of Taiwanese law professors in 
foreign conferences and private scholarly organizations, as exemplified by the 
expulsion of Taiwan’s national association of constitutional law professors 
from the International Association of Constitutional Law in 1999.240  
Finally, even when there are no political barriers to Taiwanese participa-
tion, a small country such as Taiwan is inherently easy for the organizers of 
international gatherings to overlook or ignore. A case in point is Yale Law 
School’s oft-noted global constitutionalism seminar, now entering its third 
 
232 See id. 
233 See Interview with Clerk 8, supra note 186; Interview with Clerk 2, supra note 184. 
234 Interview with Justice B, supra note 183. 
235 Interview with Clerk 3, supra note 186. 
236 See, e.g., Interview with Justice J, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan (Dec. 30, 2010); Interview with Judicial Admin., supra 
note 216. 
237 See Interview with Justice B, supra note 183.  
238 See id. (offering by way of example the use of a Harvard professor as a go-between in an 
ultimately unsuccessful effort to bring Justice Souter to Taipei). 
239 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 556 (describing unsuccessful overtures made through 
academic channels to arrange meetings with members of the Italian and Spanish Constitutional 
Courts). 
240 See id. at 550-52. 
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decade, which brings together constitutional judges from around the world 
on an invitation-only basis for closed-door discussions.241 On only one 
occasion—in 1997—has a member of the TCC participated, and sources on 
the TCC could identify only one other justice who has ever been invited. 
V. THE HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL 
A. Level of Foreign Law Citation 
Citations to foreign law are a staple of HKCFA opinions. Indeed, the 
court cites foreign law more often than it cites domestic law. In cases 
involving constitutional rights, fully three-quarters of its case citations are 
to foreign and international courts,242 while one-third of its legislative 
citations are to foreign legislation.243 
B. Level of Foreign Law Usage 
As its citations demonstrate, the HKCFA routinely gives serious 
consideration to foreign law. Once discovered, relevant foreign case law is 
unlikely to be ignored without explanation or acknowledgment. If the 
HKCFA were to learn of a Canadian appellate decision on point, for 
example, the justices would consider themselves entirely free to take a 
different approach but would also feel a “need to explain why.”244 
Moreover, any usage of foreign law is likely to be explicitly disclosed.  
The differences between common law and civil law courts help to 
explain why the HKCFA is more transparent in its usage of foreign law 
than the JSC, KCC, or TCC. First, like other common law courts, the 
HKCFA issues opinions that are heavily laden with citations and thus offer 
an inherently more complete picture of the authorities considered.245 
Second, the values of the adversarial system weigh in favor of disclosing 
foreign law usage. In the words of one justice, “fundamental fairness” 
requires that the parties have an opportunity to respond to any foreign cases 
 
241 See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 12, at 98 (citing the Yale Law School seminar as a forum for 
global judicial dialogue); Alford, supra note 19, at 669 (same); McCrudden, supra note 6, at 511 (same). 
242 Simon N.M. Young, Constitutional Rights in Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal, 27 CHINESE 
(TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 67, 82 tbl.10 (2011) (analyzing all of the HKCFA’s constitutional 
decisions over the first ten years of the court’s existence, from 1999 to 2009). 
243 Id. at 82 tbl.11. 
244 See Interview with Justice B, Permanent or Non-Permanent Justice of the H.K. Court of 
Final Appeal, in H.K. ( June 6, 2014). 
245 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (contrasting the approaches of common law 
and civil law courts to the citation of case law). 
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that the court has in mind.246 Consequently, the HKCFA aims for “full 
disclosure” of all authorities considered as well as cited.247 Any foreign 
authorities that the court considers but ultimately does not cite are 
supposed to be included in the “list of authorities not cited” that 
accompanies each decision.248 This practice of full disclosure does not 
preclude “the odd footnote reference” to a previously undisclosed foreign 
decision for the purpose of reinforcing a point already established by other 
cases.249 If, however, the substance of the decision relies on a foreign case, 
the court will “ask the parties if they have anything to say” about it.250 
A combination of legal and normative factors are highly conducive to 
judicial comparativism in Hong Kong. From a legal perspective, various 
provisions of Hong Kong’s Basic Law contemplate or require judicial 
comparativism of some form. Notwithstanding the fact that China is not a 
common law country, article 84 expressly authorizes Hong Kong courts to 
“refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions,”251 while article 8 
provides that the “laws previously in force in Hong Kong,” including “the 
common law,” “shall be maintained.”252 The Basic Law also obligates Hong 
Kong courts to apply international human rights law: article 39 
constitutionally entrenches the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and “international labour conventions.”253 
The content of the ICCPR is further incorporated into domestic law by the 
1991 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.254  
At the same time, Hong Kong’s status as an autonomous “Special 
Administrative Region” of China blunts some of the normative criticisms 
commonly leveled elsewhere against comparativism. First, it makes little 
sense to object in the context of Hong Kong that judicial comparativism 
 
246 Interview with Justice A, Permanent or Non-Permanent Justice of the H.K. Court of 
Final Appeal, in H.K. ( June 6, 2014); accord Interview with Justice B, supra note 244.  
247 Interview with Justice A, supra note 246; accord Interview with Justice B, supra note 244. 
248 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246; Interview with Justice B, supra note 244. 
249 Interview with Justice A, supra note 246. 
250 Id. 
251 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 84 (H.K.). 
252 Id. art. 8. 
253 Id. art. 39. 
254 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 383; see Lam Siu Po v. Comm’r of  
Police, [2009] 12 H.K.C.F.A.R. 237, 250C-D (C.F.A.) (H.K.) (opinion of Bokhary, J.) (observing 
that the Bill of Rights Ordinance is “taken almost verbatim” from the ICCPR); GITTINGS, supra 
note 66, at 275 (noting that the Bill of Rights Ordinance is “almost a carbon copy of the rights 
listed in the ICCPR”). 
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compromises national sovereignty.255 The whole point of Hong Kong’s 
unique constitutional scheme, which was built upon formal guarantees of 
autonomy negotiated between China and the United Kingdom, is to 
insulate Hong Kong from the full exercise of Chinese sovereignty.256 The 
authority of the Hong Kong judiciary to make continuing use of foreign and 
international law is an important ingredient of Hong Kong’s precious 
autonomy. Thus, even assuming arguendo that judicial comparativism 
compromises national sovereignty, that may be cause for celebration rather 
than criticism in Hong Kong.  
Second, Hong Kong’s unusual circumstances also defeat the criticism that 
comparativism invites judicial activism by expanding the range of materials 
that can be used to justify the invalidation of laws.257 Such criticisms rest 
upon the premise that judicial activism is illicit because it entails lawmaking 
 
255 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (asserting that “inappropriate judicial reliance 
on foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncments [sic] threatens the sovereignty of the United 
States”); ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 16 
(rev. & expanded ed. 2003) (“By creating international law [the cosmopolitan left] hopes not only 
to outflank American legislatures and courts but to have liberal views adopted at a different level 
and then imposed on the United States.”); Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling 
Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 
1303-10 (2005) (book review) (critically evaluating the use of foreign law in constitutional 
interpretation from the perspective of “democratic sovereignty,” and arguing that “the invocation 
of foreign constitutional law . . . is fundamentally at odds with democratic constitutional self-
government”); Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
239, 261-63 (2003) (noting that concerns about the impairment of sovereignty are a recurring 
theme of “criticisms of the use of non-U.S. law as a rule of decision,” and arguing that such 
concerns are not valid). 
256 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Sino–British Joint Declara-
tion and its consequences for Hong Kong’s Basic Law). 
257 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 255, at 137-38 (deeming it “illegitimate” for courts to “seek 
guidance” from foreign courts then insist that “legislatures obey” their decisions, and criticizing 
comparativism as a form of judicial activism that turns judicial review into a “launching pad[]” for 
the preferred reforms of cosmopolitan liberals); Alford, supra note 19, at 680 (“One wonders 
whether a new Supreme Court nominee can openly embrace [comparativism] and not risk the 
dreaded label of a judicial activist.”); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic 
Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 69 (2004) (“The most trenchant 
critique of [judicial] use of international materials is that it serves as mere cover for the expansion 
of selected rights favored by domestic advocacy groups . . . .”).  
Whether comparativism actually leads to judicial activism in the form of more frequent 
invalidation of laws is questionable. See Alford, supra note 19, at 675-76 (demonstrating with 
examples that “[t]he Court frequently has relied on foreign authority” to uphold restrictions on 
individual liberties, and predicting that “the Court will continue to receive invitations to reference 
foreign experiences in order to uphold government restrictions on individual freedoms or curtail 
the expansion of rights”); Ramsey, supra, at 76 (“[T]here is nothing necessarily rights enhancing 
about international materials. In many areas, it seems likely that the United States is an outlier in 
protecting rights that few other societies recognize.”). 
  
2015] Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy 989 
 
by unelected judges at the expense of democratic lawmaking processes.258 In 
the context of Hong Kong, however, it is difficult to object to judicial 
invalidation of government action as undemocratic or countermajoritarian 
because Hong Kong’s legislature and chief executive are not fully elected but 
instead chosen pursuant to a convoluted formula designed to ensure 
compliance with Beijing’s wishes.259 The acts of pseudo-elected officials on 
behalf of an authoritarian regime do not exactly cry out for judicial deference 
in the name of democracy. Indeed, far from undermining democratic self-
governance, vigorous judicial review might be said to operate as a partial 
substitute for democratic governance by keeping Hong Kong’s government 
within the kinds of legal limits that are prevalent in democratic countries, and 
by giving the people of Hong Kong a reliable and transparent mechanism for 
challenging government actions that affect them.  
C. Jurisdictions Considered 
The HKCFA relies most frequently on case law from the United 
Kingdom. Roughly half of the case citations found in the HKCFA’s 
constitutional rights jurisprudence are to British cases.260 Indeed, the 
HKCFA cites cases from the United Kingdom with much greater frequency 
than its own case law: whereas 48% of all citations are to case law from the 
United Kingdom, only 11% are to the HKCFA’s own jurisprudence.261 
Other popular jurisdictions include Canada and the United States, which 
 
258 See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 727-30 
(2009) (noting the preoccupation of American constitutional theory with the extent to which the 
supposedly “counter-majoritarian” character of judicial review necessitates judicial restraint, and 
reviewing empirical scholarship that casts doubt on the extent to which judicial review is actually 
countermajoritarian). 
259 See Albert H.Y. Chen, International Human Rights Law and Domestic Constitutional Law: 
Internationalisation of Constitutional Law in Hong Kong, 4 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 237, 273 
(2009) (observing that the existence of a “democracy deficit” in Hong Kong makes it impossible to 
object to judicial use of international law on democratic grounds); supra notes 64-67 and accompa-
nying text (describing how the chief executive and half of the members of the legislature are 
selected in ways that favor constituencies sympathetic to China and give Beijing an effective veto 
over the selection of candidates). 
260 Young, supra note 242, at 82 tbl.10. 
261 Id.; see also Andrew Byrnes, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights 
(“The courts of Hong Kong manifest an excessive reliance on, and deference to, English decisions 
at almost every level; they tend to follow, almost automatically, developments in England and have 
considerably less time for developments elsewhere in the common law world.”), in PROMOTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 318, 355 
(Philip Alston ed., 1999). 
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together account for 9% of case citations,262 and Australia and New Zealand, 
which collectively lay claim to 7%. Especially in the case of American case 
law, however, the fact that cases are cited does not necessarily mean that 
they are followed.263  
Although it receives fewer citations than the British courts, the ECtHR 
may be more influential than the raw citation numbers would suggest. 
International courts and tribunals such as the ECtHR account for only 8% 
of the HKCFA’s case citations,264 but scholars and judges alike have 
observed that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR tends to receive serious 
consideration from Hong Kong courts.265 
D. Level of Foreign Law Expertise 
Legal and normative factors of the type mentioned in Section V.B help 
to explain why the HKCFA might be especially willing to use foreign and 
international law. They do not, however, directly explain the court’s high 
level of foreign law expertise or ability to perform foreign legal research. A 
variety of institutional factors contribute to the HKCFA’s heavy capacity 
for comparativism as well as its taste for British law in particular. These 
factors include: (1) the entrenchment of the legal system inherited from the 
United Kingdom; (2) the direct participation of overseas judges and lawyers 
in the work of the HKCFA; (3) the extent to which local judges and lawyers 
are educated in the United Kingdom; and (4) the potential for assistance 
 
262 Young, supra note 242, at 82 tbl.10; see also Johannes M.M. Chan, Hong Kong’s Bill of 
Rights: Its Reception of and Contribution to International and Comparative Jurisprudence, 47 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 306, 309-10 (1998) (noting that, in interpreting Hong Kong’s Bill of Rights 
Ordinance, Hong Kong courts have made “few references to comparative jurisprudence from 
jurisdictions other than Canada or the United States,” with the exceptions of the European Court 
of Human Rights and the British Privy Council). 
263 See Chan, supra note 262, at 310 (observing that the relatively few citations to cases from 
the United States tend to be made “with reservations”); Young, supra note 242, at 82 (noting that 
constitutional cases from Canada and the United States are “often considered” but “not always 
followed”); cf. Byrnes, supra note 261, at 368-69 (reporting that Hong Kong courts “have felt 
particularly comfortable in dealing with decisions under the Canadian Charter” of Rights and 
Freedoms when asked to interpret the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, and that Canadian judicial 
decisions tend to be both more accessible and more familiar to Hong Kong counsel than American 
decisions). 
264 Young, supra note 242, at 82 tbl.10. 
265 See Chan, supra note 262, at 309 (reporting that Hong Kong courts make “extensive reference” 
to ECtHR case law when interpreting the Bill of Rights Ordinance); Young, supra note 242, at 82 
(describing the ECtHR as “[p]robably the most influential source” of foreign case law); Interview 
with Justice A, Permanent or Non-Permanent Justice of the H.K. Court of Final Appeal, in H.K. 
(May 4, 2014) (opining that Hong Kong courts may be more willing to cite ECtHR jurisprudence 
than the jurisprudence of most foreign courts); Interview with Judge 1, Current or Former Judge 
of the High Court of H.K., in H.K. (May 4, 2014) (same).  
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with foreign legal research through the relatively new system of judicial 
assistants. 
1. The Entrenched Legacy of British Rule 
An understanding of the HKCFA’s heavy expertise in foreign law, and 
British law in particular, requires at least some background knowledge of 
Hong Kong’s history and relationship with mainland China. From the mid-
1800s until China’s resumption of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong was a 
British colony,266 and the Privy Council in London served accordingly as its 
highest court.267 The establishment of the HKCFA in 1997 to replace the 
Privy Council as Hong Kong’s highest court was ordained by the Basic 
Law,268 which is technically a statute enacted by the National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) but functions as a 
constitution for the semi-autonomous Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (HKSAR).269 Both the existence and the content of the Basic Law 
reflect the terms of the Sino–British Joint Declaration, the treaty under 
which the United Kingdom returned sovereignty over Hong Kong to China 
in exchange for guarantees that Hong Kong would continue to enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy in its internal affairs.270  
Several provisions of the Basic Law guarantee the continuity of Britain’s 
legal legacy in Hong Kong notwithstanding the resumption of Chinese 
sovereignty. As previously noted, article 8 preserves “[t]he laws previously in 
force in Hong Kong” under British colonial rule—namely, “the common law, 
rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law,”271 
while article 87 expressly obligates courts in Hong Kong to apply that 
preexisting body of law.272 Because Hong Kong is now part of China, judicial 
application of the “laws previously in force in Hong Kong” and “the common 
law” involves the application of what is now technically foreign law.  
Judging from the frequency of citation to British law as well as the 
accounts given by judges themselves, the Hong Kong judiciary has 
 
266 See GITTINGS, supra note 66, at 10. While the southern portion of Hong Kong was 
originally ceded by China to Britain in perpetuity, the northern portion was instead leased for 
ninety-nine years. See id. 
267 See id. at 5. 
268 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 81 (H.K.). 
269 See GITTINGS, supra note 66, at 46-50 (explaining why, notwithstanding objections from 
mainland Chinese officials and scholars, the Basic Law “fits the definition of a constitution” and is 
consequently “commonly referred to in Hong Kong” as a “mini-constitution”). 
270 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
271 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 8 (H.K.). 
272 Id. art. 87. 
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succeeded at maintaining the continuity of the legal system.273 It is a mark 
of this continuity that Hong Kong judges—most of whom received their 
legal training in the United Kingdom—do not necessarily conceptualize 
British law as foreign. When asked why Hong Kong courts make such 
heavy use of foreign law, one justice responded that he did not think of 
English or Australian cases as foreign law but rather as simply “the common 
law,” a system of principles and reasoning that transcends national 
boundaries and encompasses Hong Kong.274 It is necessary to consider 
English and Australian cases, he explained, because one determines 
“whether one is right” by “comparing conclusions reached by other judges 
applying the same system of law in similar cases.”275 
2. Participation of Overseas Judges and Lawyers 
Articles 82 and 84 of the Basic Law explicitly authorize the recruitment 
of judges “from other common law jurisdictions,”276 while article 94 does 
the same for the legal profession by allowing the licensing of “lawyers from 
outside Hong Kong to work and practise in the Region.”277 The ostensible 
rationale for allowing foreign judges to serve on the HKCFA was not to 
increase the court’s aptitude for comparativism, but rather to compensate 
for the lack of experience with final appellate courts among Hong Kong 
judges.278 Whatever the reason for their inclusion, however, one would be 
hard-pressed to imagine a more efficient and effective way to ensure foreign 
legal expertise on a court than to appoint foreign judges.  
The HKCFA hears appeals in five-judge panels279 but has historically 
had only four permanent members, including the Chief Justice.280 By 
statute, the fifth justice is selected by the Chief Justice from a roster of local 
 
273 One member of the HKCFA recalled the experience of conducting a trial that spanned the 
days immediately before and after the British handover of Hong Kong to China. He noticed only one 
change between June 30, 1997 (the last day of British rule), and July 1, 1997 (the first day of Chinese 
rule): the royal coat of arms in the courtroom had been replaced by the red bauhinia seal of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region.  
274 Interview with Justice B, supra note 244. 
275 Id. 
276 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 82 (H.K.). Within the judiciary, only the Chief Justice of the 
HKCFA and the Chief Judge of the High Court must be Chinese citizens. Id. art. 90. 
277 Id. art. 94. 
278 See GITTINGS, supra note 66, at 189.  
279 Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 484, 5, § 16 (H.K.). Applica-
tions for leave to appeal are decided by three-judge panels. Id. § 18.  
280 By statute, the minimum number of permanent justices (including the Chief Justice) is four, 
but nothing in the statute appears to preclude the appointment of more than four permanent justices. 
Id. § 5(1),(5). In practice, the HKCFA has not had more than four permanent justices at a time.  
  
2015] Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy 993 
 
and foreign non-permanent judges.281 The list of local non-permanent 
judges consists primarily of retired members of the HKCFA itself, while 
the list of foreign judges is drawn exclusively “from other common law 
jurisdictions.”282 It is unnecessary for the foreign judges to possess prior 
exposure to Hong Kong law; indeed, anyone who possesses prior experience 
as a lower court judge in Hong Kong is ineligible for appointment as a 
foreign judge.283  
In practice, the Chief Justice ordinarily chooses a visiting foreign judge 
to occupy the last seat.284 The majority of these foreign judges have hailed 
from the United Kingdom, with Australia and New Zealand providing the 
remainder.285 In all forty-five of the constitutional cases decided by the 
HKCFA through 2009, the permanent judges of the court were joined by a 
former or sitting member of the British House of Lords, the Privy Council, 
or the Australian High Court.286 Thus far, no Canadians or South Africans 
have served as visiting judges on the HKCFA.287 One factor that 
contributes to the heavy representation of British judges is the United 
Kingdom’s longstanding practice of allowing its best active-duty judges to 
 
281 Id. §§ 9, 16. Like the permanent justices, the local and foreign “non-permanent” justices 
are appointed by Hong Kong’s Chief Executive on the recommendation of a judicial nominating 
commission. Whereas permanent justices serve until retirement age (at which point they may be 
renewed for a limited period of time), non-permanent justices face no retirement age and serve 
exclusively for fixed, renewable terms. Id. §§ 7–9.  
282 Id. §§ 5(3), 9. 
283 See id. at 4, § 12(4) (deeming ineligible for appointment as a “judge from another common 
law jurisdiction” anyone who has ever been “a judge of the High Court, a District Judge or a 
permanent magistrate, in Hong Kong”). 
284 See Young, supra note 242, at 81 (reporting that all 45 constitutional cases decided by the 
HKCFA through 2009 included the participation of a former or sitting member of the Australian 
High Court, the British House of Lords, or the Privy Council); Simon N.M. Young & Antonio 
Da Roza, Judges and Judging in the Court of Final Appeal: A Statistical Picture, H.K. LAWYER, Aug. 
2010, at 1, 3, available at http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/129553/1/HKLawyer-JudgesJudging-
Aug2010.pdf (reporting that an overseas judge participated in 97% of all cases heard by the 
HKCFA from its creation in 1997 through 2010). 
285 See Young, supra note 242, at 79, 80 tbl.9 (listing the overseas judges who participated in 
the HKCFA’s constitutional cases over the first ten years of the court’s existence, and noting that 
they all hailed from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand). At present, the list of 
non-permanent justices consists of six retired Hong Kong judges, four retired Australian judges, 
one retired judge from New Zealand, and seven active and retired judges from the United 
Kingdom. See List of Judges and Judicial Officers (Position as at 23 February 2015), H.K. JUDICIARY, 
http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/organization/judges.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/UKB4-7BV4. 
286 See Young, supra note 242, at 81. 
287 See supra note 285 (discussing the nationalities of the HKCFA’s past and present non-
permanent justices). 
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serve concurrently on overseas courts.288 An extreme example is Lord 
Neuberger, who currently serves as a non-permanent justice of the HKCFA 
as well as the chief justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court.289 In 
practice, however, the availability of active British judges is constrained by 
their domestic duties.290  
The tendency of parties to hire prominent foreign counsel in high-stakes 
constitutional cases further exposes the HKCFA to foreign law. By their 
own account, the justices “rely heavily on counsel” to bring relevant foreign 
precedent to their attention.291 Because the most sought-after human rights 
lawyers to appear before the HKCFA tend to hail from the United 
Kingdom, the HKCFA can be assured of learning about British law at a 
minimum.292 
3. The Foreign Education of Lawyers and Judges 
Until the 1970s, Hong Kong lacked either law schools of its own or a 
supply of locally trained lawyers.293 Consequently, most of the lawyers in 
Hong Kong with sufficient experience to be plausible candidates for 
appointment to senior positions in the judiciary—including all of the 
permanent justices of the HKCFA—have studied law in the United 
Kingdom. Although the passage of time may eventually bring about a 
predominance of locally trained judges at the most senior levels, this has not 
yet come to pass. 
The fact that all of the permanent members of the HKCFA (and all but 
one of its non-permanent members) received their legal education outside 
 
288 See Interview with Johannes Chan, Dean, Univ. of H.K. Faculty of Law, in Taipei, Taiwan 
( June 10, 2014) (identifying the United Kingdom’s historical tradition of dispatching personnel to 
assist its colonies and dominions as a reason for its willingness to share active judges with the 
HKCFA).  
289 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246; List of Judges and Judicial Officers (Position as 
at 23 February 2015), supra note 285 (listing both the permanent and non-permanent members of 
the HKCFA). 
290 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246 (noting that the HKCFA does not recess in 
August because that is the only time when the U.K. Supreme Court’s schedule permits Lord 
Neuberger to hear cases in Hong Kong). 
291 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 265. 
292 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246 (citing Baron Pannick, QC and Michael 
Fordham, QC as examples). 
293 See id. (noting that Hong Kong lacked any local law graduates prior to 1973); see also 
About Us, FACULTY OF LAW, U. H.K., http://www.law.hku.hk/faculty/index.php (last visited Feb. 
28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5JU9-2QDL (indicating that the University of Hong Kong, 
home to Hong Kong’s first law school, lacked any kind of law department until 1969 and lacked an 
autonomous law school until 1978). 
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Hong Kong294 has helped to ensure a high level of sophistication about 
foreign law. Even a gradual transition to locally trained judges, however, 
seems unlikely to significantly diminish the prevalence of foreign legal 
expertise on the bench given the heavily international character of Hong 
Kong law schools. For example, the members of the University of Hong 
Kong Faculty of Law—the oldest of the three local law schools—hail from 
seventeen different countries, and less than half are ethnically Chinese (a 
category that includes professors from mainland China and Taiwan as well 
as Hong Kong).295  
4. Research Assistance 
Because both the justices themselves and the lawyers who appear before 
them tend to be well versed in foreign law, the HKCFA is not reliant on its 
clerks for foreign legal expertise. Nevertheless, the clerks—known as 
judicial assistants—do provide additional support for the comparative 
enterprise.  
The use of law clerks is a relatively new phenomenon in Hong Kong. 
The HKCFA hired its first judicial assistants roughly a decade ago, and 
their responsibilities are still evolving.296 As of this writing, the number of 
judicial assistants is expanding from five to eight.297 Judicial assistants serve 
one-year terms298 and do not work exclusively for individual justices or even 
the HKCFA. Instead, they rotate between the HKCFA and the appellate 
division of the High Court and spend perhaps half of their time at the 
HKCFA performing legal research.299  
Unless instructed otherwise, a judicial assistant is likely to approach a 
research assignment by investigating both British and Hong Kong law. If 
the relevant law in those jurisdictions is unclear or conflicting, additional 
 
294 The exception is Justice Patrick Chan, who studied law at the University of Hong Kong 
and served as a permanent justice of the HKCFA until 2013, at which time he became a non-
permanent member of the court. See Patrick Chan ( Judge), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Patrick_Chan_( judge) (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/35H9-7SVN. 
295 See Interview with Johannes Chan, supra note 288 (estimating that no more than thirty-
five to forty percent of the law school’s faculty are ethnically Chinese). 
296 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 265; Interview with Judicial Assistant 1, Judicial 
Assistant to the H.K. Court of Final Appeal and the High Court of H.K., in H.K. ( June 6, 2014). 
297 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246 (noting the planned expansion of the number 
of judicial assistants to eight); Interview with Judicial Assistant 1, supra note 296. 
298 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 265; Interview with Judicial Assistant 2, Judicial 
Assistant to the H.K. Court of Final Appeal and the High Court of H.K., in H.K. ( June 6, 2014). 
299 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246; Interview with Judicial Assistant 1, supra note 
296 (indicating that “about half the job is legal research”); Interview with Judicial Assistant 2, supra 
note 298 (describing a system of three-month rotations between the High Court and the HKCFA). 
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jurisdictions such as Australia or Canada may also be considered.300 Of the 
current crop of five, three have foreign law degrees (two from England and 
one from Australia). However, the committee of judges responsible for 
hiring the judicial assistants does not place a premium on foreign legal 
expertise, and the proportion of assistants with foreign training varies 
considerably from year to year. 
E. Level of Interaction with Foreign Courts 
When it comes to interaction with foreign judges, the Hong Kong 
judiciary is a model of transparency and recordkeeping. Its annual report, 
available in both English and Chinese from its website, lists in 
chronological order every foreign visitor to the judiciary, ranging from a 
“14-member delegation of the Judicial Research and Training Institute of 
the Republic of Korea” to a “10-member delegation led by Mr Sherali 
Rahmanov, Deputy Chairperson of the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan.”301 Likewise, the report lists visits by members of the Hong 
Kong judiciary to destinations and institutions outside Hong Kong.302 
Several judges indicated that the report’s listing of interaction with foreign 
jurists can be trusted as comprehensive.303  
The HKCFA’s overall level of interaction with foreign courts and 
judges can fairly be described as high. Although the report does not always 
distinguish between visits to the judiciary as a whole and visits to the 
HKCFA in particular, it is clear that one or more members of the HKCFA 
have at least monthly in-person interaction with some combination of 
 
300 See Interview with Judicial Assistant 1, supra note 296; E-mail from Judicial Assistant 2, 
Judicial Assistant to the H.K. Court of Final Appeal and the High Court of H.K., to author ( June 
10, 2014, 13:01 EST) (on file with author). 
301 See Hong Kong Judiciary Annual Report 2013: Highlights of Events in 2013, H.K. JUDICIARY, 
http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/annu_rept_2013/eng/highlights.html (last updated 
Feb. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/DHS4-7X7F. The report also includes aggregate 
statistics for the number of discrete visits and visitors in three separate categories, “Local,” “The 
Mainland,” and “Overseas,” but these overall figures distinguish neither between visitors to the 
judiciary as a whole and visitors to the HKCFA, nor between judicial and non-judicial visitors. See 
Hong Kong Judiciary Annual Report 2013: Number of Visits and Visitors to the Judiciary, H.K. 
JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/annu_rept_2013/eng/visiters.html (last 
updated Feb. 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UA9V-YXGQ. 
302 Inspection of the report reveals, for example, that on May 23, 2013, Chief Justice Ma 
delivered a talk entitled “Courage and the Law: Upholding the Dignity of the Individual” at the 
University of Zurich, while on the following day, a magistrate judge named Lin Kam-hung 
attended a maritime law seminar in Shenzhen. See Hong Kong Judiciary Annual Report 2013: 
Highlights of Events in 2013, supra note 301. 
303 See Interview with Justice A, supra note 246; Interview with Justice B, supra note 244; Inter-
view with Judge 1, Current or Former Judge of the High Court of H.K., in H.K. (June 6, 2014). 
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foreign or mainland Chinese jurists, above and beyond what is entailed by 
the inclusion of a foreign judge on every panel. Hong Kong is also part of 
what has been described as an “informal circuit of judges” among 
Commonwealth countries and has become—alongside England, Australia, 
and New Zealand—a primary exporter of judges, “particularly to smaller 
jurisdictions in the Caribbean and Pacific regions.”304  
VI. CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR COMPARATIVISM 
Explanations for judicial comparativism can be divided into what might 
be called “demand-side” and “supply-side” explanations. Demand-side 
explanations focus on the preferences that judges have with respect to 
comparativism (or, put differently, their demand for foreign legal exper-
tise). Supply-side explanations focus on the extent to which judges possess 
the resources and capabilities needed to engage in comparativism (or, in 
other words, the supply of foreign legal expertise available to judges). To 
fully understand the occurrence of comparativism, it is necessary to investi-
gate both the supply and demand sides of the equation. Judges will not 
engage in comparativism, or any other practice, unless they possess both the 
inclination and the ability to do so. Moreover, supply and demand cannot 
be discussed independently of one another because they are interdependent. 
Over time, demand increases supply by incentivizing investment in the 
necessary institutional infrastructure, while supply increases demand by 
lowering the cost to judges of engaging in comparativism.  
Most discussion of comparativism tends to dwell on the demand side of 
the equation, to the neglect of the supply side. There is little agreement, 
however, over what motivates judges to seek out foreign law. The most 
conventional explanation for judicial comparativism, in the sense of being 
the explanation typically offered by judges themselves, casts judicial motiva-
tions in a flattering light: judges practice comparativism because they 
believe that it enriches their knowledge and thus the quality of their 
decisionmaking.305 The explanation advanced by opponents of comparativism 
 
304 Simon N.M. Young, The Hong Kong Multinational Judge in Criminal Appeals (noting also 
that “Canadian and American judges do not appear to be involved” in this international flow of 
judges), in CRIMINAL APPEALS 1907-2007: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 130, 132 (Chris Corns 
& Gregor Urbas eds., 2008).  
305 See, e.g., Bryde, supra note 11, at 296; Justice Ginsburg Interview, supra note 11, at 819; Kirby, 
supra note 19, at 186; La Forest, supra note 199, at 218, 220 (“[L]ittle pockets of particular expertise 
develop in foreign courts . . . . [T]he use of foreign material affords another source, another tool 
for the construction of better judgments . . . . [F]rom time to time a look outward may reveal 
refreshing perspectives.”); L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 9, at 26-27; Anthony Mason, The Place of 
Comparative Law in Developing the Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong, 
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posits a less noble set of judicial preferences: judges resort to foreign law, 
critics argue, for the purpose of justifying ideologically desired results that 
lack sufficient support in domestic law.306 
Although empirical research suggests that there is at least an element of 
truth to the less charitable view,307 scholars have identified a much broader 
range of reasons why courts may develop a taste for comparativism.308 The 
level of judicial interest in foreign law could, for example, be a function of 
the adequacy of domestic jurisprudence. A court faced with a relatively 
sparse body of domestic jurisprudence might use foreign law to perform a 
gap-filling function. This might be the case for a relatively new court, a 
court confronted with regime change (such as democratization) that funda-
mentally alters its own role and calls for reexamination of its existing 
jurisprudence, or a court faced with a relatively new constitution.309 This 
 
37 H.K. L.J. 299, 302 (2007) (“In many instances, relevant choices have been made, sometimes 
differing choices, by courts of other jurisdictions. Apart from these choices, the reasoning behind 
the choice may provide useful assistance.”); Rehnquist, supra note 14, at 412 (“[N]ow that 
constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts 
begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative 
process.”); Breyer, supra note 14. See generally Law, supra note 47, at 147 (summarizing, with examples, 
“the justifications given by most judges, most of the time, for engaging in comparativism”). 
306 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 255, at 137-38 (denouncing comparativism as a means by which 
cosmopolitan liberals advance their preferred reforms); Black et al., supra note 24, at 21, 43 
(hypothesizing, and finding empirical evidence, that the members of the U.S. Supreme Court “cite 
transnational sources of law to prop up the logic of their opinions” and “create the illusion that 
[they are] acting with considerable supporting precedent” when reaching ideologically motivated 
decisions or overruling precedent); Ramsey, supra note 257, at 69 (cautioning that judicial 
comparativism can “serve[] as mere cover for the expansion of selected rights favored by domestic 
advocacy groups”). 
307 See Black et al., supra note 24, at 35 (finding as an empirical matter that U.S. Supreme 
Court justices are more likely to cite “transnational law” when reaching decisions that they favor 
on ideological grounds, striking down statutes, or overruling precedent); Erik Voeten, Borrowing 
and Nonborrowing Among International Courts, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 547, 567, 572 (2010) (finding that 
separate opinions by ECtHR judges that cite external legal sources “almost always argue in favor 
of a more expansive” interpretation of rights, and concluding that “the use of external decisions is 
driven in part by the individual ideologies of judges”). 
308 See, e.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 21-22 (listing “globalization and increased inter-
connectivity,” “instrumentalism,” “the importance of professional networks that judges operate in,” 
and “structural features” among the various explanations offered by scholars for the phenomenon 
of “global constitutional dialogue,” and emphasizing the role of “sociopolitical context” in shaping 
“whether and where the judicial mind travels in its search for pertinent foreign sources”); 
McCrudden, supra note 6, at 516-27 (identifying ten factors that might promote judicial compara-
tivism including, inter alia, the type of political regime in which the foreign court is situated, and 
the sympathy of the audience toward foreign law references). 
309 See, e.g., BOBEK, supra note 11, at 14, 42-43 (noting that “[n]ewly established or transforming 
legal systems frequently use comparative reasoning as a source of inspiration and external authority,” 
and that such use may decline once “a system starts believing in its own self-sufficiency”); Chen, supra 
note 259, at 272 (“Without an indigenous tradition of constitutional protection of human rights, it 
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period of jurisprudential scarcity is likely to coincide, moreover, with a 
period of political and institutional flux that raises an abundance of unusually 
important or contentious constitutional questions,310 which may only 
increase the court’s need for authority of some kind to justify and legitimate 
its decisions.311  
From a theoretical perspective, it is unclear whether courts in mature 
legal systems will necessarily make less use of foreign law. There are at least 
three distinct possibilities that point in different directions. The first 
possibility might be called the substitution hypothesis: to the extent that 
foreign law fills a void left by a lack of homegrown jurisprudence that 
coincides with a period of heightened need for legal authority, judicial 
comparativism might be expected to decline over time as domestic law 
offers an increasingly adequate substitute for foreign law.312 A second 
 
[has been] natural for Hong Kong to draw on external resources for support and guidance.”); 
Gianluca Gentili, Canada: Protecting Rights in a 'Worldwide Rights Culture': An Empirical Study of the 
Use of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada (1982–2010) (finding empirically that, 
following Canada’s adoption of a new constitution in 1982, the Canadian Supreme Court’s “citation 
of foreign law declined between the end of the 1990s and the end of the 2000s,” and attributing 
this decline to the development of “sufficient domestic jurisprudence” and consequent reduction in 
reliance on “foreign sources”), in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL 
JUDGES, supra note 11, at 39, 54; Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of 
Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 763, 790 (2002) (“[L]egislatures 
in new democracies are typically underdeveloped and unable to carry out what might otherwise be 
their natural function of norm replacement. One would thus expect courts in democratic 
transitions to play a special role of looking abroad to transform their constitutional orders.”); 
Mason, supra note 305, at 302 (noting the “natural attraction” of comparative law for a “newly-
established court which has not yet developed its own corpus of jurisprudence”); McCrudden, 
supra note 6, at 523-24; Saunders, supra note 11, at 574, 582 (noting that “[f]oreign law may lose its 
authority . . . as local jurisprudence develops,” and citing Germany, South Africa, and Hungary as 
examples of countries where judicial use of foreign jurisprudence has declined “as the local 
jurisprudence becomes established”). 
310 See, e.g., GINSBURG, supra note 63, at 30, 106-246 (observing that, “in the context of new 
democracies and political transitions,” “by definition the institutional structure of the political 
system is in a period of transition,” and chronicling the landmark constitutional cases faced by 
courts in Taiwan, Mongolia, and Korea in the aftermath of democratization); Shannon Ishiyama 
Smithey, A Tool, Not a Master: The Use of Foreign Case Law in Canada and South Africa, 34 COMP. 
POL. STUD. 1188, 1193-94 (2001) (observing that, in the aftermath of major constitutional change, 
both the Canadian Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court were faced with many 
“highly contentious” and “literally ‘unprecedented’” situations). 
311 Cf. Smithey, supra note 310, at 1192, 1204, 1207 (hypothesizing that judges search more broadly 
for support for their opinions in the face of opposition, and finding consistent with this hypothesis 
that the Canadian Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court were more likely in their 
early years to cite foreign law in cases involving novel or “particularly contentious questions,” such as 
those decided by a fractured court or involving the overturning of government action). 
312 See BOBEK, supra note 11, at 14-15 (noting a decline in judicial use of foreign law in  
Germany and central European post-communist countries after an “initial boom of comparative 
inspiration,” and suggesting that the decline may be attributable to a growing sense of “self-
 
  
1000 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 927 
 
possibility might be called the habituation hypothesis: comparativism is habit-
forming and becomes increasingly well accepted and difficult to dislodge over 
time. Yet another possibility might be called the circumvention hypothesis: 
judges engage in comparativism precisely because there is domestic law on 
point that they wish to avoid or circumvent. When precedent stands in the 
way of a court’s objectives, the court must turn elsewhere for support, and 
the use of foreign law may help the court to overcome the obstacle posed by 
domestic law.313 
Use of foreign law can also be a way for a court to elevate its status and 
promote acceptance of its decisions among domestic audiences by identifying 
itself with high-prestige courts and countries.314 The practice of looking to a 
handful of prestigious and influential countries for guidance may be perceived 
not as a form of illicit judicial activism, but rather as a constraint upon judicial 
discretion and thus a source of legitimacy.315 Courts that need to consolidate 
 
sufficiency”); id. at 43 n.12 (identifying Germany and South Africa as countries in which judicial 
references to foreign sources diminished as domestic law accumulated); Smithey, supra note 310, at 
1199-1200, 1206 (finding in both Canada and South Africa a “small but significant” negative 
relationship between the number of constitutional cases previously decided and the degree of 
foreign law citation in subsequent constitutional cases, but also reporting that this relationship 
failed to reach statistical significance in the case of Canada once additional variables were 
introduced into the analysis). 
313 See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 24, at 35 (reporting that the Supreme Court becomes more 
likely to cite “transnational law” when it is overruling precedent or striking down laws).  
314 See, e.g., WOJCIECH SADURSKI, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ENLARGEMENT 
OF EUROPE 23 (2012) (observing that “being aligned with a prestigious and powerful European 
tribunal, endowed with a high degree of legitimacy derived from states’ international obligations, 
is extremely welcome in conflict-prone and democratically weak domestic contexts,” and noting for 
example that the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s practice of citing ECtHR case law may 
advance both its domestic legitimacy and foreign reputation); Black et al., supra note 24, at 39 
(finding empirically that the “transnational law” citation habits of U.S. Supreme Court justices 
favor “those countries most likely to be deemed legitimate by the American public and by elites”—
namely, stable, democratic, wealthy, English-speaking countries); Kalb, supra note 11, at 440 
(arguing that use of foreign jurisprudence “may allow for a borrowing of their perceived legitimacy 
by a court lacking in its own”); Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 570 (observing the awareness of the 
TCC that “following in the footsteps of powerful and prestigious countries” helps Taiwan to 
“generate badly needed support and acceptance among the international community”); Saunders, 
supra note 11, at 580 (suggesting that a new constitutional court may make use of foreign jurispru-
dence to “augment [its] authority” and “establish its place in the constitutional order”); cf. Gregory 
A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 178, 189-91 (1985) (finding that within the United States, prestige differentials among state 
supreme courts are a significant predictor of “intercourt communication,” measured in terms of the 
degree to which one state supreme court cites another). 
315 See, e.g., Kalb, supra note 11, at 439-41 (arguing that strategic judicial citation of foreign law in 
transitional democracies can have the effect of legitimating courts and bolstering judicial independ-
ence); Sydney Kentridge, Comparative Law in Constitutional Adjudication: The South African Experience 
(suggesting that use of comparative jurisprudence helps to ensure that judges do not simply make a 
constitution “mean whatever [they] want it to mean”), in JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A 
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their authority have the most to gain from making strategic use of foreign 
law in this manner. Therefore, all other things equal, relatively new courts 
and courts in new or transitional democracies might be expected to engage 
more heavily in comparativism.316 
Our four East Asian case studies offer fresh perspective on these  
hypotheses. Although the substitution hypothesis makes logical sense, it 
does not appear to be the case that courts resort to comparativism only in 
the absence of sufficient domestic jurisprudence. The example of Canada is 
sometimes cited as support for the substitution hypothesis: it has been 
argued that two or three decades of judicial experience with the 1982 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms led to a decline in the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s use of foreign constitutional jurisprudence.317 However, nearly as 
much time has elapsed in South Korea and Taiwan since democratization 
and the emergence of vigorous judicial review, yet the accumulation of over 
a quarter-century of domestic jurisprudence does not appear to have 
curtailed the practice of comparativism by either the KCC or TCC. Thus, at 
least for Korea and Taiwan, the habituation and circumvention hypotheses 
are more consistent with the evidence than the substitution hypothesis. It 
may be that the explanatory power of the substitution hypothesis turns at 
least partly on institutional factors that vary from court to court. For example, 
substitution of domestic for foreign jurisprudence may be less likely if a court 
has the time and resources to conduct both foreign and domestic legal 
research and thus is not forced to choose one at the expense of the other. The 
KCC, at least, fits this description. 
 
NEW SOURCE OF INSPIRATION?, supra note 11, at 329, 330; Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings 
and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 269, 273 (2003) (citing the 
argument made by Domingo Sarmiento, future president of Argentina, that Argentinian courts ought 
to adhere strictly to American constitutional precedent in order to ensure that their case law does not 
simply reflect personal opinion); Voeten, supra note 307, at 553 (“Citing external sources . . . signals 
that legal reasoning is shared by others and thus is not arbitrary.”). 
316 See Kalb, supra note 11, at 448. 
317 See HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 33-34 (reviewing evidence of a “jurisprudential matura-
tion” effect in Canada, Hong Kong, and India); Gentili, supra note 309, at 54 (attributing a decline 
in the Canadian Supreme Court’s citation of foreign law to the growing availability of domestic 
precedent); Smithey, supra note 310, at 1199-1200, 1206 (finding evidence that foreign law citation 
in Canada and South Africa decreased as domestic precedent increased). But see Harding, supra 
note 16, at 411-12 (arguing that “the Supreme Court of Canada’s use of foreign law has not 
diminished with the establishment of a uniquely Canadian body of law, but rather has increased in 
frequency and diversity”); La Forest, supra note 199, at 212, 217 (arguing that Canadian courts are 
characterized by “modern and expanding reliance on foreign materials,” but also acknowledging 
that “recourse to American materials [may] become less necessary in the [constitutional] context as 
[Canada] develop[s] a more extensive and distinctive domestic jurisprudence”).  
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It is also clear from the case studies that many judges value compara-
tivism as a means of enhancing rather than undermining the legitimacy of 
judicial review. Whereas constitutional comparativism has attracted fierce 
criticism in the United States,318 popular reaction may actually encourage 
the use of foreign law in places such as Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. As 
a member of the TCC noted, the ability to say “this is how it’s done 
elsewhere” and “we used a foreign mainstream standard” can, in especially 
controversial or politically sensitive cases, provide a “kind of safe harbor” 
from criticism that a court is fashioning answers out of whole cloth to suit 
its own whims.319 Judicial comparativism can have these legitimating effects, 
moreover, even if judicial style disfavors the explicit citation of foreign law. 
Those in the legal community have little difficulty recognizing the telltale 
signs of foreign jurisprudence.320 No footnote is necessary, for example, 
when the TCC suddenly introduces the terminology of “clear and present 
danger”321 in a case involving public demonstrations.322 As one justice 
observed: “Yes we say it in Chinese, but people know what it means in 
English.”323  
No discussion of comparativism would be complete without at least 
some discussion of a variable that figures prominently in the comparative 
law literature—namely, the distinction between common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. Neither legal tradition appears to be inherently more condu-
cive to comparativism than the other: within East Asia, one finds examples 
of both civil law and common law courts (the KCC and TCC on the one 
hand; the HKCFA on the other) that engage heavily in constitutional 
comparativism. That does not mean, however, that membership in a 
particular legal family has no implications for the practice of judicial 
comparativism. The effects of this variable are seen not in whether compara-
tivism is practiced at all, but rather in how it is practiced.  
First, common law courts tend to be more transparent about compara-
tivism than civil law courts, in the sense that they are more likely to reveal 
their use of foreign law by explicitly citing it in their opinions.324 The 
 
318 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
319 Interview with Justice J, supra note 236. 
320 See Kalb, supra note 11, at 424 (observing that the adoption of “key foreign concepts” 
renders the influence of foreign sources “easy to detect in many decisions,” even if the sources 
themselves have not been explicitly identified). 
321 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
322 J.Y. Interpretation No. 445, 1998 SHIZI 15 (Constitutional Ct. Jan. 23, 1998) (Taiwan). 
323 See Interview with Justice J, supra note 236 (discussing the sudden appearance of the 
“clear and present danger” test in Interpretation No. 445). 
324 Cf. Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, The Use of Foreign Precedents: A Limited Prac-
tice, An Uncertain Future (noting an “almost perfect correlation” between whether a constitutional 
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HKCFA’s citation practices render its opinions a more reliable indicator of 
foreign law usage than those of the KCC, TCC, or JSC. Second, membership 
in a particular legal family appears to have a substantial effect on which 
jurisdictions tend to be chosen for comparison. In East Asia, those jurisdic-
tions that borrowed directly or indirectly from the German legal tradition 
continue to look toward Germany, whereas a history of British colonialism 
instead yields enduring jurisprudential ties to other Commonwealth 
nations. The result is what Alan Watson calls “transplant bias”: courts do 
not “systematically search” for the most informative or relevant foreign 
models but instead return time and time again to a handful of favored 
examples.325 These examples will not necessarily be the most intellectually 
illuminating or substantively comparable ones but will instead reflect such 
factors as historical legacy and global prestige.326  
VII. DIPLOMATIC EXPLANATIONS FOR COMPARATIVISM 
Judges sometimes engage with foreign law and foreign courts for reasons 
that have little to do with the performance of legal or adjudicative func-
tions. Their motivations can instead be more diplomatic than legal in 
character. Scholars may disagree over the normative desirability of judicial 
diplomacy,327 but as an empirical matter, judicial diplomacy is already 
occurring. And it is occurring because constitutional courts have both 
opportunities and incentives to practice it. Diplomacy may not be the 
primary responsibility of courts, but it is not entirely alien to them either. 
Judicial diplomacy is an ambiguous term that could describe any of three 
conceptually distinct types of behavior, the last of which demands particular 
attention. First, ordinary diplomats may make instrumental use of courts, or 
 
court explicitly cites foreign law and whether the court belongs to the common law or civil law 
tradition), in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES, supra note 
11, at 411, 412. 
325 Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 
1146-47 (1983). 
326 See id. at 1147; see also HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 23, 41-68 (describing the Israeli Supreme 
Court’s tendency to rely heavily on American and Canadian jurisprudence, while ignoring other, 
potentially more relevant bodies of law, as a strategy for identifying itself with high-prestige courts). 
327 Compare JACKSON, supra note 19, at 123 (noting the possibility that judges may act as 
“diplomats,” but arguing that courts should not view constitutional adjudication as a “positive 
opportunity to advance national interests” or promote their own international influence), with Noah 
Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, (Magazine), at 57, 66 
(arguing that “the fact that the Constitution affects our relations with the world requires the 
justices to have a foreign policy of their own,” and that the Supreme Court should “weigh national 
and international interests” and consider how the Constitution is perceived abroad when engaging 
in constitutional interpretation).  
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seek to influence courts, in the course of conducting otherwise conventional 
diplomacy. The work of the courts may be used as a selling point in the 
quest for international leadership or acceptance, as in the case of State 
Department publications that educate international audiences about the 
U.S. Supreme Court328 or Israeli mailings of prominent Israeli Supreme 
Court decisions to American legal academics.329 Relatedly, diplomats may 
also seek to encourage courts to factor foreign policy considerations into 
their decisions, as when officials repeatedly drew the Supreme Court’s 
attention to the damaging impact of racial segregation on international 
perceptions of the United States in the context of the Cold War.330 
Second, judicial diplomacy might refer to the modes of interaction that 
courts adopt with one another.331 For reasons ranging from the jurisdictional 
to the geopolitical, courts may find themselves employing stereotypically 
diplomatic tactics and instruments when dealing with foreign counterparts. 
The bywords for this kind of behavior are negotiation and agreement rather 
than adjudication and enforcement, tact and secrecy rather than transparency 
and justification. Multinational litigation can trigger judicial diplomacy of 
this sort: inter-court agreements for resolving global bankruptcies, for 
example, have been described as the equivalent of “case-specific, private 
international insolvency treaties.”332  
This variety of judicial diplomacy also surfaces as a strategy for navi-
gating sensitive situations with a high risk of public embarrassment. For 
example, Taiwan’s lack of diplomatic recognition requires the TCC to 
employ a diplomatic touch when interacting with foreign courts. If it wishes 
to invite foreign judges to Taiwan, it may try to avoid placing its guests in 
 
328 See infra note 340 and accompanying text. 
329 See Letter from Yariv Ovadia, Consul for Commc’ns & Pub. Affairs, Consulate Gen. of 
Isr. in L.A., Cal., to author (Mar. 8, 2005) (on file with author) (introducing a mailing of Israeli 
constitutional case law on the subject of torture to American legal scholars). 
330 See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 79-111 (2000) (describing both the arguments made on foreign policy 
grounds against racial segregation by both Justice Department and State Department officials, and 
the manner in which the State Department subsequently seized upon the Court’s decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as “the counter to Soviet propaganda it had been 
looking for”). 
331 See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 12, at 94-95 (reporting that the lack of international 
treaties or guidelines governing global bankruptcies has forced courts to create “their own 
regimes” consisting of “court-to-court agreements”); id. at 86 (noting that “courts are adapting the 
general notion of international comity, or the comity of nations, to fit the specific needs of courts” 
and “judges are actually negotiating with one another to determine which national court should 
take control over which part of multinational lawsuits”). 
332 Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, 33 
TEX. INT’L L. J. 587, 589 (1998). 
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an awkward position by holding a conference at a university then inviting 
judges to attend the conference, rather than asking foreign judges to visit 
the TCC itself in their official capacity.333 Similarly, the mere existence of 
formal relations or other agreements with other courts may demand confi-
dentiality in order to prevent Chinese interference.334  
The third and potentially most controversial form of judicial diplomacy—
and the focus of the present discussion—is the judicial pursuit of foreign 
policy goals. The U.S. Supreme Court is a case in point. From time to time, 
members of the Court have alluded to the desirability of influencing 
international audiences in particular ways.335 A particularly revealing 
example is Justice Breyer’s explanation-cum-apology for his heavily criticized 
decision to cite the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in an Eighth Amendment 
case.336 His comments warrant reproduction in full: 
Look, let me be a little bit more frank, that in some of these countries there 
are institutions, courts that are trying to make their way in societies that 
didn’t used to be democratic, and they are trying to protect human rights, 
they are trying to protect democracy. They’re having a document called a 
constitution, and they want to be independent judges. And for years people 
all over the world have cited the Supreme Court, why don’t we cite them 
occasionally? They will then go to some of their legislators and others and 
say, “See, the Supreme Court of the United States cites us.” That might 
give them a leg up, even if we just say it’s an interesting example. So, you 
see, it shows we read their opinions. That’s important.337 
 
333 See Interview with Justice M, Current or Former Member of the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan ( June 13, 2014). 
334 See id. 
335 See, e.g., Kersch, supra note 45, at 789 (“The job before us . . . is to try to transfer 
knowledge from one nation to another, so that, despite cultural, historical, or institutional barriers, 
we can create fairer, more effective judicial systems, including safeguards of institutional integrity 
where they are now lacking.” (quoting a speech given by Justice Breyer at NYU Law School)); 
Toobin, supra note 14, at 50 (“Why should world opinion care that the American Administration 
wants to bring freedom to oppressed peoples?  . . . If we are asking the rest of the world to adopt 
our idea of freedom, it does seem to me that there may be some mutuality there, that other nations 
and other peoples can define and interpret freedom in a way that's at least instructive to us.” 
(quoting Justice Kennedy)). 
336 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (citing, inter alia, Catholic Comm’n for Justice & Peace in Zim. v. Att’y-Gen., [1993] 1 
Zim. L. Rep. 239, 240, 269); see also Anderson, supra note 255, at 1306-07 (suggesting that Justice 
Breyer’s citation backfired by lending legitimacy not to the Zimbabwe Supreme Court, but instead 
to “Robert Mugabe’s wicked regime”).  
337 Breyer & Scalia, supra note 14.  
  
1006 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 927 
 
Extrajudicial remarks of this sort reveal a dimension of judicial motiva-
tion that is not made explicit in judicial opinions. What Justice Breyer 
describes is a form of judicial statecraft or diplomacy, directed at such goals 
as the promotion of judicial independence and the rule of law in other 
countries.338 Some may object that the Court has no business pursuing 
foreign policy objectives, much less citing foreign law.339 But it already does 
so. In collaboration with the State Department340 and through the Federal 
Judicial Center,341 the Court works to improve the administration of justice 
and promote the rule of law in other countries.  
The U.S. Supreme Court is far from alone in practicing judicial diplo-
macy of this ilk. Worldwide, it has become commonplace for judges to 
address themselves to foreign as well as domestic audiences. In a survey of 
supreme court judges from common law jurisdictions, almost one-fifth of 
respondents identified “the international community, broadly conceived” as 
part of the audience for their judgments.342 With the reactions of the 
international community squarely in mind, constitutional courts have 
played a self-conscious role in bolstering or rehabilitating the international 
legitimacy of marginalized regimes343 and global superpowers344 alike.  
 
338 See Alford, supra note 19, at 669 (noting the willingness of certain justices to use foreign 
law not simply to “resolve cases and controversies,” but also to “perform functions akin to foreign 
diplomats,” and describing Justice Kennedy in particular as “an evangelist for freedom abroad”); 
Kersch, supra note 45, at 784-85 (observing that “[i]nternational and transnational support” from 
judges in “well-established, advanced western democracies” can be “a life-line” for judges in 
“[p]ost-communist and post-colonial states” who “are often subjected to intense political 
pressures”); Scalia–Breyer Conversation, supra note 43, at 523 (“The United States Supreme Court 
has prestige in this area. Foreign courts refer to our decisions. And if we sometimes refer to their 
decisions, the references may help those struggling institutions.” (quoting Justice Breyer)). 
339 See, e.g., Alford, supra note 19, at 670 (quoting former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez’s 
admonishment that “[t]he Judiciary is not supposed to have a foreign policy independent of the 
political branches”). 
340 For an example of glossy literature extolling the virtues of constitutionalism and the rule 
of law (and the Supreme Court as exemplar of said virtues), see BUREAU OF INT’L INFO. 
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER 
THE LAW (2013). 
341 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
342 See Flanagan & Ahern, supra note 11, at 15-16. 
343 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 6, at 1181-82 (citing Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan as 
examples of “marginal states” that “have courted foreign approval and enhanced their legitimacy 
by engaging in constitutional conformity”); Ronen Shamir, “Landmark Cases” and the Reproduction 
of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel’s High Court of Justice, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 783 (1990) 
(arguing that Israeli Supreme Court decisions concerning the occupied territories have not only 
“enhanced the court’s own legitimacy,” but also “legitimized Israeli rule over the territories”); 
Smithey, supra note 310, at 1196 (observing that South African judges were “explicit about their use 
of foreign precedent to underscore the legitimacy of the new constitutional regime”); see also 
JACKSON, supra note 19, at 255-56 (noting that the use of “good faith, public reasoning” by 
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Comparativism is just one of a number of strategies for conducting  
judicial diplomacy. Other common strategies include hosting international 
conferences, translating opinions for a broader audience, and participating in 
international organizations, but these are not the only possibilities. The KCC, 
for example, has adopted a creative, multi-pronged approach: its efforts to 
exercise international leadership have ranged from the relatively conventional 
moves of participating in the Venice Commission345 and organizing the 
AACC346 to the more unorthodox moves of hiring a celebrity athlete as 
goodwill ambassador347 and creating foreign-language cartoons for children.348  
In some cases, these alternative strategies may be more effective or  
prudent than citing foreign law. For the U.S. Supreme Court, overt compara-
tivism has the obvious drawback of inviting heavy criticism, and the fact that 
it occurs in service of foreign policy goals hardly makes it more palatable. 
Courts such as the KCC and TCC face a different problem: their opinion-
writing conventions tend to favor relatively minimal citation of case law,349 
which makes it harder for them to curry favor with foreign courts by citing 
foreign jurisprudence. Given this limitation, the KCC’s resort to alternative 
strategies is unsurprising. 
For other courts, however, importing foreign jurisprudence may be the 
best or most appropriate strategy available. The HKCFA illustrates how 
judicial comparativism in particular can be especially well suited to advancing 
political and economic interests at the international level. Hong Kong faces 
the challenge of maintaining its status as a global financial center and 
protecting the basic freedoms of its citizens despite the fact that it is at the 
mercy of the authoritarian, often oppressive regime in Beijing.350 Given the 
 
constitutional courts “may contribute to [a] state’s stature and negotiating power in the interna-
tional community”). 
344 See DUDZIAK, supra note 330, at 90-114 (discussing the impact of Cold War geopolitical 
considerations on the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); supra 
note 22 and accompanying text (describing the Federal Judicial Center’s Office of International 
Judicial Relations). 
345 See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. 
346 See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. 
347 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (noting Yuna Kim’s appearance in multilingual 
promotional materials for the KCC).  
348 See Virtual Tour: Cartoon for Children, CONST. CT. KOREA, http://www.ccourt.go.kr 
/home/english/virtualtour/cartoon01.jsp (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
Y4PE-V3BL (introducing younger audiences to the work of the KCC via a series of English-
language cartoons on the “Children’s Constitutional Court”). 
349 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing citation practices in the civil law world). 
350 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckley, Protesters in Hong Kong Ease Sit-In at Govern-
ment Headquarters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2014, at A10 (“Real decision-making power on the side of 
the authorities rests in Beijing with China’s president, Xi Jinping.”). 
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lack of democratic governance in Hong Kong, the judiciary and the 
HKCFA in particular bear disproportionate responsibility for (1) protecting 
the basic rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents; (2) upholding the 
autonomy of Hong Kong from the PRC under the “one country, two 
systems” constitutional rubric;351 (3) defending the rule of law in Hong 
Kong from mainland Chinese encroachment or the appearance thereof; and 
(4) reassuring both domestic and international audiences, including the 
foreign businesses and investors that are the lifeblood of the economy, that 
Hong Kong remains autonomous and deserving of confidence. 
The HKCFA’s heavy reliance on foreign law advances all of these goals. 
As Sir Anthony Mason, a non-permanent member of the HKCFA and 
former Chief Justice of Australia, has explained: 
For a newly established court of final appeal, like the [HKCFA], compara-
tive law has an added attraction. It is important that the Court’s decisions 
should be seen to conform to internationally accepted judicial standards. 
Indeed, for Hong Kong there is a double attraction: Hong Kong’s reputa-
tion as an international financial centre depends upon the integrity and 
standing of its courts. Further, in the context of Hong Kong’s relationship 
with the central government in Beijing, it is important that the decisions of 
the Hong Kong courts reflect adherence to the rule of law in accordance 
with internationally adopted judicial standards.352 
 
351 See Chen, supra note 259, at 272-73 (observing that the “internationalisation” of Hong 
Kong’s constitutional law is “at once a good in itself and a good means to enable Hong Kong to 
resist ‘mainlandization,’” and arguing that for purposes of “fortify[ing] Hong Kong against those 
forces coming from the mainland that may erode the freedoms and way of life that the people of 
Hong Kong cherish,” “there is everything to be gained, and nothing to lose, by attaching Hong 
Kong as firmly and closely as possible to the international system for the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”).  
352 Mason, supra note 305, at 302-03; see also, e.g., YASH GHAI, HONG KONG’S NEW CON-
STITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC 
LAW 323-24 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that continuity with English law was seen as necessary to 
“reassure the business community” and “enhance the court’s prospects of independence”); 
Anselmo Reyes, The Performance Interest in Hong Kong Contract Law (“In the mind of investors, if 
the Hong Kong court were seen as too readily diverging from the common law applicable before 
July 1997, there would be concern that Hong Kong law was mutating into something unknown and 
uncertain. Rational or not, investors’ perceptions might then lead to doubts about the continuance 
of the rule of law in Hong Kong and that could jeopardize the free market strategy that is the 
cornerstone of Hong Kong’s well-being. In short, Hong Kong’s history is such that any change in 
the common law system, let alone radical change, risks being perceived by the outside world as 
introducing an element of capriciousness in the operation of the law.”), in REMEDIES FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT (Mindy Chen-Wishart et al. eds., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1) 
(on file with author). 
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The benefits of tethering Hong Kong law to foreign law are in some sense 
analogous to the benefits of pegging the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. 
dollar. Just as the currency peg stabilizes the Hong Kong dollar, the tether-
ing of Hong Kong constitutional jurisprudence to the jurisprudence of a 
select handful of Commonwealth jurisdictions promotes the stability and 
continuity of Hong Kong Law. This stability and continuity, in turn, help 
to sustain foreign and domestic confidence in the quality and integrity of 
Hong Kong’s judiciary and legal system.353 The challenges that Hong Kong 
faces in maintaining its international competitiveness and signaling its 
autonomy from China are ever-present background considerations that 
motivate judges to err on the side of citing more foreign law rather than 
less.354  
VIII. INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR COMPARATIVISM 
Unlike the explanations discussed above in Parts VI and VII, institu-
tional explanations for comparativism give due attention to the capabilities 
as well as the preferences of judicial actors. The institutional environment 
in which lawyers and judges find themselves shapes both their ability and 
their desire to engage in comparativism.  
The impact of institutional variables on judicial ability to practice  
comparativism is straightforward. Courts will not use what they lack the 
ability to use, and by definition, a court that lacks the resources and mecha-
nisms necessary to learn about foreign law in a systematic way will make at 
most limited use of foreign law. It is no coincidence that, among the five 
courts summarized in Table 1, there is a strong correlation between each 
court’s institutional capacity for comparativism and the extent to which 
each court actually practices comparativism. Institutional capacity alone 
may not guarantee that judges will engage in comparativism, but it is a 
necessary condition: enthusiasm for foreign law on the part of individual 
judges makes little difference if it is not paired with the time and resources 
needed to investigate foreign law.  
 
353 See Interview with Judge 1, supra note 265 (observing that the tethering of Hong Kong 
law to foreign law has a “conservatizing influence” on Hong Kong law and helps to reassure 
foreign audiences that Hong Kong remains a part of the common law world); Interview with 
Justice A, supra note 265 (agreeing that the practice of comparativism by Hong Kong courts has 
the effect of boosting foreign confidence in Hong Kong’s legal system). 
354 See Interview with Judge 1, supra note 265 (quoting a high-ranking Hong Kong judge’s 
advice to continue citing “all these U.K. cases,” even when it does not appear necessary to do so, 
because the practice reassures the rest of the world that Hong Kong’s legal system remains up to 
international standards). 
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The impact of institutional variables on judicial preferences is less obvious 
but becomes apparent when we consider a key feature of the institutional 
environment in which courts operate—namely, the systems in place for 
training legal elites. Legal education inculcates skills and values that shape not 
only the capabilities, but also the preferences of legal elites. A system of legal 
education that fails to promote knowledge of foreign law is unlikely to produce 
lawyers and judges with either the ability or the desire to use foreign law.  
Together, judicial comparativism, institutional capacity, and compara-
tive legal education form a positive and self-sustaining feedback loop: each 
element stokes the development of the others. First, comparative legal 
education simultaneously stimulates judicial interest in foreign law and 
enhances the ability of courts to make use of foreign law. Second, judicial 
comparativism simultaneously generates demand for comparative legal 
education and gives courts a reason to invest in institutional mechanisms for 
learning about foreign law. Third, the existence of such institutional 
mechanisms simultaneously facilitates judicial comparativism and creates 
prestigious employment opportunities that incentivize lawyers to obtain 
comparative legal training, which completes the feedback loop.  
It is thus a mistake to say that courts acquire institutional capacity only 
if judges are already interested in comparativism, or that institutional 
factors are merely epiphenomenal to judicial preferences. The level of 
judicial interest in comparativism is not logically antecedent to the level of 
institutional capacity for practicing comparativism. Rather, judicial interest 
in comparativism is endogenous to the institutional environment. By 
manipulating the institutional variables that regulate the supply of lawyers 
and judges with exposure to foreign law, it is possible to influence judicial 
demand for foreign legal expertise, and vice versa. 
The relevant institutional variables can be divided into two categories: 
those involving the internal design of courts, and those involving legal 
education. This distinction is somewhat artificial, however, because the 
effects of institutional design and legal education are strongly interdependent. 
A. The Role of Institutional Design 
Judicial usage of foreign law cannot occur without judicial awareness of 
foreign law. Judges cannot make use of foreign examples that they simply do 
not know. In theory, there are two ways in which judges might gain the 
necessary awareness. The first is through judge-to-judge, or “J2J,”  
interaction.355 The second is through institutional mechanisms built into the 
 
355 Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 535 (quoting a member of the TCC). 
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court itself, such as the availability of foreign-trained law clerks or the estab-
lishment of a research arm that specializes in foreign law. But these two 
mechanisms are not equally effective. 
In practice, J2J interaction has proven neither necessary nor sufficient 
for judges to become sophisticated about foreign law.356 Comparison of 
Taiwan and the United States highlights the inadequacy of J2J interaction 
as a means for learning about foreign law. Opportunities for members of the 
TCC to interact with foreign judges are heavily constrained, whereas the 
members of the U.S. Supreme Court receive a steady stream of foreign 
visitors and are in high demand overseas. It would be difficult to argue, 
however, that American justices know more than Taiwanese justices about 
foreign law. Conferences and cocktail chatter with members of the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht are poor substitutes for a doctorate in German 
law.357 By most accounts, the interactions that judges have with one another 
at international conferences and events are “likely to be brief”358 and 
dominated by “[s]mall talk” with insufficient time for “substantive discus-
sion.”359 It may be that the members of the U.S. Supreme Court neverthe-
less learn from such interactions. If so, however, that may simply reflect a 
relatively low baseline level of knowledge.  
Mechanisms for acquiring foreign legal expertise that are built into a 
court’s institutional structure are vastly more effective at promoting judicial 
comparativism than sporadic face-to-face interaction with foreign judges. 
Comparison of the JSC, KCC, TCC, and U.S. Supreme Court reinforces 
the commonsensical conclusion that courts with the institutional capacity to 
learn about foreign law make greater use of foreign law. Conversely, courts 
that lack such capacity are at a decisive disadvantage. Put simply, courts 
cannot do what they cannot do. Even a judge who wants to make compara-
tive arguments will find it difficult to do without any institutional support 
either inside or outside the court.360  
 
356 See BOBEK, supra note 11, at 49 (reporting that the type of knowledge obtained from 
judicial meetings, networks, and associations “tends to be superficial, selective, and random” and 
“is rarely of any use for national judicial decision-making”); id. at 74 (arguing that the impact of 
“informal exchanges and encounters . . . on judicial decision-making” has been “markedly 
exaggerated” in the debate over the propriety of judicial comparativism). 
357 Cf. id. at 49 (observing on the basis of experience as a Czech judicial administrator that 
“most often, judges prefer to talk amongst themselves about anything other than their cases”). 
358 Interview with Justice B, supra note 244 (indicating that a participant would be “lucky to 
speak to one person for one hour”). 
359 Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 567 (quoting members of the TCC). 
360 See Breyer, supra note 14 (observing that “[n]either I nor my law clerks can easily find 
relevant comparative material on our own,” and urging law professors to “supply that demand” by 
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Institutional capacity can be broken down into two components, institu-
tional design and resources. Table 1 summarizes the design characteristics 
and resources that shape each court’s capacity for foreign legal research. As 
this Table highlights, neither the JSC nor the U.S. Supreme Court boasts 
anything resembling the array of mechanisms and resources for foreign legal 
research available to the KCC or TCC. It is no coincidence that neither the 
JSC nor the U.S. Supreme Court rivals the KCC or TCC in their use of 
foreign law. All else being equal, if the resources available to a court include 
an array of foreign law specialists—as in South Korea and Taiwan—the 
result will be opportunistic usage of foreign law. Conversely, if resources 
for performing foreign legal research are scarce—as in the United States 
and, to a lesser degree, Japan—comparative analysis is likely to be less 
frequent.  
In some cases, institutional mechanisms may be introduced for the  
purpose of facilitating comparativism. The KCC clearly falls in this category 
with its extensive array of researchers and advisers who are either hired for 
their foreign legal expertise or dispatched to study law overseas.361 Institu-
tional features need not be intentionally designed to promote compara-
tivism, however, in order to have that effect. Consider the design of the 
TCC, which heightens the court’s capacity for comparativism but in ways 
more subtle than the design of the KCC. Two of the most relevant design 
characteristics of the TCC are facially neutral but have a heavy impact 
when paired with the right resources.  
The first design characteristic is the heavy representation of legal  
academics on the court, which is guaranteed by law.362 On its face, the fact 
that a majority of the TCC’s members are former law professors might 
seem inconsequential for the use of foreign law. However, the fact that 
constitutional scholars in Taiwan overwhelmingly possess foreign legal 
training renders their presence a de facto guarantee of the TCC’s ability to 
engage in comparativism.363 By contrast, although Japanese law professors 
 
equipping “the law students, who will become the lawyers, who will brief the courts” with the 
skills needed to make comparative arguments). 
361 See supra subsections III.D.2-4, III.D.6 (discussing the qualifications and expertise of the 
Constitutional Research Officers, the Constitutional Researchers, the Academic Advisers, the 
researchers at the CRI, and the foreign correspondents contracted by the CRI). 
362 See infra Table 1 (breaking down the composition of the TCC by professional background); 
supra note 202 and accompanying text (explaining the abundance of legal academics on the TCC). 
363 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
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also tend to be knowledgeable in foreign law,364 they typically hold no more 
than one of the fifteen seats on the JSC.365  
The second design characteristic, which interacts with the first, is the 
manner in which law clerks are recruited. Although Taiwan’s justices are 
limited to one clerk each, they are free to select clerks of their own liking. 
By itself, the vesting of clerkship hiring in individual justices has little or no 
inherent tendency to facilitate comparativism: the KCC makes heavy use of 
foreign law notwithstanding the fact that its members have no say over who 
their clerks will be, while the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have free 
rein in clerk selection yet rarely engage in comparativism. The clerk 
recruitment method matters in the case of the TCC, however, because those 
making the hiring decisions are interested in foreign law and able to recruit 
from a pool of likeminded potential clerks. Any institutional design charac-
teristic that gives individual justices control over resources also enables 
them to indulge their own proclivities, and in the case of the TCC, those 
proclivities happen to include comparativism.366 Fortunately for the justic-
es, Taiwan’s educational system generates an ample supply of law graduates 
with the necessary linguistic and comparative expertise.  
Now consider, by contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court. Unlike its coun-
terparts in Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, it simply lacks the necessary 
institutional capacity to learn about foreign law in anything approaching a 
routine and systematic manner. There is no expectation or requirement, 
formal or informal, that the Justices have prior experience with foreign law, 
and they typically have no formal training in foreign legal systems.367 Nor, 
 
364 See infra Table 1 (reporting the number and proportion of constitutional scholars at top 
Japanese law schools with foreign legal training). 
365 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. As of this writing, the only former law professor 
on the JSC is Justice Kiyoko Okabe, who taught family law after lengthy service as a career judge. 
See OKABE Kiyoko, SUP. CT. JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/about/justice/okabe/ 
index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/824S-XEZE.  
366 Cf. Tokuji Izumi, Concerning the Japanese Public’s Evaluation of Supreme Court Justices, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1769, 1779 (2011) (suggesting, based on his experience as a member of the JSC, 
that enabling Japanese justices to select their own clerks “would invigorate the Court’s deliberations, 
which in turn could lead to an increase in the Court’s production of important jurisprudence”). 
367 Three of the four former academics on the Court as of this writing studied abroad over 
the course of their formal educations, but none focused on law during their time abroad. Justices 
Breyer and Kagan both hold degrees from Oxford, but not in law. See Elena Kagan, OYEZ, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/elena_kagan (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
F6XK-KF7W (indicating that Justice Kagan’s field of study at Worcester College, Oxford, was 
philosophy); Stephen G. Breyer, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/justices/stephen_g_breyer (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PYU8-QY8B (indicating that Justice Breyer studied 
economics at Magdalen College, Oxford). Justice Scalia spent his junior year as an undergraduate 
at the University of Fribourg but focused on history, economics, and literature. See JOAN 
BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT 
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unlike some courts, does the U.S. Supreme Court even attempt to compen-
sate for these deficiencies by hiring clerks or researchers with the kind of 
training, experience, or even language abilities, that might help fill the 
resulting knowledge gaps.368 Instead, the Court makes do with the help of 
recent graduates of America’s top law schools—which generally do not 
require their students to learn about foreign law—and an obscure arm of the 
Library of Congress called the Directorate of Legal Research.369 
These meager resources are no match for justices who have studied law 
overseas or spent decades publishing scholarly articles about foreign law, or 
a cadre of experienced professional researchers with foreign law degrees or, 
for that matter, an entire research institute dedicated to the study of 
 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 25 (2009). Justice Ginsburg did not study abroad but published 
repeatedly on the subject of Swedish civil procedure during her time as a law professor. See, e.g., 
RUTH BADER GINSBURG & ANDERS BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN (1965); 
Justice Ginsburg Interview, supra note 11, at 805 (citing various scholarly works by then-Professor 
Ginsburg on Swedish law). 
368 See, e.g., Bentele, supra note 11, at 244 (noting that justices of the South African Constitu-
tional Court “have the benefit of up to five clerks selected from applicants around the world” in 
addition to two South African law clerks); Somek, supra note 91, at 284 n.1 (attributing the Israeli 
Supreme Court’s prowess at comparative constitutional analysis in part to its “practice of 
employing clerks from all over the world, who do the research work on their country of origin”); 
supra subsection III.D.2 (discussing the practices of the “constitutional research officers” and 
foreign law specialists employed by the KCC).  
A court need not employ clerks or justices who are literally foreign in order to possess high 
institutional capacity for learning about foreign law. Although the Canadian Supreme Court does 
not make a point of hiring clerks from other countries, it enjoys both an innate knowledge of, and 
capacity for learning about, foreign law that the U.S. Supreme Court lacks. The unwritten rules 
governing the allocation of seats on the Canadian court on the basis of geography guarantee that a 
sizeable portion of the justices are native francophones with a civil law background. See F.L. 
Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A System in Transition, in APPOINTING 
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE 
WORLD 56, 59 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006). So, too, are a sizeable fraction of 
the court’s clerks. The infrastructure for this legal and linguistic diversification is both intellectual 
and historical: Canada’s law schools provide a combination of common law and civil law training in 
a combination of English and French. See Aline Grenon & Louis Perret, Globalization and 
Canadian Legal Education, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 549-52 (2002) (describing how certain 
Canadian law schools ensure “direct access to Canada’s legal and linguistic duality” by offering 
both civil law and common law instruction in both official languages). 
369 See Alford, supra note 18 (noting that in 2004, the Library of Congress received from 
“judicial agencies” 165 “research requests” pertaining to foreign law); Michael Ravnitzky, The 
Directorate of Legal Research at the Library of Congress: A Treasure Hidden Under a Bushel Basket, 
LLRX.COM (Nov. 22, 2006), http://www.llrx.com/features/lclegalresearch.htm, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/RS8C-7UWG (describing the Directorate of Legal Research as a “research department 
contained within the Library of Congress” that “receives scant mention . . . even among the legal 
research community”). 
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comparative constitutional law.370 The result, as described by Justice Breyer, 
is hardly surprising: “Neither I nor my law clerks can easily find relevant 
comparative material on our own.”371 If Justice Breyer—a seasoned scholar, 
a longtime champion of comparativism,372 and the most widely traveled 
member of the Court373—cannot find the comparative material that he 
needs, what hope is there for the rest of the Court? Comparativism requires 
more than a willingness or desire on the part of individual judges to use 
foreign law. It also requires institutional support. When it comes to  
comparativism, the old adage does not hold true: where there is a will, there 
is not necessarily also a way. 
B. The Role of Legal Education 
Institutions cannot operate without resources, and no resource is more 
crucial to comparativism than an adequate supply of lawyers who know 
foreign law. Mechanisms for recruiting judges or clerks with training in 
foreign law make little difference if no one possesses the necessary training. 
Without the support of Taiwanese legal education, for example, neither the 
appointment of legal academics as justices nor the hiring of experienced law 
clerks would ensure the TCC’s engagement with foreign law. The recruitment 
practices of the TCC promote judicial comparativism because they tap into a 
deep talent pool of academics and law graduates with exposure to foreign law.  
Similar mechanisms would be unlikely to succeed in the United States 
because American legal education fails to produce the necessary talent. 
Vicki Jackson has argued that there are a number of ways in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court might acquire the capacity to learn about foreign law in a 
fair, transparent, and accurate manner.374 These include briefing procedures 
that guarantee adequate and balanced participation by a combination of 
court-appointed experts and knowledgeable amici curiae,375 the hiring of 
foreign lawyers as clerks,376 and more generally efforts to ensure that it “has 
 
370 See supra note 161 and accompanying text (noting that the Korean Constitutional Court, 
Peruvian Constitutional Court, and Argentinian Supreme Court all possess their own foreign law 
research institutes). 
371 See Breyer, supra note 14. When asked by the author, one of the Justices confirmed that the 
Court lacks personnel knowledgeable about foreign law, and that this lack of expertise discourages 
comparativism. 
372 See Law, supra note 15, at 653-54 & n.4 (citing various opinions and public pronouncements 
by Justice Breyer). 
373 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
374 See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 190-91.  
375 Id. 
376 Id. at 189. 
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within its institutional apparatus personnel with sufficient education and 
expertise to assist in research on issues of foreign or international law.”377 
Even if the Court were willing to implement such institutional reforms, 
however, most of them presuppose a supply of foreign legal expertise that 
largely does not exist in this country. The United States does not boast an 
enormous pool of scholars who specialize in comparative constitutional law 
or attorneys with training in foreign constitutional law. Nor is it easy to 
import the necessary expertise, as Congress has by statute barred the hiring 
of foreign lawyers as law clerks.378  
Legal education generates the expectations, values, and resources needed 
for judicial comparativism to flourish. In East Asia, law schools serve as 
both a source of substantive expertise in foreign law and a vehicle for 
normalizing and valorizing the use of foreign law. Legal education in Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong embodies the view that the study of foreign 
law is relevant, worthwhile, and conventional. The educational background 
of constitutional law professors at elite law schools might be considered a 
rough proxy for the extent to which legal education supports constitutional 
comparativism. All but one of the professors who teach constitutional law at 
Korea’s top three law schools have studied law in another country.379 The 
same is true of all eight of the constitutional law professors at Taiwan’s 
leading law school and of every tenure-track constitutional law professor at 
all three of Hong Kong’s law schools.380 Even in Japan, where judicial 
comparativism is less prevalent, most legal scholars possess deep knowledge 
of at least one foreign jurisdiction.381 In the area of constitutional law 
specifically, one-quarter to two-thirds of the constitutional law faculty at the 
University of Tokyo, Keio University, and Waseda University possess some 
kind of foreign legal training.382 Schools of this ilk, in turn, produce the lion’s 
 
377 Id. The Korean Constitutional Court is pursuing such a strategy to a dramatic extent by 
establishing its own research institute to be staffed by scholars who are fluent in foreign languages. 
See supra subsection III.D.6. 
378 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 704, 123 Stat. 3034, 
3205-06 (2009) (providing that “no part of any appropriation . . . shall be used to pay the 
compensation of any officer or employee of the Government of the United States” who is not a 
citizen, a permanent resident “seeking citizenship,” a refugee who plans to pursue citizenship, or “a 
person who owes allegiance to the United States”). 
379 All six of the full-time faculty identified on Seoul National University’s website as teaching 
constitutional law, and all five of the constitutional law professors identified on Yonsei University’s 
website, have studied law overseas. Five of the six constitutional law professors at Korea University 
have foreign legal training. See infra Table 1. 
380 See infra Table 1. 
381 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
382 The fact that so many Japanese constitutional scholars have studied law abroad at some 
point is all the more remarkable in light of the traditional propensity of Japanese law schools to 
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share of the career judges, elite academics, and government officials who 
eventually become constitutional court justices.  
By contrast, a system of legal education that simultaneously celebrates the 
exceptionalism and superiority of domestic law and relegates all consideration 
of foreign law to upper-year elective courses that are perceived as lacking 
practical applicability is not a system that will generate a meaningful supply 
of lawyers and judges with much appetite or aptitude for comparativism.383 
For law schools to highlight and reinforce the status of comparative law as an 
endeavor distinct from, and secondary to, the ordinary work of lawyers and 
judges is to ensure that comparative law will be perceived as unimportant or 
irrelevant by judges. The result is the “vicious circle” described by former 
Israeli Chief Justice Aharon Barak: “[J]udges d[o] not tend to rely on compar-
ative law; lawyers d[o] not cite comparative law to judges; law schools d[o] 
not stress comparative law; scholars d[o] not emphasise comparative law; 
judges d[o] not tend to rely on comparative law; etc.”384 Judicial behavior and 
legal education are mutually reinforcing and interdependent. Judicial indif-
ference to comparative arguments gives law schools little incentive to stress 
comparative law, but law schools are simultaneously responsible for educating 
judges to be indifferent to comparative law. 
This hypothetical system of legal education bears more than a passing 
resemblance to American legal education. There is no meaningful pool of 
 
recruit professors directly out of their undergraduate legal studies. Until recently, law was an 
exclusively undergraduate subject in Japanese universities. See Chen, supra note 144, at 32-33; 
Shigenori Matsui, Turbulence Ahead: The Future of Law Schools in Japan, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 4, 
10-11 (2012) (describing Japan’s adoption in 2002 of three-year graduate law schools alongside the 
existing four-year undergraduate curriculum in law); Setsuo Miyazawa & Hiroshi Otsuka, Legal 
Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan, 1 ASIAN–PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 24 (2000). At 
present, Japanese universities have both undergraduate law faculties and graduate law schools, 
which overlap to varying degrees. Matsui, supra, at 11. At Keio University, one of the graduate law 
school’s three constitutional law professors has studied in the United States, while all three of the 
constitutional law specialists in the undergraduate law faculty have studied abroad. At Waseda 
University, two of the three constitutional law professors in the graduate law school and two of the 
five in the undergraduate law faculty have studied abroad. The University of Tokyo’s graduate law 
school has three constitutional law specialists, one of whom has spent time in the United States as 
a visiting scholar. The undergraduate law faculty shares the same three constitutional law 
professors as the graduate law school, plus a constitutional theorist who has not studied abroad. 
These tallies are based on a survey of the relevant law school websites in various languages 
conducted by the author’s multilingual research assistants circa August 2014. 
383 See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 576 (observing that the indifference of American law 
schools to comparative training precludes an “adequate supply of outstanding judges and clerks” 
with expertise in foreign law and serves as an “obstacle to the emergence of robust judicial 
comparativism”). 
384 Aharon Barak, Comparison in Public Law, in JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: 
A NEW SOURCE OF INSPIRATION?, supra note 11, at 287, 287. 
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talent in the United States from which either potential clerks or judicial 
candidates with substantial foreign legal expertise can be recruited. Nor is 
foreign legal training made more attractive by the prospect of an academic job, 
as in East Asia or much of the rest of the world. Although law school hiring of 
teaching candidates who hold both a J.D. and a Ph.D. is accelerating, would-
be law professors who obtained their law degrees in the United States do 
not go overseas for their Ph.Ds., and recent hiring trends offer little  
evidence that teaching candidates are rewarded by the job market for having 
foreign legal training.385 The dearth of such training on the part of the 
nation’s law professors, meanwhile, tends to mean that little knowledge of, or 
interest in, foreign law will be imparted to the next generation of lawyers.386  
Although legal education is an important determinant of judicial  
comparativism, its precise impact is difficult to pin down because it  
interacts in complex ways with many other variables. Legal education is 
deeply embedded in its social, political, and economic environment, meaning 
that it both shapes and is shaped by its environment. Consequently, the 
effect of legal education cannot be neatly isolated from the effect of other 
environmental factors. There can be little doubt, for example, that the 
extent to which a country’s system of legal education fosters comparativism 
is influenced by market forces. All else being equal, lawyers from smaller 
countries have stronger economic incentives to learn foreign law: the sheer 
size of the American and Japanese economies387 means that American or 
Japanese lawyers who ignore foreign law sacrifice fewer opportunities than 
Korean or Taiwanese or Hong Kong lawyers who do the same. Student 
demand for comparative law presumably translates into increased educa-
tional offerings in comparative law. One could argue, therefore, that the 
emphasis in Korea on English fluency and knowledge of American law 
merely reflects the fact that those skills are prized by both foreign and 
 
385 See Lawrence Solum, Entry Level Hiring Survey 2010, LEGAL THEORY BLOG  
(Apr. 12, 2010), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2010/04/entry-level-hiring-survey-2010.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7MM3-BDVR (listing the educational credentials of those hired into 
tenure-track teaching positions at American law schools in 2010); Lawrence Solum, 2009 Entry Level 
Hiring Report, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 26, 2009), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/ 
04/2009-entry-level-hiring-report.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S58K-XXRT (doing the same for 
2009). 
386 Cf. Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 37 
(1995) (arguing that American courts eschew international law partly because it is both “unknown” 
and “unusual” to American judges and lawyers). 
387 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK DATABASE (2013), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/download.aspx (identifying 
the United States, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan as having the first, third, fifteenth, and twenty-
seventh largest economies in the world, respectively). 
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domestic employers.388 Conversely, one might conclude that American law 
schools offer little comparative training simply because American law 
students generally do not view such training as highly beneficial to their 
employment prospects.389 
It would be a mistake, however, to view legal education as merely  
epiphenomenal to market forces, or to conclude that a lack of supply simply 
reflects a lack of demand. For a variety of reasons ranging from regulatory 
fiat390 to sheer confusion, the legal education industry responds imperfectly 
to economic conditions, and to the extent that it does respond, its responses 
are the product of internal debate over what those conditions happen to be 
and how best to respond. The result is that the standard American law school 
curriculum is hardly a faithful reflection of either student or employer 
demand. Run-of-the-mill legal employers in this country may not be 
clamoring for lawyers well versed in Chinese or German law, but they are 
unlikely to view presidential immunity or equal protection doctrine as 
enormous moneymakers either. From a market perspective, it seems just as 
arbitrary to make constitutional law mandatory as to make comparative law 
optional.391 Indeed, market forces might even favor comparative law over 
constitutional law: ongoing weakness in the domestic employment market 
for lawyers,392 combined with the growth of transnational legal practice and 
 
388 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing the professional opportunities 
that English fluency and American legal training create for Korean attorneys). 
389 See Krotoszynski, supra note 32, at 132 (noting the “chicken-and-egg problem” that “[l]aw 
schools do not invest major resources in international and comparative law offerings in part 
because domestic legal employers do not place much value on such training”). 
390 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 12 (2012) (listing various accredi-
tation requirements that prevent certain cost-cutting or price-cutting measures by law schools). 
391 The obvious rejoinder is that law schools mandate constitutional law because the Multi-
state Bar Examination includes a constitutional law component. However, that merely begs the 
question of why bar examiners see fit to test constitutional law notwithstanding its irrelevance to 
the majority of legal practice, which in turn implicates the role of legal education in defining what 
is considered important by lawyers. 
392 See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Is Law School Worth the Cost?, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 173, 174 
(2013) (characterizing the job market for law graduates as “bleak” and “not likely to improve any 
time soon”); David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, § 3, at 1 (noting, 
inter alia, the disappearance of “some 15,000 attorney and legal-staff jobs at large law firms” from 
2008 through the end of 2010). But see, e.g., Ronit Dinovitzer et al., Buyers’ Remorse? An Empirical 
Assessment of the Desirability of a Lawyer Career, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 223-24 (2013) (arguing that 
“the conventional story of crisis is vastly oversimplified,” and that the availability of high-salary 
positions at large law firms for new graduates is a misleading measure of the economic value of 
legal education); Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 249, 251, 253-59 (2014) (concluding on the basis of extensive statistical analysis that 
“law school remains a lucrative investment,” and estimating “a dramatic increase in earnings for 
law degree holders of approximately $57,200 per year,” after controlling for hours worked). 
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overseas employment opportunities,393 may render foreign legal expertise an 
increasingly sensible investment. Neither legal educators nor bar examiners 
nor educational accreditation bodies are mere slaves to market demand. For 
better or for worse, they make choices with profound consequences for the 
ability of judges and lawyers to navigate an increasingly globalized world, 
and the choices they make are not necessarily optimal from a strictly 
economic perspective. 
CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL DIPLOMACY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL NETWORKS 
Judicial behavior is shaped not only by legal and political constraints, 
but also by institutional constraints. Comparativism is no exception. 
Institutional constraints on comparativism can take a variety of forms, 
ranging from docket pressures that limit opportunities for exploration394 to 
underinvestment in basic research tools.395 It is difficult to think of any 
institutional variable that plays a larger role in determining the prospects 
for comparativism, however, than legal education. An environment in which 
lawyers and judges are unfamiliar with foreign law is an environment in 
which courts will lack either the taste or the capacity for foreign legal 
research and judicial comparativism will be at best sporadic.  
Comparativism is especially dependent upon institutional support because 
it is resource-intensive. A typical law clerk armed with a copy of the Federalist 
Papers and little else may be reasonably well equipped to engage in what 
passes for originalism,396 while textualism may call for little more than access 
 
393 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the Literature and a Research 
Agenda for Further Study, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 7-11 (2007) (describing empirically the 
global expansion of top law firms); Not Entirely Free, Your Honour, ECONOMIST, July 31, 2010, at 46 
(discussing how a “talented graduate from any of the world's top law schools can expect a life of 
globe-trotting”). 
394 See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text (discussing the docket pressures faced by the 
JSC and the implications of such pressures for a court’s capacity to conduct foreign legal research). 
395 See E-mail from Clerk 2, Current or Former Court Attorney to a Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the Philippines, to author (May 7, 2014, 8:57 AM EST) (on file with author) (noting that 
the “court library is virtually bare,” “Westlaw access is limited to AmJur and Corpus Juris,” and 
clerks have “no access” to the work of other courts “except through Google”); E-mail from Clerk 3, 
Current or Former Court Attorney to a Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, to author 
(May 7, 2014, 11:20 AM EST) (on file with author) (describing the court library’s collection as 
“prehistoric,” and noting that access to the sole Westlaw subscription in each justice’s chambers is 
rationed according to “office policy”).  
396 See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1996) (criticizing the Supreme Court's use of “originalist 
evidence” as “a mix of ‘law office history’ and justificatory rhetoric”); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the 
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 156 (describing the “law-office history” on 
display in the Court’s opinions as “disastrous” from a historian’s perspective). 
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to a handful of vintage dictionaries. But there is no obvious and equivalent 
shortcut that American judges can use to perform even a watered-down 
version of comparativism. No amount of personal enthusiasm or international 
travel on the part of the Justices is likely to make up for the fact that—unlike 
the members of the Korean Constitutional Court—they lack a full-time staff 
of comparativists to navigate literally an entire world of foreign law.397 Nor is 
technology alone the solution. Anyone can operate an Internet search engine 
and locate foreign legal materials,398 but very few can digest the results.399 
Critics of comparativism400 and sophisticated comparativists401 alike have 
drawn attention to the perils of invoking foreign law without the knowledge 
needed to place that law in context. The requisite understanding of context is 
not simply a Google search away. Neither the competence nor the confidence 
to engage in comparativism can easily be acquired without meaningful 
investment in infrastructure and education.  
What distinguishes comparativism even more sharply from other judi-
cial practices, however, is the fact that it is not merely a type of legal 
argumentation, but also a form of judicial diplomacy. Scholars may disagree 
over the normative desirability of judicial diplomacy,402 but as an empirical 
matter, it is already commonplace. Why else, for example, would courts in 
non-English-speaking countries go to the trouble and expense of translating 
 
397 See Breyer, supra note 14 (urging American law professors to help solve the problem by 
equipping “the law students, who will become the lawyers, who will brief the courts” with the 
skills needed to make comparative arguments). 
398 See HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that “[v]irtually all reputable peak courts across 
the globe maintain websites where thousands of rulings . . . may be browsed with ease,” and that 
new online portals allow easy retrieval and comparison of “the entire corpus of constitutional texts 
around the world”). 
399 See Law, supra note 47, at 153-54 (observing that an online search for information on rare 
genetic disorders inundates the user with information that is of little use without advanced 
scientific training, and querying whether there is “any reason to doubt that online comparative 
research performed by judges and clerks without prior training in foreign law would be plagued by 
precisely the same problems”). 
400 See, e.g., Scalia–Breyer Conversation, supra note 43, at 528-29 (“One of the difficulties of 
using foreign law is that you don’t understand what the surrounding jurisprudence is. So that you 
can say, for example, ‘Russia follows Miranda,’ but you don’t know that Russia doesn’t have an 
exclusionary rule.” (quoting Justice Scalia)). 
401 As Sir Anthony Mason—an unusually experienced comparativist who has served on the 
highest courts of Australia, Hong Kong, and Fiji—has observed, the public law of other countries 
“cannot be understood or applied in the absence of a comprehensive understanding of its political, 
historical, social and cultural context.” Mason, supra note 305, at 305; see also id. at 306 (observing that 
even a judge already familiar with multiple jurisdictions “may feel that he or she lacks the under-
standing of other systems of law needed to embrace judicial decisions of those other systems”). 
402 See supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
  
1022 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 927 
 
their opinions into English and maintaining English-language websites?403 
Why would any court operate an entire research institute for the purpose of 
conducting foreign legal research that has no direct bearing on actual 
cases?404 Why would a court invest considerable resources in launching 
international organizations and hosting international conferences?405 Why 
do judges who are already highly sophisticated about foreign law, and who 
learn relatively little of substance from actual dialogue with foreign jurists, 
nevertheless place a premium upon participating in such dialogue?406 Why 
would judges ever cite foreign law to a greater degree than they themselves 
consider necessary?407 Without the concept of judicial diplomacy, all of these 
practices are somewhat mystifying. But the idea that courts pursue diplomatic 
objectives and compete for prestige and influence makes sense of all of them.  
 The phenomenon of judicial diplomacy poses an obvious challenge to 
traditional conceptions of the role and function of constitutional courts. But 
its arrival on the global scene seems inevitable. Constitutional courts have 
long occupied the grey area between law and politics.408 In the face of 
globalization, it should come as no surprise that they have begun to blur the 
distinction between law and diplomacy as well. The more that courts 
interact with one another, the less likely that they will concern themselves 
 
403 The JSC, KCC, and TCC, for example, all operate English-language websites that feature 
English translations of their decisions. See Decisions, CONST. CT. KOREA, http:// 
english.ccourt.go.kr (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://www.perma.cc/3BAE-RG48 
(select “Decisions” from the title bar); Interpretations, JUD. YUAN, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/ 
constitutionalcourt/en/p03.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A3C2-LAJQ; 
Judgments of the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/ 
judgments/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3BAE-RG48. 
404 See supra subsection III.D.6 (discussing the KCC’s Constitutional Research Institute). 
405 See supra Section III.E (describing the KCC’s role in organizing and hosting various 
international judicial groups and conferences). 
406 See supra text accompanying notes 358-59 (observing that various members of the JSC, 
KCC, and TCC were all hard-pressed to identify cases in which J2J interaction had taught them 
“something truly new or unfamiliar” about foreign law). 
407 See supra note 354 and accompanying text (describing a high-ranking Hong Kong judge’s 
encouragement to err on the side of citing British law, even if citation is not strictly necessary, as a 
way of reassuring external audiences that the legal system in Hong Kong continues to meet 
international standards). 
408 Hans Kelsen’s rationale for advocating separate constitutional courts, and for excluding 
human rights from constitutions, was that constitutional adjudication (and rights adjudication in 
particular) commingles law and politics and contaminates the judiciary by turning judges into 
lawmakers. See Miguel Schor, Judicial Review and American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 46 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 535, 554-55 (2008) (describing Kelsen’s acknowledgment of the “political 
nature” of constitutional law and the character of constitutional adjudication as “lawmaking”); 
Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review—And Why It May Not Matter, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2767-68 (2003) (noting Kelsen’s opposition to adjudication of rights claims 
for fear that “judges would become the lawmakers” and thereby invite “political backlash”). 
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only with the reactions of domestic audiences, and the more likely it 
becomes that they will behave in ways intended to influence those in other 
countries. Sustained interaction among judges of talent and ambition is 
bound to give rise to a desire for recognition and prestige on the part of 
some participants.409 Meanwhile, the multiplication of hybrid political 
arrangements that combine traditional states with supranational governance 
and autonomous regions410 increasingly places courts in the position of 
having to formulate quasi-diplomatic strategies for defining and navigating 
novel relationships among competing sovereigns. 
 Judicial diplomacy and judicial dialogue are both metaphors for the 
cross-border interaction that transpires among courts, but they emphasize 
very different aspects of that interaction. Whereas the dialogue metaphor 
implies communication among open-minded peers for the sake of mutual 
learning and reasoned problem-solving,411 the diplomacy metaphor evokes a 
world in which competing courts jockey for influence and prestige and the 
outcome of their competition depends on factors that are more geopolitical 
than intellectual in nature. The dialogue metaphor certainly paints the more 
flattering picture of judicial behavior, but it does not capture the whole 
truth. Transnational judicial interaction in the twenty-first century is not 
simply an exercise in collective learning or intellectual debate. It is also, as 
the diplomacy metaphor suggests, an exercise in power politics. 
The political and diplomatic dimensions of transnational judicial interac-
tion are highly evident in East Asia. For the HKCFA, heavy reliance on 
foreign jurists and foreign law is a way of asserting and reinforcing the 
autonomy from the PRC that Hong Kong is supposed to enjoy pursuant to 
 
409 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among 
Men (arguing that social interaction causes people first to compare themselves to others, then to seek 
superiority over others) (“Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked at 
himself, and public esteem acquired a price.”), reprinted in THE DISCOURSES AND OTHER EARLY 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 113, 166 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1755). 
410 See James N. Rosenau, Governance in a New Global Order (coining the term “fragmegration” 
to describe the ongoing “clash between globalization, centralization and integration on the one hand, 
and localization, decentralization and fragmentation on the other,” which has resulted in a “bifurcated 
system” that combines traditional nation-states with a competing “multicentric system” of both 
supranational and local authorities), in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION: POWER, AUTHORITY AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 70, 70-73 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002). 
411 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 12, at 70 (describing a “growing dialogue” among constitu-
tional court judges “around the world on the issues that arise before them” that “both contribute[s] 
to a nascent global jurisprudence on particular issues and improve[s] the quality of their particular 
national decisions”); Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 531 (“The metaphor of dialogue 
is . . . attractive because it both implies and promises that all participants are both entitled and 
empowered to speak. . . . Dialogue is supposed to be inclusive, and it is supposed to involve 
mutual engagement. Therein lies much of its appeal.”). 
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treaty arrangements. For the TCC, efforts to interact with other courts 
become delicate exercises in diplomacy because such interaction circumvents 
Taiwan’s lack of diplomatic recognition and runs the risk of antagonizing the 
PRC. For the KCC, mastery of foreign law and engagement with interna-
tional organizations are elements of a multi-pronged strategy aimed at 
winning regional and global influence. 
Such influence will not be easily won. Any court that wishes to claim the 
mantle of constitutional leadership in East Asia must contend with the twin 
titans of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the U.S. Supreme 
Court.412 A current jurisprudential map of the region would depict a tug-of-
war between two constitutional superpowers, with Germany regaining the 
upper hand in Taiwan while the United States gains strength in Korea. But 
the KCC’s prospects are improved by the fact that the JSC is a fast-fading 
competitor. Notwithstanding the formidable historical advantages conferred 
by the colonial imposition of Japanese law, the loss of interest in Japanese 
constitutional law among Japan’s closest neighbors is palpable.413  
Even if judicial diplomacy can help a well-funded court from a mid-
sized country such as Korea to become more influential and prestigious 
within a particular region, success on a worldwide scale may remain elusive. 
The globalization of constitutional law is characterized not only by the 
emergence of generic or universal elements, but also by the persistence of 
distinct constitutional families.414 Judging from the patterns of judicial 
comparativism seen in East Asia, it is difficult for constitutional courts to 
exercise influence outside their own networks.415 This appears to be true for 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which is prominent and well-respected yet lacks 
a dedicated following outside the civil law world that is commensurate with 
 
412 See Overview, supra note 176 (announcing that the KCC used its hosting of the World  
Conference on Constitutional Justice as an opportunity to promote “beyond Asia” a “Korean system 
of constitutional justice” that “differs from the German or U.S. models”); Telephone Interview with 
Unnamed Official, supra note 127 (reporting that former KCC Chief Justice Lee Kang-Kook viewed 
the courts of Germany, Austria, and the United States as embodying “mainstream constitutional 
jurisprudence,” and noting a “general consensus” in Korean constitutional circles that the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and U.S. Supreme Court are the “big two”). 
413 See supra Section III.C (discussing the KCC’s growing indifference to Japanese constitu-
tional jurisprudence); supra note 192 and accompanying text & Section IV.C (describing the 
declining influence of Japanese constitutional jurisprudence in Taiwan). 
414 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 6, at 1221-26, 1243 (concluding on the basis of an empirical 
analysis of constitutional drafting patterns that global constitutionalism is characterized by both “a 
strong and growing generic component” and an ideological divide between two families of 
constitutions, one of which draws heavily upon the “Anglo-American legal tradition”). 
415 See Chang & Yeh, supra note 44, at 1175 (“Trans-regional discourse [among constitutional 
courts] is rare, and even if it does occur, it usually takes place between courts of the same legal 
family, civil law or common law.”). 
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its reputation.416 Likewise, the Canadian Supreme Court and South African 
Constitutional Court are both praised for their global influence,417 yet 
neither has established a foothold in East Asia outside the common law 
outpost of Hong Kong.418 Just as the influence of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms on constitutional drafting appears to be confined 
largely to the common law world,419 it may be that the Canadian Supreme 
Court and South African Constitutional Court carry little weight beyond a 
niche market of other common law courts in the English-speaking world.  
The traditional cleavage between civil law and common law countries has 
not disappeared in the face of globalization but instead lingers in the form of 
jurisprudential networks and spheres of influence. It is consequently a grave 
error for English-speaking scholars to assume that the practice of compara-
tivism in their own countries resembles the practice of comparativism in the 
rest of the world. Scholars have already noted the existence of a “Common-
wealth model of constitutionalism” defined by distinctive forms of judicial 
 
416 The influence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is, of course, not exclusively limited to civil law 
countries. See, e.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 47 (noting the Israeli Supreme Court’s citation of 
constitutional jurisprudence from Germany in addition to a variety of common law countries); Navot, 
supra note 90, at 145 fig.4 (reporting that 5.5% of the Israeli Supreme Court’s foreign law citations are 
to Germany). Not even Israel, however, offers especially strong evidence that civil law courts enjoy 
influence outside the civil law world. First, Israel is not a purely common law jurisdiction but instead 
has both common law and civil law characteristics. See JuriGlobe–World Legal Systems: Mixed Legal 
Systems, U. OTTAWA, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/sys-mixtes.php (last visited Feb. 
28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VJG7-ZLNL (classifying Israel as possessing a “mixed system” 
of civil law, common law, Jewish law and Muslim law). Second, notwithstanding its mixed legal 
heritage, Israel still exhibits a bias in favor of other common law jurisdictions, with Germany 
constituting the exception to the rule. See HIRSCHL, supra note 11, at 43 (noting that the Israeli 
Supreme Court most frequently cites “American, Canadian, British, and German rulings”); Navot, 
supra note 90, at 145-47 (highlighting the dominance of citations to common law jurisdictions, and 
deeming the Israeli Supreme Court’s “minimal number of references to continental 
courts . . . surprising in view of the fact that several constitutional-institutional issues that the ISC 
addressed are addressed by European countries as well”). 
417 See sources cited supra note 98. 
418 Even in Hong Kong, references to South African jurisprudence are rare. See Young, supra 
note 242, at 82 tbl.10 (reporting that only 2% of the HKCFA’s case law citations are to “other 
national courts,” a category that includes all courts in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and 
all parts of Europe apart from the United Kingdom); Interview with Justice B, supra note 244 
(indicating that Canadian and South African decisions are cited less frequently than other 
jurisdictions because they are “not cited as often to us by counsel,” but that Canada is still cited 
“more than South Africa”). 
419 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 818-21 (finding “robust and growing constitutional 
similarity between Canada and other members of the common law family” and concluding that 
“Canada is, at least to some degree, a constitutional trendsetter among common law countries,” but 
finding no evidence that Canada is emulated by “the rest of the world”). 
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review420 and packages of constitutional rights.421 The indifference of  
Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese courts to the leading lights of the common 
law world underscores yet another characteristic of the Commonwealth 
model—namely, membership in a somewhat insular jurisprudential network 
that not everyone necessarily cares to join.422  
The ECtHR and the U.S. Supreme Court may be the only courts that 
truly bridge the divide between these two jurisprudential networks. At 
present, they are the only common points of reference for constitutional 
courts throughout East Asia. In the case of the ECtHR, there is no shortage 
of explanations for this crossover appeal. First, the court itself belongs to 
both networks: its jurisdiction and its expertise span a combination of civil 
law and common law countries.423 Second, the ECtHR is a mouthpiece for 
constitutional jurisprudence in an entire region of the world. To follow the 
ECtHR is to follow the practice of not just one or two countries, but forty-
seven countries,424 many of which are highly prestigious in their own right. 
Any appeal to the existence of widely shared norms or practices is thus 
 
420 Stephen Gardbaum, Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 8 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 167, 167-68 (2010) (identifying a “new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism” 
in the form of institutional variants of judicial review that seek to reconcile parliamentary and 
judicial supremacy). 
421 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 821 (finding evidence of a constitutional “split  
between common law countries and the rest of the world” in the form of the emergence of a 
“Commonwealth model of constitutionalism” that encompasses “not only a set of institutional 
mechanisms for reconciling judicial and legislative power, but also a set of substantive rights 
guarantees and limitations”); Law & Versteeg, supra note 6, at 1170, 1221-25 (finding as an empirical 
matter that constitutions divide ideologically into “statist” and “libertarian” camps, the latter of 
which is characterized by the inclusion of historically “Anglo-American” rights provisions that 
“epitomize a common law tradition of negative liberty and, more specifically, judicial protection 
from detention or bodily harm at the hands of the state”). 
422 See, e.g., BOBEK, supra note 11, at 84-87, 95 (discussing the strong tendency of British courts 
to cite courts from other Commonwealth countries rather than other European countries, “even when 
interpreting European laws of a unified European asylum system,” and observing that “in the cases in 
which English judges have a choice left as to the authority they wish to rely upon . . . their attention 
remains fixed on the English-speaking common law countries outside of Europe”); Flanagan & 
Ahern, supra note 11, at 21 (reporting that eleven out of forty-three respondents to a survey of 
supreme court judges from common law jurisdictions indicated that “in a judgment about domestic 
rights,” they would cite foreign law only from other common law jurisdictions); Gentili, supra note 
309, at 57-59 & 57 tbl.2, 59 graph 4 (reporting that roughly 95% of the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
citations to foreign precedent are to decisions from common law jurisdictions).  
423 See EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, JUDGES OF THE COURT SINCE 1959 (2015), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/List_judges_since_1959_ENG.pdf (listing all 
judges who have served on the ECtHR since 1959, including a number from Ireland and the 
United Kingdom). 
424 See Our Member States, COUNCIL EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-
member-states (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8BSG-V7FP (listing the 
member states of the Council of Europe). 
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bolstered if the jurisprudence of the ECtHR can be invoked. Third, the 
substantial overlap between the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), which the ECtHR is charged with enforcing, and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)425 means that courts 
faced with the task of interpreting the ICCPR or analogous instruments 
have a natural reason to consider the case law of the ECtHR.426  
The crossover appeal of the U.S. Supreme Court, by comparison, cannot 
be taken for granted. Not only does the Supreme Court lack the aforemen-
tioned advantages of the ECtHR, but there is also mounting evidence that 
the global influence of American constitutionalism is in decline.427 The 
persistence of the Court’s influence in a particular corner of the globe is 
open to a number of possible explanations. It may be that East Asia is 
atypically receptive to American influence, for example, or that foreign 
interest in American constitutional jurisprudence still has a long way to fall 
before it disappears. The latter view is more than plausible. The U.S. 
Supreme Court pioneered the practice of judicial review and continues to 
boast one of the most extensive bodies of constitutional jurisprudence in the 
world. Even if constitutional courts elsewhere have indeed grown increas-
ingly lukewarm toward its work, the recognition and prestige that it earned 
over the course of two centuries are unlikely to dissipate overnight.  
It is increasingly clear, however, that the Court faces greater competi-
tion than ever for the attention of foreign audiences. Other courts are now 
at least as eager to export their own jurisprudence, and the forces of globali-
zation only make it easier for them to do so. Whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s influence overseas will endure in the face of old rivals and new 
challengers alike is likely to depend on factors as diverse as the availability 
of overseas scholarships,428 the attractiveness of the U.S. legal market, and 
 
425 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 845 (“The ECHR, like the ICCPR, primarily features 
traditional, first-generation civil and political rights.”). 
426 See, e.g., Lam Siu Po v. Comm’r of Police, [2009] 12 H.K.C.F.A.R. 237, 263B (C.F.A.) 
(H.K.) (deeming the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on article 6(1) of the ECHR “of immediate relevance” 
to interpretation of article 14.1 of the ICCPR “notwithstanding certain differences in wording”). 
427 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 1, at 766-68, 799-804 (summarizing the existing literature 
on the declining influence of American constitutional jurisprudence, and documenting empirically 
the declining influence of the U.S. Constitution on constitutional drafting practices); id. at 768 & 
n.18 (reviewing various empirical studies to the effect that “citation to U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions by foreign courts is in fact on the decline”); Liptak, supra note 98 (reporting that foreign 
courts are paying decreasing attention to American jurisprudence, particularly in the area of 
constitutional rights). 
428 German and American investment in the education of foreign lawyers has paid tangible 
dividends in Taiwan. Historically, the prevalence of citations to German law as opposed to U.S. 
law has tracked the balance of power on the TCC between former Deutsche Akademischer Austausch 
Dienst scholars (funded by Germany) and former Fulbright scholars (funded by the United States). 
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the status of English as the lingua franca of law and commerce. But a little 
judicial diplomacy could not hurt either.   
 
See Law & Chang, supra note 11, at 576-77 & 577 n.18. Germany also invests in the training of 
foreign lawyers via the government-funded Humboldt Foundation, which counts various 
prominent foreign jurists among the recipients of its fellowships. See, e.g., Press Release, Alexan-
der von Humboldt Found., Humboldtian Elected President of Hungary ( June 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.humboldt-foundation.de/web/33749.html (hailing the election of Laszlo Solyom, 
former chairman of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and former Humboldt Fellow, as 
President of Hungary). 
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